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Errata 
• page 61, line 1 
"first" should be "second" 
• page 61, line 5 
"second" should be "first" 
• page 63, paras (1)(i) and (1)(ii) 
The text of these two paragraphs should be reversed. 
• page 78, Theorem 8.2.2 
"EInstTab(/345)" is omitted from the statement of the theorem. 
• page 78, sentence on last two lines 
"Errab" should be "EInstTab" throughout this sentence (3 occurrences). 
Analytic Proof Systems for Classical and Modal Logics of Restricted Quantification 
Ian Gent 
Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the relationship between proof systems for propositional logic 
and for logics of restricted quantification incorporating restriction theories. Such logics 
are suitable for the study of special purpose reasoning as part of a larger system, an 
important research topic in automated reasoning. Also, modal and sorted logics can be 
expressed in this way. Thus, results on restricted quantification apply to a wide range 
of useful logics. D'Agostino's "expansion systems" are used to generalise results to 
apply to a variety of tableau-like propositional proof systems. 
A certain class of propositional expansion systems is defined, and extended for 
restricted quantification in two different ways. The less general, but more useful, 
extension is proved sound and complete provided that the restriction theory can be 
expressed as a set of definite Horn clauses. 
In the definite clauses case, the result is used to present a generalisation of Wallen's 
matrix characterisations of validity for modal logics. The use of restricted 
quantification enables more logics to be covered than Wallen did, and the use of 
expansion systems allows analogues of matrices to be defined for proof systems other 
than tableaux. 
To derive the results on matrices, the calculi for restricted quantification are made 
weaker, and so can be unsound for some restriction theories. However, much greater 
order independence of rule applications is obtained, and the weakening is sound if one 
of two new conditions introduced here hold, namely "alphabetical monotonicity" or 
"non-vacuity". Alphabetical monotonicity or non-vacuity are shown to hold for a range 
of interesting restriction theories associated with order sorted logics and some modal 
logics. 
I also show that if non-vacuity holds, then instantiation in restricted quantification can 
be completely separated from propositional reasoning. 
The major problem left open by this thesis is whether analogues of the previous matrix 
characterisations can be produced based on the proof systems introduced for non-
definite clause restriction theories. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
If your thesis is utterly vacuous 
Use first order predicate calculus. 
With sufficient formality 
The sheerest banality 
Will be hailed by the critics: "Miraculous!" 
-- Henry A Kautz 
An important way of improving the efficiency of automated reasoning is to pick out subproblems for 
which efficient inference methods are available, and to build such methods into more general reasoning 
processes. This thesis represents a foundational study of the interface between efficient, special purpose, 
inference and general inference. This is done by the study of the relation between proof systems for first 
order quantified logics and for propositional logic, the quantified logics I consider being logics using 
restricted quantification. This provides a framework in which formulas from a special purpose theory can 
be separated from the rest of a logic: in this thesis I show that this separation can be incorporated into 
proof systems, clearly isolating the special purpose reasoning. 
The two main ideas of restricted quantification can be illustrated very quickly. The first idea is that the 
domain of each quantifier is restricted by a first order predicate. I will take a restricted quantifier to be 
either "ex ,p(x)", read as "for all x such that p(x)", or "ax, p(x)", read as "there is some x such that p(x)". The 
new quantifiers do not add any expressiveness to the ordinary predicate calculus, because "ex,p(x) 4(x)" is 
understood to mean exactly the same as if it had been written "ex (p(x) (1)(X) )" while "a7c, p(x) 0(x)" is 
understood to mean exactly the same as if it had been written "Iv (p(x) A 4(x))". The second idea 
introduces special purpose theories: this is achieved by adding restriction theories to logics of restricted 
quantification. A restriction theory is simply a set of predicate calculus statements in the language of the 
predicates appearing as restrictions. Using restriction theories, both modal logics and sorted logics can be 
expressed very easily as logics of restricted quantification. For instance, in modal logics, we can use the 
simple fact that DO is true in world e iff ew.£R x 0(x). Here, "R" is the usual accessibility relation, and we 
vary its properties by varying the restriction theory. For example, the theory corresponding to S4 
expresses the transitivity and reflexivity of the restriction theory. Again this does not extend the 
expressiveness of restricted quantification beyond that of the predicate calculus, because I will take 
restriction theories to be first order. 
Restricted quantification provides an excellent framework for the study of the link between special 
purpose inference methods and general methods. It gives us a a simple framework for expressing that one 
part of a logic is to be considered as a special purpose theory. As a result, it is possible to construct proof 
systems which very clearly isolate special purpose reasoning from general reasoning: doing this forms 
the subject of this thesis. 
As mentioned above, modal logics can be expressed using restricted quantification. Automated reasoning 
for modal logics has been a considerable research subject in recent years. Despite the presence of the 
accessibility theory in the semantics of modal logics, most workers have used indirect methods to reason 
with this while those who have reasoned explicitly with the accessibility theory, such as Wallen (1989) 
have done so only in the context of modal logics.' In this thesis I show how my results may be applied to 
modal logics: these results obtain all the advantages of earlier specially designed methods such as 
Wallen's while being much more general. 
This thesis concentrates exclusively on the link between proof systems for propositional logic and proof 
systems for logics of restricted quantification. However, I do not seek to choose one propositional proof 
system, such as analytic tableaux or resolution, and work on first order extensions of that. I avoid the 
choice of a particular propositional proof system by using D'Agostino's (1990) definition of an expansion 
system, which generalises many proof systems. There is very little theoretical basis for the choice of a 
particular propositional proof system as optimal, given the lack of formal knowledge concerning the 
properties of different propositional systems for proof search: therefore it is better to discuss techniques 
that can be applied to a variety of propositional proof systems. I discuss this important point further in 
Section 1.2 of this introduction, since it is a point most workers in this field have missed, with the 
exception of Frisch (1991). 
The first order proof systems presented in this thesis are all ground proof systems; that is, every 
application of every proof rule for quantification must introduce explicit terms. Proof systems 
introducing free variables in which unification is used are not considered. This is not to underestimate the 
importance of unification in automated reasoning. Instead, it is to claim that in my study of extending 
propositional proof systems for restricted quantification, unification is not an issue. The study of 
unification problems is a research topic in itself, and I could not do it justice in the scope of this thesis. 
My contributions can be much more effectively expressed than if I included particular unification 
algorithms, possibly using non optimal ones and confusing the contributions I make. 
The results obtained in this thesis represent the isolation and generalisation of earlier insights which have 
been used to develop automated reasoning systems. This represents a notable contribution to the 
development of automated reasoning as a science. By generalisation of an insight, useful techniques can 
be applied to a wider range of problems. By isolation of an insight, the basis of a successful technique 
can be seen much more clearly and with less technical detail intervening between an efficient system and 
the understanding of that system. As the processes of isolation and generalisation develop in more 
subfields of automated reasoning, those research workers building reasoning systems can call on ever 
greater bodies of expertise. System designers can make more rational design decisions while having to 
do less theoretical work to justify those decisions. 
In the rest of this introduction I discuss further the results, aims and methods of my work, and then 
present a chapter-by-chapter outline of this thesis. 
Section 1.1: Results 
The only new result in this thesis which concerns propositional logic is a rather minor and easy one. 
Namely, I show how to extend Mondadori's (1989) proof system KE to deal with propositional 
equivalences. 
Apart from the extension of KE, all the other results in this thesis concern extending propositional 
expansion systems to deal with restricted quantification. 
The main results of this thesis are as follows: 
I show how a certain class of propositional expansion system can be extended to a sound and 
complete proof system for restricted quantification, provided that the restriction theory has what I 
call the "least Herbrand model property". This simply demands that all sets of restrictions have a 
least Herbrand model2 in the restriction theory. This condition is satisfied if the restriction theory 
1  Frisch and Scherl (see references) are most honourable exceptions to this. However they do not consider tableau-style 
or matrix-style proof systems, which are the main subject of this thesis. 
2 Least Herbrand models are also called "unique minimal models" and "initial models" elsewhere in the literature. 
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can be written in definite Horn clauses.3 Such calculi have two interesting and crucial properties. 
First, no branching is introduced into proof trees by the special purpose reasoning associated with 
restricted quantification. Second, reasoning within the restriction theory takes place only when 
checking the side condition on the expansion rule for universal instantiation. Because of these 
properties these calculi form the foundation for the next four results, (2) to (5). The last result, (6), 
concerns the consequences of the least Herbrand model property failing. 
(2) I show how the order dependence of rule applications due to the side condition on universal 
instantiation can be eliminated by the use of a weaker side condition. The resulting proof system is 
sound if one of two new conditions I identify hold, namely "alphabetical monotonicity" or "non-
vacuity". 
(3) I show that alphabetical monotonicity or non-vacuity holds for a range of interesting restriction 
theories, including those associated with order sorted logics and a selection of modal logics. 
(4) I generalise Wallen's (1989) matrix characterisations of validity along two axes: I give the result if 
alphabetical monotonicity or non-vacuity holds; and I define analogues of matrices based on an 
arbitrary countermodel expansion system. 
(5) I show that if non-vacuity holds for a restriction theory, then instantiation in restricted quantification 
can be completely separated from propositional reasoning. 
(6) I show how to extend propositional countermodel systems to sound and complete systems when the 
least Herbrand model property does not hold. Unlike the proof systems considered at (1), the 
resulting proof systems allow branching when universal instantiation takes place. Whether or not 
analogues of the previous four results can be produced in this case represents the major problem left 
open by this thesis. 
Section 1.2: Aims 
Two main aims lie behind my work. The first is to examine proof systems for restricted quantification. 
The second is to do so by extending propositional proof systems, in as much generality as possible with 
respect to the propositional systems. The worth of both of these aims needs to be justified. 
Restricted quantification, as presented in this thesis, allows one to separate out syntactically one kind of 
logical information (that from the restriction theory) from another (that of ordinary logical information). 
This has long been recognised as being useful "syntactic sugar" although it does not extend the 
expressiveness of a logic (see for instance Hailperin 1957a, 1957b). If a logic can be expressed by 
restricted quantification in such a way that the restriction theory is very simple, and all references to the 
restriction theory appear only in restrictions, then reasoning about restrictions can be efficiently 
implemented without full predicate logic reasoning. A particular use of this kind of separation has been 
made in sorted logics, where this type of syntactic separation can improve the efficiency of automated 
theorem proving (see for example Cohn's (1989a) survey paper). In sorted logics the theory is often 
extremely simple This emphasises the difference between reasoning in the theory (perhaps taking linear 
or quadratic time) and reasoning outside the theory (which is undecidable). 
Many logics of particular interest can be expressed very simply as logics of restricted quantification. 
Examples are modal logics and sorted logics. Modal logics have been studied because of the usefulness 
of modalities in expressing concepts such as knowledge and belief (see for example Halpern and Moses 
1985). Many-sorted logics have been studied because their use can improve the efficiency of deduction 
(see for example Cohn 1989a). For these logics, many special purpose proof systems have been 
developed to take account of the separation of information between the accessibility theory and the rest of 
the logic (in modal logics) or between the sort theory and the rest of the logic (in sorted logics). Until the 
recent work of Frisch (1991) and Biirckert (1990a), no work in automated reasoning focused on the more 
3 Definite Horn clauses are clauses in which at exactly one positive literal appears. 
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general framework of restricted quantification. Therefore it has been difficult to appreciate the 
fundamental insights lying behind many of the proof systems developed for these logics. The work of 
Frisch and Biirckert has begun to show that the same insights used to develop proof systems for modal or 
sorted logics can be used in the general context. This thesis justifies this further. Therefore there is a 
simple reason for studying proof systems for restricted quantification: we obtain a great deal of generality 
and lose very little efficiency in the resulting proof systems. 
In this thesis I do not extend particular propositional proof systems to restricted quantification: instead I 
show how whole classes of propositional proof systems may be extended. There are two reasons for this. 
First, many results about extending propositional proof systems to quantificational proof systems can be 
generalised so there is no point restricting the results. Second, the basic properties of propositional proof 
systems for proof search are very little known. Therefore any commitment to quantified systems based 
on a particular propositional system risks being the wrong commitment. The first point is simple, but I 
will discuss the second further in the rest of this section. It seems to have been missed by most authors, 
judging by the fact that most authors who deal with sorted logics, modal logics, or restricted 
quantification only consider extensions of particular propositional proof systems. 
There is, sadly, very little knowledge concerning the relationship between proof search in different 
propositional proof systems. A body of fine work, starting with Cook and Reckhow (1974, 1979), has 
established some worst case results for individual proof systems and some results about the relationships 
between size of proofs in different proof systems. However, many of these results are not sufficient to 
relate the properties of proof search in different proof systems. 
A typical example of a result relating proof size in different proof systems is given by Boolos (1984). He 
shows there is a class of formulas whose shortest proofs in a natural deduction system (that of Mates 
1972) can be exponentially shorter than their shortest proofs in an analytic tableaux system. 
Unfortunately, even this kind of devastating result is not conclusive for proof search. Although we can be 
sure that the tableau proof cannot be found in better than exponential time, we cannot be sure that the 
natural deduction proof can be found in a shorter time by a general purpose theorem proving method. 
As well as not being necessarily suitable for considerations of proof search, such results can be rather 
surprising. This means that judgements of the desirability of different proof systems must be based on 
only the most rigorous results, and such results are usually not available. A recent, startling, example 
relating truth tables and analytic tableaux, is due to D'Agostino (personal communication 1991, 
conjectured in D'Agostino 1990). It is easy to construct examples showing that the size of analytic 
tableaux can be exponentially smaller than truth tables, and it has been widely assumed that tableaux are 
a uniform improvement on truth tables. D'Agostino quotes noted authors who have implied this, 
including Beth (1958) (one of the inventors of tableaux) as well as introductory textbooks by Gallier 
(1987) and Jeffrey (1981). D'Agostino has shown that this assumption is mistaken: on certain classes of 
examples, analytic tableaux must be exponentially larger than the equivalent truth tables. 
Unfortunately, formal results relating proof search in different proof systems are rarer than results on the 
maximum size of proofs. An example is again due to D'Agostino (1990). He shows that any proof 
search strategy for analytic tableaux can be simulated in Mondadori's (1989) system KE. Furthermore, 
the simulation can always be done in linear time, but in some cases leads to proofs very much more 
quickly than in the tableaux. Gore and D'Agostino (1991) show some empirical consequences of this 
result. Bibel (1982) also studies the theoretical relationship between various propositional theorem 
proving methods. 
It is rather disturbing that theoretical uncertainties about the relationship between different proof systems 
appear for propositional logic. The situation for quantified logic can only be worse. 
Faced with the lack of theoretical comparisons, it is tempting to think that we can turn to empirical tests 
of different automated theorem provers to form a judgement about their worth. Unfortunately we have no 
real insight how to construct valid empirical tests. Concentration on single examples such as Schubert's 
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steamroller (Stickel 1986) is rather pointless, while even such useful lists as Pelletier's (1986) list of 
seventy five problems beg the question of how they were constructed. Such examples, and other 
researchers' results on them, should certainly be used as guides if one is implementing an automated 
theorem prover, but they provide little basis for a strong belief in the superiority of one method over 
another. In this I strongly disagree with Wos's statement that 
"Different reasoning programs and different approaches within a reasoning program should be 
compared and analyzed in detail by gathering statistics from attempts to answer questions and 
solve problems; the statistics concerning CPU seconds, of course adjusted for the type of 
computer being used, are especially significant." (Wos 1988, page 28, Research Principle 2) 
I prefer instead, at least for judging the effectiveness of different theorem proving methods, Wallen's 
maxim that 
If you can prove that it's better, it's not worth implementing; and if you can't prove that it's 
better, it's not worth implementing. (Wallen, personal communication4 1989) 
Unfortunately, whether or not one seeks empirical tests of theorem provers, no body of examples such as 
Pelletier's is available for restricted quantification. This can be clearly illustrated by considering modal 
logics. Standard examples of theorems from textbooks such as Hughes and Cresswell (1968) can be 
proved by rather simple methods such as Morgan's (1976) yet few more complex examples have arisen in 
the literature. Fitting and Mints have been pleading at conferences for such a set of examples,5 but none 
appears to be forthcoming. Indeed, there is very little published material concerning implementations of 
modal logic theorem provers, even for a non standard set of examples. Even authors such as Fitting 
(1988) and Wallen and Wilson (1987), in papers explicitly discussing implementations, do not give 
examples of theorems that had been proved using their systems. There is at least some hope. Modal and 
temporal logics seem to be coming in to some favour as tools in artificial intelligence and theoretical 
computer science (see for example Atkinson and Cunningham 1991, Torsun and Manning 1990, Gent 
1991a). These fields may well provide a range of non-trivial examples. 
From this discussion it can be seen that there is no good reason to choose one propositional proof system 
over another, either in general or for extension to restricted quantification. Yet the choice of what might 
turn out to be the wrong system runs the risk of wasting a lot of work. So there are considerable 
advantages to be gained from avoiding premature choice of a propositional proof system. In this thesis I 
avoid this choice by using a general formalisation of refutation based proof systems, namely expansion 
systems. 
Section 1.3: Methods 
My aim has been to explore the link between proof systems for propositional logic and restricted 
quantification. I have tried to do this using methods of as much generality as possible. 
First, D'Agostino's (1990) formalisation of expansion systems allows results to be generalised across a 
variety of propositional proof systems. Furthermore, it provides a sound basis for such general results, 
because one can easily express properties such as soundness and completeness of expansion systems. In 
this thesis I provide formal proofs of results for restricted quantification based on such properties of 
propositional expansion systems. 
Starting with propositional expansion systems as my base, I show how these can be extended in a very 
simple way to proof systems for restricted quantification. This is the principal use in this thesis of a 
semantic argument for deriving proof systems for restricted quantification. By choosing a simple 
extension of propositional proof systems, the semantic argument is kept as simple as possible, and the 
resulting characterisation of validity is also as simple as possible. This then provides an excellent 
4 by telephone, hence the lack of quotation marks. 
5 At two separate conferences I have attended Fitting has made this plea, crediting it to Mints. 
-5- 
starting point for developing other proof systems for restricted quantification. Having used the semantic 
argument to give a relatively simple characterisation of validity, I subject the resulting proof systems to a 
considerable amount of syntactic, proof theoretical, analysis. 
Syntactic arguments relate two different proofs, which are always finite objects. This can be a 
considerable advantage over semantic arguments, which must relate syntax to infinite objects such as 
models. This enables me to discuss a wide range of proof systems based on the ones derived 
semantically, with the intention of deriving more computationally sensitive characterisations of validity. 
Using this approach gives more insight than the bare results: the various conditions on the theorems in 
this thesis can all be seen to arise at particular places. Different conditions arise from what is required of 
propositional systems, of the restriction theory to extend these systems for restricted quantification, and 
again of the restriction theory in the derivation of later proof systems. These conditions arise separately, 
so the reasons for each can be seen separately and in perfect context. 
In summary, my approach is to use just one semantic argument, deriving a possibly inefficient proof 
system, and then apply syntactic arguments to derive more efficient proof systems. This seems to me to 
be a very natural approach. The concept of computationally efficient proof systems is not directly related 
to the semantics of logics. It is, however, a relationship between different syntactic entities, namely proof 
systems. By the explicit use of syntactic arguments which relate different proof systems, this relationship 
is made clear. Indeed, these syntactic arguments are motivated by a desire to derive computationally 
efficient proof systems. In particular, the main motivation is to derive proof systems in which the order 
dependence between different parts of a proof is minimised. This follows from the observation that the 
fact that the order dependence between different proof rules is a major source of inefficiency in proof 
search. I consider this observation, from Wallen (1986), to be crucial. Deriving the same range of proof 
systems, each by a separate semantic argument, would make this point less clear. 
This description of my methods does not apply to the final new result presented in this thesis, namely the 
extension of propositional proof systems in the case that the restriction theory does not satisfy the least 
Herbrand model property. This last result is proved semantically, with no further proof theoretical 
analysis. The success of the analysis of the earlier systems gives good ground for suggesting that such 
analysis should be applied to this more complicated case. 
Section 1.4: Chapter by Chapter Outline 
In Chapter 2 I introduce formal details of restricted quantification, including syntax and semantics as well 
as an extension of Smullyan's (1968) uniform notation to restricted quantification. I also discuss briefly 
how modal logics may be expressed by restricted quantification. 
In Chapter 3 I introduce the framework within which I present proof systems throughout this thesis. This 
is D'Agostino's (1990) formalisation of "expansion systems". I choose this framework because many 
proof systems can be expressed naturally in it, as can the proof rules I present later to deal with restricted 
quantification. The archetypal expansion system is analytic tableau, proofs being branching trees and 
branches being terminated by explicit contradictions. However, resolution, for example, can be expressed 
easily as an expansion system. I also introduce Mondadori's (1989) tree structured proof system KE, 
which D'Agostino has shown to be of considerable interest because of its naturalness and advantageous 
proof theoretical properties. 
In Chapter 3 I discuss various important properties of importance in expansion systems, such as 
soundness and completeness. In particular, a common argument in showing the completeness of tree 
based proof systems is that branches can be expanded systematically to ensure that no part of the search 
space is omitted. I show that this argument can be generalised to all expansion systems. Also, I formally 
distinguish between those expansion systems, like tableaux and KE, where a failed proof enables us to 
construct a countermodel, and expansion systems like resolution, where this is not so easy. I call the 
former "countermodel" expansion systems. This distinction is important because countermodel 
expansion systems can be extended for restriction quantification more easily than non-countermodel 
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systems. 
In Chapter 4 I introduce a first extension of propositional expansion systems to restricted quantification. 
This is done by the introduction of new expansion rules for existential and universal quantifiers. 
Expansion of existentials introduces the restriction on the quantifier explicitly. The rules may only be 
applied if certain side conditions are satisfied at the point of expansion. The crucial side condition applies 
to the universal rule, and demands that the explicit restrictions on the branch force the restriction on the 
universal to be satisfied. This expansion system does not introduce any new branching structure into 
proofs. Furthermore, the restriction theory need only be considered when checking the side conditions. 
The advantage of this first proof system is that it is complete for a very wide range of restriction theories, 
namely for any theory satisfying a simple semantic condition, that each set of restrictions has a least 
Herbrand model. However, completeness only holds for countermodel expansion systems. 
The fact that theory reasoning is incorporated solely into one side condition in the proof systems of 
Chapter 4 means that restricted quantification introduces no extra propositional reasoning more than 
unrestricted quantification. Also, the fact that the system is sound and complete in a very general case 
means that further study can identify particular subcases where refinements can be made. These 
properties of the systems of Chapter 4 make them extremely suitable for further study, as the next four 
chapters show. Much of this study concerns the elimination of order dependence of expansion rule 
application, arising from the side conditions in the proof systems. 
In Chapter 5 I identify two important extra properties of restriction theories which allow the reduction of 
the order dependence of expansions in a proof. Whereas in Chapter 4, where the precise point in a tree 
where a universal expansion is applied is crucial to the satisfaction of the side condition, one can use a 
slightly weaker side condition, with the result that this order dependence is reduced. This weaker side 
condition relies only on global properties of a proof for its satisfaction. In Chapter 5 I identify a 
condition I call "alphabetical monotonicity". This ensures that the weaker side condition is still sound. 
Unfortunately, this soundness relies on the presence of another side condition which retains a lesser 
degree of order dependence. So I show that a stronger condition than alphabetical monotonicity, which I 
call "non-vacuity", means that this other side condition can be omitted while retaining soundness. 
Where non-vacuity holds, the only order dependence left in trees comes from the standard eigenvariable 
condition on existential expansions, that a name introduced from an existential formula must be a new 
name. This can be dealt with in ways well known from theorem proving in classical first order logic, as I 
discuss later in the thesis. 
In Chapter 6 I give proofs of the satisfaction of alphabetical monotonicity and non-vacuity for various 
restriction theories, concentrating on modal and sorted logics. Non-vacuity is satisfied if the theory leads 
to serial or reflexive modal logics or ensures non-empty sorts in sorted logics. 
In Chapter 7 I discuss one method that has been applied to classical logic for ensuring the satisfaction of 
the eigenvariable condition on existential instantiation. This is the use of reduction orderings due to 
Bibel (1987). The arguments I use are due to Wallen (1986, 1989). First I remove all side conditions 
from the proof systems, meaning that the expansion rules are used just to check for the existence of a 
closed tree. I have already established in Chapter 5 that the side condition using the restriction theory can 
be checked globally. Then, given a tree one can define a binary relation which, when acyclic, ensures that 
a tree satisfying the eigenvariable condition exists. Unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, where 
alphabetical monotonicity holds but non- vacuity does not, a remnant of order dependence remains. This 
has to be catered for by using an unpleasant definition of closure: unpleasant because checking it involves 
more work than the usual definition. (The usual definition of closure is that identical formulas of opposite 
signs occur.) Where non-vacuity holds this usual definition is good enough. The work of this chapter 
generalises Wallen's (1989) approach to matrix characterisations of validity for modal logics. Unlike 
Wallen and Bibel, however, I do not discuss how matrices should be represented, or how to implement a 
theorem prover based on the characterisation of validity I derive in this chapter. 
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I showed earlier that where non-vacuity holds, no order dependence of expansion rules arises from the 
restriction theory. This means that the nature of propositional miles is irrelevant. The quantifier 
instantiation rules of Chapter 4 only applied to explicit quantifiers, and was only complete for 
countermodel expansion systems. In Chapter 8 I show that we can apply similar rules to quantifiers 
contained in complex formulas, so long as non-vacuity holds. That is, while before we could only 
instantiate explicit quantifiers, now we can instantiate soundly into formulas whose outermost connective 
is propositional. In this way any propositional proof system can be extended to restricted quantification, 
not just countermodel expansion systems. 
All the work from Chapters 4 to 8 makes the assumption that the restriction theory satisfies the least 
Herbrand model property. In Chapter 9 I drop this assumption. I introduce a new rule for universal 
instantiation and show it to be sound and complete whether or not the least Herbrand model property 
holds. However, the new rule allows branching to occur due to universal instantiation, making it much 
less desirable than the rule from Chapter 4. I do not study the resulting proof systems in depth, as I did 
for the earlier proof systems from Chapter 5 to Chapter 8. Rather, given the work of those chapters, I 
pose the repetition of this work in the new context as a research problem. Solving this problem in a way 
that resulted in efficient proof systems would be of great importance to automated reasoning in logics 
such as temporal logics, whose accessibility theory fails the least Herbrand model property. 
In Chapter 10 I consider work from the literature that is related to mine, as well as giving some 
conclusions and suggestions for further work. 
Also included in this thesis is Appendix 1. Here, I discuss how the correctness of prefixed expansion 
systems like Fitting's prefixed tableaux (1983, Chapter 8) may be deduced from work presented in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 in this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Restricted Quantification 
In this chapter I introduce the syntax and semantics of logics of restricted quantification, logics which are 
the subject of study of this thesis. The basic semantic notion of restricted quantification is simple. 
Instead of usual, unrestricted, quantifiers read as "for all x" and "there is an x" we use restricted 
quantifiers, read as "for all x satisfying p" and "there is an x satisfying p" where p is a restriction. The 
question is, what is a restriction? Hailperin (1957), for example, allows arbitrary first order logic 
formulas. I will only allow instances of predicates to appear as restrictions.1 As well as allowing 
quantification to be restricted, one can write down a theory concerning the restrictions. In this thesis I 
will demand that this theory be expressed in first order logic. I will call the theory a "restriction theory". 
The result is a language very much like Biirckert's (1990a) except that he considers arbitrary theories, 
possibly not expressible in first order logic. Taking this view of restricted quantification gives great 
generality, allowing sorted and modal logics to be expressed very easily. 
In Section 2.1 I introduce formal details of restriction theories. In Section 2.2 I introduce, given a 
restriction theory E, a logic EL of restricted quantification with restrictions from the theory. In Section 
2.3 I give formal semantics for unrestricted and restricted quantification. In Section 2.4 I extend 
Smullyan's (1968) uniform notation to deal with restricted quantification, a uniform notation I will use 
throughout the rest of this thesis. In Section 2.5 I discuss how modal logics may be expressed as logics of 
restricted quantification for appropriate restriction theories. In Section 2.6 I do the same for sorted logics. 
Section 2.1: Restriction Theory E 
I will introduce the notation of a Restriction Theory E. I assume that the language of E consists of some 
number of E-predicates 
(arity 0) p°1, p°2, p03, 
(arity 1) pl i , p12 , p13, 
(arity 2) p2 i, p22, p23,  
etc. 
and that terms in E are built from some collection of variables 
x, y, z,... 
and some collections of E-functions, including constants regarded as functions of no arguments 
(arity 0) f131, f°2, f3, 	 . 
(arity 1) f I 	 f 1 2, f 1 3, • • • 
(arity 2) j•2 1,122, f23,  
etc. 
I As Felix Hovsepian very kindly pointed out to me, I do not need to demand this, at least not until Chapter 5. Howev-
er, it makes presentation slightly easier. 
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Notation 
I have every intention of abusing my notation as much as possible. For instance I will usually 
drop the arity superscript and often the disambiguating subscript, as well as using mnemonic 
names for predicates wherever helpful. 
Definition 2.1.1 (Atom, Clause Syntax) 
An atom is an instance of a predicate with each argument position instantiated with a term. For 
example if p2 is a two-place predicate then p2(x, f (g (y,z))) would be an atom if f and g were 
functions and x, y, and z were variables. 
A clause is an object of the form 
B 1, B2, . . 	 II 1, H2, . . H„ 
where either m or n may be 0, and each B1, H1, is a E-predicate instanced with suitable terms. Each B, 
is said to be in the body of the clause and each Hj in the head of the clause. 
The empty clause is the unique clause in which both m and n are 0. 
A goal clause is a non-empty clause in which n is 0. 
A Horn clause is a non-empty clause in which n is 0 or 1. 
A fact is a Horn clause in which m is 0. 
A definite clause is a clause in which n is 1 (that is, a non-goal Horn clause). 
Definition 2.1.2 (Clause Semantics) 
The empty clause has the value f in any model. 
The semantics of a non-empty clause 
B 1, B 2, . . . Bm 	 H , H 2, . . . H„ 
is given by the first order logic semantics (as defined in Section 2.3) of: 
ex ] ex2 • • • Vxk (B B2A • • • A B,n) 	 (Hi V H2V • • • V HO 
where x , x2, . . . , xk are all the free variables in the clause. 
Definition 2.1.3 (Restriction Theory E) 
A restriction theory E, is any set of clauses using only E-atoms, E-functions, and variables. 
Section 2.2: Logic of Restricted Quantification - EL 
Throughout, I will use the propositional connectives —I (not), A (and), v (or), and (material implication), 
together with the logical constants t (truth) and f (falsity). 
As well as variables, constants, and functions as introduced in Section 2.1, I also assume that we have 
some countably infinite set of names available, including the distinguished name E (which will play a 
special role later) 
E, a 1, a2, a3, . . . 
Names are distinct from constants because names will play a special role (in existential instantiation) in 
the proof systems in this thesis. To ensure names play their correct role I will assume that names are not 
used in the statement of the theory E, although constants might be. Where names are allowed, they may 
be used in terms in the same way as constants. 
Given a restriction theory E, I can define a E-logic EL. The predicates of EL are the predicates of E 
together with some L-predicates: 
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(arity 0) p01,  P 02,  P 03,  
(arity 1) P11, P12, P13, 
(arity 2) P21, P 22,  P23,  
etc. 
Terms in EL are built up from the same variables and functions as in 
functions in EL have to appear in E. However, the fact that all functions 
not mean that E has to say anything about them. 
The crucial feature of EL is that E-literals are built into the syntax 
subformulas of a EL-formula will be known to be E-formulas. This is 
quantifiers into the language of EL. 
A formula quantified by a restricted quantifier is a formula of the form 
Vx ,p(,) 4)(x) 
or 
E. It may seem odd that all 
are officially E-functions does 
of EL in such a way that certain 
achieved by introducing restricted 
3x,p(x) 0(x) 
where p(x) is a E-formula and OW is some EL formula. I will call p(x) the restriction of the 
quantification. I will also demand that E-atoms may only appear as restrictions. 
Definition 2.2.1 (Syntax of a E-logic) 
Given a restriction theory E and a set of L-predicates, the well formed formulas of a E-logic are 
built as follows. 
(i) any L-atom is a well formed formula, as are the formulas t and f. 
(ii) if 4) and v are well formed formulas then so are Only-, OVW, 4) i, 
(iii) if 4) is a well formed formula and p is a E-atom, then Vx,p 4) and 3x, p 4) are both well formed 
formulas. 
Later I define the formal semantics for EL. The semantics of the two restricted quantifiers will be exactly 
as if they were defined in terms of standard unrestricted quantifiers by this relativisation. 
,p(,) 4)(x) =def ex(P(x)4(1(x)) 
and 
:p(x) (1)(x)°def x(p(x)Ail)(x)) 
Note that Vx, p(x) and ay , p(x) are duals in the same way that V and are duals, in that 
Vx,p(x) 
 —14)(x) = -ax:p(x) 
I demand that unrestricted quantifiers occur only in E. This will be convenient to simplify the 
presentation of proof systems in this thesis, and is no restriction to the expressiveness of EL since 
	
Vx 4)(x) 	 Vx,t 4)(x) 
	
x 4)(x) 	 p(x) 
Note that in general Vx,p(x) OW does not imply x,/,(x) OW, because it is possible that the universal 
quantification might be empty: there may be no x such that p(x) holds. It might be that the restriction 
theory ensures that any restricted quantification is non-vacuous. Where this is so, better proof systems 
can be constructed than where vacuous quantification is possible. Indeed, investigation of this point is the 
main subject of Chapters 5 to 8 in this thesis. 
Section 2.3: Semantics of E Logic 
I have expressed the meaning of restricted quantification via a relativisation into classical first order logic. 
Casual readers need not concern themselves with a formal definition of the semantics of E-logic. 
However, I must include such a definition so that I can prove formally that the proof systems I give 
characterise the logic correctly. 
The semantics I give are entirely standard, except for the changes required to incorporate E, and restricted 
quantification. The substance of the following definitions is taken from Fitting (1990b, §5.3). 
Definition 2.3.1 (Model) 
A model M is a pair <D, I> where: 
D is a non-empty set, called the domain of M; 
I is a mapping, called an interpretation that associates: 
to every name a some member al E D; 
to every n-place function symbol f some n-ary function 
Dn D;  
to every n-place relation symbol P some n-ary relation 
P I cDn . 
An assignment in a model M = <D, I> is a mapping A from the set of variables to the set D. We 
denote the image of the variable v under an assignment A by v A. 
Given a model M = <D, I> and an assignment A, we associate each term t with a value tI,A  in D as 
follows: 
1. for a name a, a I'A = ; 
2. for a variable v, v l,A =vA ;  
3. for a function symbol f, 
A = .j 1/1 I,A , 	 ,tnIA (f(t i , 	 — 	 ' 
As well as the usual semantic definitions, and the definition of semantics of restricted quantification, I 
consider sets of formulas to be equivalent to the conjunction of all the formulas in the set. 
Definition 2.3.2 (Semantics) 
1 	 For the atomic cases, (P(t 	 ,t,))"' = t if and only if <t1A, . . 	 ,A> E PI, ti,A  = t, and 
fLA _ f.  
2 	 (—X)" = t if and only if X"=f. 
3 	 (XAY)LA = t if and only if X" = t and 17" = t. 
(XvY)LA = t if and only if XI,A = t or Yl'A = t. 
(XDY)I'A = t if and only if XI,A = f or Y" = t. 
4 	 ( Vx 43(x) )I'A = t if and only if (I)(x)" = t for every assignment B that is an x-variant of A. 
5 	 (fix c13(x) )" = t if and only if c13(x)" = t for some assignment B that is an x-variant of A. 
6 	 ( Vx.p(x)(13(x) )I'A = t if and only if (13(x)" = t for every assignment B that is an x-variant of A 
and such that p(x)" = t. 
7 	 ( ,p(,)43(x) )" = t if and only if c13.(x)" =t for some assignment B that is an x-variant of A 
and such that p(x)" = t. 
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8 	 If S is a set of formulas, then Si' A = t if and only if XI' A = t for each X e S. 
It is trivial to check that the relativisation of the previous section, together with (4) and (5) above, gives 
exactly the same semantics to restricted quantification as (6) and (7). 
Definition 2.3.3 (E-model, E-satisfiable, E-entails, kE, E-valid) 
A E-model is a model of E. 
A formula (13 is true in the model M (or M satisfies t) iff .4" = t for all assignments A. 
A formula (13 is E-satisfiable if and only if there is some E-model which satisfies 0. It is E-
unsatisfiable if and only if it is not E-satisfiable. 
If every E-model that satisfies a set of formulas U = 01, 02, . } also satisfies a formula 0, then U 
E-entails 0. This is written as 
U 	 0 or 01, 02, 
A formula (13 is E-valid if and only if every E-model satisfies 0. 
Section 2.4: The Uniform Notation for Restricted Quantification 
In presenting the proof systems in this thesis, I shall use Smullyan's (1968) elegant idea of uniform 
notation, with a slight adaptation to suit my purposes. The insight behind the uniform notation is that sets 
of logical connectives behave in similar way. The only important distinctions are between those contexts 
where connectives that behave conjunctively, disjunctively, existentially, and universally. That is, in 
considering proof theory we only really have to consider four, schematic, connectives. All other details 
can be captured by listing how each logical connective fits into the schema. 
The proof systems in this thesis will deal with polarised formulas, that is formulas associated with a 
polarity (or sign). It is to polarised formulas that the uniform notation applies. 
Definition 2.4.1 (Polarity, Polarised Formula) 
A polarity is a member of the set {0,1}. 
A polarised formula is a formula associated with a polarity. For example the formula PAQ 
associated with polarity 0 would be written OPAQ. 
For convenience, I will define the semantics of polarities. This will allow me to treat polarised formulas 
as if they were formulas of EL, and to talk meaningfully about polarised formulas being satisfied or not in 
a model. Note that polarities do not become connectives by this move: they may only appear once, at the 
outside of a formula. 
Definition 2.4.2 (Semantics of Polarised Formulas) 
(1 (13)" = t if and only if 4„t, A t.  
(0 (13)" = t if and only if (0,A = f. 
In the uniform notation, there are five types of polarised formulas: literals, a-type, (3-type, 7-type and 8-
type. You can think of an a-type formula as acting as an "and", a I3-type formula as acting as an "or", a 7-
type formula as acting as a universal restricted quantification, and a 8-type formula as acting as an 
existential restricted quantification. 
Definition 2.4.3 (Literal) 
Formulas containing no connectives are called literals. That is, a literal is a polarised formula 00 or 
10 if (I) is a L-atom, or simply p if p is a E-atom. 
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Definition 2.4.4 (a-type formula) 
a formulas act conjunctively. An a formula has two immediate subformulas al and a2. Those 
formulas of type a, and their subformulas, are shown below. 
Formula 
a 
Subformulas 
cc] 	 a2  
10Aw 10 lw 
00vw 00 Ow 
00Dw 10 Ow 
1-0 00 - 
Definition 2.4.5 ((3-type formula) 
A 13 formula has two immediate subformulas, Rt  and 02. The 0-type formulas and their subformulas are 
defined below: 
Formula Subformulas 
13  131 132 
oomv 00 Oiit 
14)viv 10 lw 
10Dw 00 lw 
0-0 10 
The issue of subformulas is more complicated for y and S formulas than for a and (3-type formulas. This 
is because, in a subformula of, say, 1Vx:p(x) 0(x), the quantifier "Vx" disappears and hence we need to 
instantiate the variable x in 10(x) by some name or term. For a particular term t, I shall write 10(t) for this. 
For each term t we must regard 10(0 as a subformula of the original quantification. This is represented in 
the following tables by indexing the subformula by the introduced terms. 
Another point about subformulas of restricted quantifications is how to deal with the restrictions that 
arise. The main subformula of a y or 8 formula will be denoted by yo or so, and will be a polarised 
formula. The restriction of a y or 6-type formula will be denoted by 7, or 6r. To emphasise that 
restrictions are different to normal formulas, they will be unpolarised formulas. For instance, this means 
that expansion rules cannot be applied to any formula (t) or or(t). Certainly any reasoning that takes 
place concerning restrictions will have to be by some special purpose mechanism within a theory. 
Notation 
In this thesis, having arranged that subformulas of y and 6-type formulas are indexed by a 
term, I shall often omit to mention the term where that term is unimportant. For instance, I 
might refer to -to instead of y0(t). 
Definition 2.4.6 (y-type formula) 
y formulas act as universal restricted quantifications. Formulas of type y, and for a given term t their 
subformulas 7,(t) and y0(t) are defined as follows: 
Formula Subformulas 
7 7r(t) y0(t) 
1 Vx,pco p(x) p(t) 1 OW 
0 3x,p(x) p(x) p(t) 0 0(t) 
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Definition 2.4.7 (8-type formula) 
8 formulas act as existential restricted quantifications. Formulas of type 8, and for a given term t 
their subformulas 8,(t) and 60 (t) are defined as follows: 
Formula Subformulas 
8 8,(t) 80(t) 
lx :p(x) 0(x) p(t) 1 OW 
0 e x :p(x) 0(x) p(t) 0 OW 
Section 2.5: Modal Logic as a Logic of Restricted Quantification 
The primary motivation for my work for this thesis was the study of Lincoln Wallen's (1989) matrix 
proof systems for modal logics. In this thesis, it is convenient to regard modal logics as logics of 
restricted quantification, with the restrictions relating to the modal accessibility relation. To emphasise 
this convenience, I shall formally define modal logics in this way. Amongst others, Miura (1983) and 
Ohlbach (1988) have studied the expression of modal logics in this way, based on their Kripke semantics. 
I do not seek to introduce modal logics to readers unfamiliar with them. Such readers should consult an 
introduction to modal logics, such as Hughes and Cresswell (1968), Chellas (1980), or Simmons (1992). 
In this thesis I do not consider non-normal modal logics. Non-normal modal logics are those in which the 
set of formulas true in a world is not forced to be consistent. Most modal logics seen in the literature of 
Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science are normal modal logics. Fitting (1983) discusses theorem 
proving methods for non-normal modal logics. 
Section 2.5.1: Propositional Modal Logic 
We can translate a formula of modal logic to s-logic using the translation function -Cm of one argument. 
Tin (0) = 'Cm E) 
where s is an arbitrary name for a starting world, and the translation function 'cm of two arguments is 
defined in the obvious way for propositional connectives and as follows forOand 0: 
'cm (DO, w) = 	 :wA 'cm (0,x) 
'cm (0(1), w) = 	 'cm (0,x) 
Various conditions on the accessibility relation fR, are defined as follows: 
Theory 
	
Clause 
Seriality 	 wRnext(w) 
Reflexivity 	 ww,w 
Symmetry wicx xRw 
Transitivity 
	 (wYcx A -,VRy ) 	 w 
In the clause for seriality, the function "next" is a skolem function. So for any world w, next(w) is some 
world accessible from w. Note that this is not the same as the interpretation of next in some temporal 
logics, where next(w) refers to the unique successor of w. 
Section 2.5.2: First Order Modal Logic 
Propositional modal logics may be extended to first order logics, but there is not just one first order 
extension of each modal logic. The problem is that we must decide how the universe of individuals 
varies from possible world to possible world. Different first order variants of modal logics are 
appropriate for different applications. There are four common variants of first order modal logic, as 
follows. 
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• constant domain, in which the set of individuals is assumed to be the same in each possible world 
• varying domain, in which we make no assumptions on how the sets of individuals in different 
worlds are related 
• cumulative domain, in which any individual existing in a world is assumed to exist anywhere which 
is accessible from that world 
• descending domain, in which any individual existing in a world is assumed to exist anywhere that 
world is accessible from. 
The choice of first order variant can be made independently of the choice of propositional modal logic. 
The accessibility theory can interact with the theory of the domains, though. For example, if the 
accessibility theory includes symmetry then the cumulative domain and the descending domain variants 
are identical. 
The effect of these different variants can be seen by considering the Barcan formula and its converse. 
The Barcan formula (for the predicate P) is 
Vx q P(x) 	 Vx P(x). 
This formula is true in the descending and constant domain variants of first order modal logic. 
The converse of the Barcan formula (for the predicate P) is 
q Vx P(x) D Vx q P(x). 
This formula is true in the cumulative and constant domain variants of first order modal logic. 
Different translations into E-logic are used for constant domain modal logics and for the rest. 
For constant domain modal logic, the translation 'cm is extended by: 
Ticn ( ex 9 w) = ex :dom(x) tinc (0, W) 
Tic/ 3-T , w) = 3X :doni(e) tin(41),W) 
No change is made to the theory E. The restriction "dom(x)", read as "x is in the domain" provides an 
implicit two sorted structure onto the set of terms: those that represent possible worlds and those that 
represent individuals in the (constant) domain 
For the other variants, life is a little more complicated. We need to add a new E-predicate in, where x in w 
is read as "the object x exists in the domain of world w". The translation im is extended by: 
T;;;,( Vx (1) , w) = X :x in w 	 (0,0 
T,( 3.X , w) = 3X:x in w 	 (0,W) 
The following additions are made to E: 
Variant 
	 Clause 
Varying Domain 	 (none) 
Cumulative Domain x in w 1, w 1 w2 
	
x in w2 
Descending Domain xinw2,w1Rw2 
Section 2.6: Sorted Logics as Logics of Restricted Quantification 
Sorted logics can be expressed as logics of restricted quantification even more easily than modal logics. 
Again, I do not seek to introduce sorted logics: Cohn (1989a) provides an introductory survey of sorted 
logics. 
In simple sorted logics, the only syntactic extension to predicate logic is the attachment of sorts to 
variables. The change to the semantics of the logics arises from splitting the domain of discourse into a 
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set of sorts, so that each individual belongs to only one sort. No relationships between the various sorts 
exist. Such an approach is described, for example, in Enderton (1972). For example, one might write 
"every man loves a woman" as 
xman 	 loves(x,y) 
Such a logic can easily be relativised into a E-logic. The above example would become 
ex:man (x) 3Y :woman (x) loves(x,y) 
Since in the simple sorted logics, nothing can be said about the relationship between sorts, it may seem 
that E must be empty. However, one decision we must make is whether or not each sort should have non-
empty domains If we do not make any demand on the domain of any sorts then indeed the theory E will 
be empty. If we want to ensure that each sort is non-empty, then we must add clauses to E ensuring this. 
For men and women we might write: 
—> man (adam) 
woman(elizabeth) 
As a simple extension of sorted logic one can impose a partial ordering on sorts, for instance by 
declaring: 
human man 
human woman 
woman spinster 
man bachelor 
This partial ordering, as usual, is assumed to be transitive. If the relation sorts 	 sort2 holds this is 
interpreted as demanding that every individual of sort2 is also an individual of sorts. This extension of 
sorted logic is called order sorted logic. Order sorted logic is discussed at length by Schmidt-Schauss 
(1989). With the above orderings, one could express "everybody hates somebody" as 
xhumanyh„,,,„„ hates (x,y) 
while with only the sorts man and woman available we would have to write: 
[ex,. (~Yran hates (x,y) v~zwoman hates(x,z))] 
A [Vxwoman 
	 Y man hates(x,y) v 	 hates(x,z))] . 
Order sorted logics can easily be expressed as E-logics, the above examples giving rise to the following 
clauses: 
man (x) 	 human(x) 
woman(x) human(x) 
spinster(x) woman(x) 
bachelor(x) man(x) 
The transitivity of is mirrored by the transitivity of implication. 
In order sorted logics, typically functions are also sorted. This means that as well as sort ordering 
declarations, we must have function declarations. For example, we might declare the functions fiance, 
fiancee, and best_man as follows: 
. fiance : spinster 	 bachelor 
fiancee : bachelor 	 spinster 
best_man : fiance x fiancee 	 man 
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These function declarations can again be expressed very simply as clauses in E. They would be written: 
spinster(x) 	 bachelor(fiance(x)) 
bachelor(x) —> spinster(fiancee (x)) 
fiance (x) A fiancee (y) 	 man(best_man(x,y)) 
More generally, a declaration 
f : sort1 X sort2 X ' ' ' X sort, 	 sort° 
would be translated as 
sort i(x 1) A sort 2(x 2) A • • • A SOrtn(Xn) 	 sort 0(f(x 1,x 2, . . ,x„)) 
As in simple sorted logics, we have to add suitable clauses if we wish to ensure that each sort is non-
empty. Such clauses will simply be of the form: 
sorts (t ) 
where t is some term built up from E-constants and E-functions. 
In order sorted logics, polymorphism or overloading of function symbols is not allowed. That is, each 
function may only be declared once. Also, the sort heirarchy declared by must be a tree. Cohn (1987) 
introduced a very expressive polymorphic sorted logic in which the sort heirarchy may be a lattice. Such 
a logic cannot easily be modelled as a logic of restricted quantification. 
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Chapter 3 
Expansion Systems 
In this chapter I introduce a simple way of avoiding talking about specific proof systems. I follow 
D'Agostino's (1990) definition of "expansion systems", which captures the idea of a tree based proof 
system in which we search for contradictions. Tableau, resolution, and Mondadori's (1989) KE can all 
easily be expressed as expansion systems, although resolution does not use the tree structure inherent in 
expansion systems. In the rest of this thesis, I show how to extend certain expansion systems under 
certain circumstances to deal with restricted quantification. I avoid explicitly choosing a single system, 
thereby giving general results. 
To the reader who wishes to skim this chapter: 
Until Chapter 8 I only deal with "countermodel expansion systems". These are just like tableaux 
in almost all respects. You may wish to glance at Section 3.5 where I define 'Positions", a concept I 
use throughout this thesis. 
In Section 3.1 I introduce expansion systems formally. I also define "countermodel" expansion systems. 
The characteristic of a countermodel expansion tree is that an open branch easily defines a model for the 
formulas on the branch. I also give examples of propositional expansion systems and examples of proofs 
in those systems. In Section 3.2 I show how the common argument of systematically searching trees for 
an open branch (see for instance Smullyan 1968) can be given quite generally for any expansion system. 
In Section 3.3 I discuss soundness and completeness of expansion systems, showing how the argument of 
Section 3.2 helps to prove completeness. I also prove soundness and completeness for the propositional 
systems introduced in Section 3.1. In Section 3.4 I show how Konig's Lemma can be used to prove that 
if there is a proof there must be a finite proof in an expansion system. 
In Section 3.5 I define the notion of "positions" in expansion trees. Usually in this thesis I will discuss 
positions instead of formulas when discussing proof systems. This is because positions are entities that 
contain all the structural information that a formula does, and more besides. A position contains 
historical information about how formulas arise in expansion trees, information that can be different for 
two different occurrences of the same formula. This information will often be important. 
Section 3.1: Definition of Expansion Systems 
The following definitions are taken, with slight changes to fit my syntax, from D' Agostino (1990, §2.6.1). 
Definition 3.1.1 (Expansion rule, Expansion system, Saturated) 
1. 	 An n x in expansion rule R is a relation between n-tuples of polarised formulas and m-tuples of 
polarised formulas, with n 0 and in I. Expansion rules may be represented as follows: 
Xi 
X, 
v i I • • • Iv,, 
where the xi 's and the vi 's are schemes of polarised formulas. 
We say that the rule has n premises and m conclusions. If m =1 we say that the rule is of linear type, 
otherwise we say that the rule is of branching type. 
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2. An expansion system S is a finite set of expansion rules. 
3. We say that S,X is an expansion of S under an n x m rule R if there is an n-tuple a of elements of S 
such that X belongs to some m-tuple h in the set of images of a under R. 
4. Let R be an n xm expansion rule. A set U is saturated under R or R-saturated if for every n-tuple a 
of elements of U and every m-tuple h in the set of images of a under R, at least one element of h is 
also in U. 
5. A set U is S-saturated if it is R-saturated for every rule R of S. 
Of course the expansion rules are read as tree construction rules. This is defined formally by: 
Definition 3.1.2 (S-tree) 
Given an expansion system S and a set of formulas S, we can build trees as follows. 
1. The empty tree is an S-tree for S. 
2. Given any branch X in an S-tree for S and any formula X E S, the tree in which a node labelled 
by X is added to X, is an S-tree for S. 
3. Given any branch X in an S-tree for 5, any formulas X1 , 	 , Xn on the branch, and an 
expansion rule R such that (Y1, . . , Yn,) is the image under R of (X 1, 	 , X,), the tree in which 
X is extended by m separate nodes, each node i labelled by Y„ is an S-tree for S. 
Definition 3.1.3 (closed, open, complete) 
Let X be a branch of an S-tree. 
We say that A, is closed if the set of its nodes is explicitly inconsistent, that is if it contains two 
signed formulas OX and 1X for some formula X. Otherwise it is open. 
A tree 2 is closed if all its branches are closed, and open otherwise. 
We also say that a branch X, is complete if it is closed or the set of its nodes is S-saturated. 
A tree 7 is completed if all its branches are complete. 
D' Agostino says (1990, §2.6.2): 
"Any set of rules meeting our definition of analytic refutation system can be considered an 
adequate formalisation of the idea of proving validity by a failed attempt to construct a 
countermodel." 
For my purposes, this is not quite an adequate formalisation. Nothing ensures that a countermodel can be 
found from a completed tree. Although many expansion systems can ensure that a countermodel exists 
from an open completed tree, some do not explicitly give a countermodel. This is the crucial property I 
will need. The following definition expresses this property more formally. 
Definition 3.1.4 (Countermodel Expansion System) 
An expansion system S is a countermodel expansion system if for any S-saturated set of formulas U 
which is not explicitly inconsistent: 
there is at least one model satisfying each atomic formula in U; and 
any model M satisfies each formula in U if M satisfies each atomic formula in U. 
That is to say, if S is a countermodel expansion system, then we can find a model for U by finding any 
model M such that for any atomic formula P: 
if 1P E U then M satisfies P; 
if OP e U then M does not satisfy P. 
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Note that resolution is not a countermodel expansion system. For example, suppose U consists of the 
single clause 1PvQ. This is resolution-saturated. As there are no signed propositions in U, any 
propositional model satisfies the conditions above. Unfortunately such models include those which fail to 
satisfy PvQ. 
Because my work involves extending propositional systems to first order systems, I need to ensure that 
propositional systems leave quantifiers alone. Then I can know that the quantifier rules I will introduce 
will act as I intend them to, without interference from the propositional rules. To this end I make the 
following definition. 
Definition 3.1.5 (Propositional Expansion System) 
An expansion system S is a propositional expansion system if it treats each quantification exactly as 
if it were a proposition. 
This definition ensures that propositional expansion systems cannot use the structure of quantifications. 
Furthermore, anything that the system can do to a proposition it can do to a quantification. For example, 
if it can introduce 1P from 0-1P then it must be able to introduce 1Vx 1 from 0—lex I. All the expansion 
systems for propositional logic that I consider in this thesis will certainly be propositional expansion 
systems. 
Section 3.1.1: Running Example for Propositional Expansion Systems 
To illustrate the various expansion systems that I will consider, I will use the same example and give 
proofs in the different systems. The formula is: 
(PmQ)A(Pm-1Q) 
It is not difficult to see that the formula is unsatisfiable. Suppose P is true. Then from the first conjunct Q 
must be true. But if Q is true then from the second conjunct P must be false. So P cannot be true. But if 
P is false then from the first conjunct Q must be false and from the second conjunct P must be true. So P 
can be neither true nor false and the formula is unsatisfiable. 
This formula is not acceptable to proof systems which cannot deal with equivalence. In that case we need 
an equivalent formula which does not use equivalence. I will use the 
following equivalent formula. 
(PvQ)A (Pv-1Q)A (-iPvQ)A (-iPv-iQ) 
Section 3.1.2: An example of an expansion system: Analytic Tableau 
Perhaps the most standard and familiar example of an expansion system is analytic tableau. I will call the 
system Tab. I present Tab using the uniform notation to make the presentation as simple as possible. 
There is one expansion rule for each type of polarised formula - a- and 13-types. 
Expansion Rules for Tab 
(0 ) a 
al 
a2 
(3) 	 13  
R1 132 
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Running example: Tableau without equivalence 
1(PvQ) 
1 (P v-iQ) 
1(—PV Q) 
1(-iP v-1Q) 
1P 	 1Q  
1—P 	 1Q 	 1P 	 1-1Q  
OP 	 1-1P 	 1-1Q 	 1—LP 	 1—Q 	 OQ 
0 	 OP 	 OQ 	 OP 	 OQ 	 0 
0 	 0 	 0 	 0 
Notation 
I use the symbol "0" simply to give an explicit indication that the branch is closed. When 
giving examples of expansion trees, such as the one above, I omit the vertical line separating 
branches, preferring instead to use the clear spatial separation between branches. 
It is interesting to note that the tableau above ends in six branches, yet there are only two propositions in 
the example. Indeed, my running example is an instance of a general class of formulas which prove an 
unexpected result due to D'Agostino. Analytic tableaux have usually been thought to be uniformly better 
than truth tables, but for this class of examples there is no polynomial bounding the size of the tableau in 
terms of the size of the truth table! D'Agostino conjectured this result in his D.Phil. thesis (1990) and has 
since proved it (D'Agostino, personal communication, June 1991). 
Section 3.1.3: An example of an expansion system: KE 
Recently, another tableau-like system has been shown to be of considerable interest. This is Mondadori's 
(1989) KE. 
I present KE using the uniform notation to make the presentation as simple as possible. 
Notation 
In the following presentation, I use X' to mean the complement of X. That is, if X is 1P then X' 
is OP and if X is OP then X' is 1P. 
Expansion Rules for KE 
(A) a 
al 
a2 
 
(B1) 
R 
R'2 
c 
(B2) 
R 
I32c 
02 f31 
(PB) 
X X c 
Running example: KE without equivalence 
1(PvQ) 
1(Pv-iQ) 
1 HP v Q ) 
1(Pv—,Q) 
1P 	 OP 
1Q 	 1-1Q 
1-1Q 	 0 Q  
OQ 	 1P 
1 X Y  
1X OX 
1Y OY 
0 X Y  
1X OX 
OY lY 
(0) 
As well as Mondadori, KE has been studied extensively by D'Agostino (1990). D'Agostino shows, for 
example, that there are classes of examples for which tableaux cannot polynomially simulate the KE 
proof, and also argues that any tableaux search method can be copied by KE with in the worst case a 
linear overhead but in the best case a great improvement in efficiency. Gore and D'Agostino (1991) have 
compared simple implementations of tableaux and KE, with results tending to confirm this. 
Section 3.1.4: Extending Tab for equivalence 
The (a) and (13) rules in Tab do not apply to formulas whose top connective is = (equivalence). This is 
rather unfortunate. Without rules for equivalence we must translate any formula with equivalence to one 
without it. This translation can increase the size of a formula exponentially. It is not difficult to come up 
with tableau rules for equivalence. Indeed the following simple rules work. There is no particular point in 
introducing some more uniform notation: it would be as complex as the notation it replaces. 
Tableau Expansion Rules for Equivalence 
Running example: Tableau with equivalence 
1P 
1P 
1P 
	 O P 
1Q 	 OQ 
1P 	 O P 
 
1P 	 O P 
1—Q 	 0—Q 	 1—Q 	 0 —Q  
OQ 	 0 	 0 	 1 Q 
Section 3.1.5: Extending KE for equivalence 
We have just seen that tableaux can be extended easily to cover equivalence: easily, but perhaps not 
naturally since the new rules do not look like the old ones. On the other hand, KE can be extended to 
equivalence by introducing rules just like the old ones.' 
I Although the material in this section is easy, it is new, as far as I know. 
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KE Expansion Rules for Equivalence 
(1E+L) 
1X =Y 
lx (1E-L) 
1X -Y 
OX 
1Y OY 
(OE+L) 
0XmY 
1X (OE-L) 
OX=Y 
OX 
OY lY 
(1E+R) 
1 X 	 Y 
1 Y (1E-R) 
1 X 	 Y 
OY 
lx OX 
(OE+R) 
0 X 	 Y 
1Y (OE-R) 
0 X 	 Y 
OY 
OX lx 
Although it is preferable to include them for symmetry, the right handed rules are unnecessary in the 
sense that they can be derived by an application of (PB) and one of the left handed rules. For example, 
(OE+R) could be derived as follows with an application of (OE+L) on the right hand branch: 
0 X Y 
lY  
1 OX X  OY 
0 
Running example: KE with equivalence 
1 P 
1P 
1P 	 O P 
1Q 	 OQ 
1-1Q 	 1P 
OQ 	 O 
0 
This expansion tree is identical to the tree produced in Section 3.1.3 for KE without completeness, except 
that one expansion of a negation in the earlier tree is not needed here. It says something about the 
naturalness of KE, and the new rules for equivalence, that the quite drastic translation into clause form did 
not affect the proof at all. The extension of tableaux for equivalence does not have this property: the trees 
given in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.4 are quite different from each other. 
Section 3.2: Systematic Construction of Completed Trees 
Usually, the first step in proving the semantic completeness of an expansion system is to give a 
systematic procedure for constructing a completed tree. In fact, this argument can be generalised to apply 
to any expansion system. The only restriction is that the set of well formed formulas must be countable. 
This certainly holds in first order logics as long as the set of names, function symbols, and constants is 
countable. 
Theorem 3.2.1: Completed Tree Existence Theorem 
If the set of well formed formulas is countable, then in any expansion system S, there is a completed S-tree 
for any finite set of formulas S. 
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Proof 
Consider any set of formulas U. Define a potential expansion from U to be an m-tuple (Y1 , 	 , Y,n ) such 
that there is an n-tuple (X1 , 	 ,X0) of elements of U of which (Y1 , 	 Y01) is the image under some S- 
expansion rule. Given any set of formulas, the set of potential expansions from U is countable, since the 
set of well formed formulas is countable, and the set of all finite tuples of a countable set is countable. 
Hence we can number the potential expansions with positive integers. 
I now define the systematic procedure for building a tree. 
A S-tree T for a finite set of formulas S is systematic if it satisfies the following conditions: 
the first formulas in T are the formulas in S; 
if a node in T is the endnode of an incomplete branch X containing a set of formulas U, then the 
following potential expansion is applied to X in : the least numbered potential expansion from U 
all of whose m formulas do not appear in U. 
Now, given any finite set S of formulas, consider a systematic tree '1 for S. To show it is completed, I 
show that any branch X is complete. The subscript "." indicates that X may be an infinite branch. 
If Xeo is closed, then it is by definition complete. 
Suppose that X,00 is open. Then X_ consists of a number of finite subbranches k1, 	 ... and associated 
00 
sets of formulas Ul , U2, . . Note that U1 c U2 c • • • Then U00 = u U,. 
i=i 
I must show that U0„ is S-saturated. It is enough to show that for any potential expansion (Y 1 , • Ym) from 
Uoo , at least one Yi is in the set U. 
As a potential expansion from U 00, (Y 1 , . ,Y,n) must be the image of some n-tuple (X 1 , 	 ,X,2) of 
elements of U00. Then there must be some p such that each Xi is in the set Up. So (Y1 , 	 , Y,n) is a 
potential expansion from Up, associated with some finite number q. Certainly it remains a potential 
expansion from Up, Up+1, 	 Up _Eq. By the pigeonhole principle,2 the number associated with at least one 
of the q +1 expansions applied to Up, Up+1, 	 Up±q must be greater than q. Say it was the expansion 
applied to Up Since the tree T is systematic, some Y, must appear in Up So Yi n U. This is exactly 
what I needed to show. Hence U 00 is S-saturated and the branch 2o0 is complete. 
Section 3.3: Soundness and Completeness of Expansion Systems 
Definition 3.3.1 (Soundness, Completeness) 
An n x m expansion rule R is sound iff, for any satisfiable set S containing an n-tuple (X 1 , . . ,X0 ) that 
yields an m-tuple (Y1 , 	 ,Y,0) under R, then there is some Y, such that S, 	 is satisfiable. 
An expansion system S is sound iff 
a set of signed formulas S is unsatisfiable if there is a closed S-tree for S. 
An expansion system S is complete iff 
there is a closed S-tree for a set of signed formulas S if S is unsatisfiable. 
The simple relationship between sound expansion rules and systems is made clear by the following 
observation. 
2 that n +1 pigeons cannot fit in to n holes. 
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Observation 3.3.2 
If all the rules in an expansion system are sound, then that expansion system is sound. Furthermore, if a 
sound expansion system is complete then all the expansion rules are sound. 
Proof 
The first claim can be checked by a simple induction argument on the size of expansion trees, using the 
soundness of each expansion rule application. 
Now suppose that S is a complete expansion system containing an unsound n x m expansion rule such that 
X 1 , 	 ,X, is satisfiable but that for each i, X 1 , . ,Xn, Yi is unsatisfiable. Then, from the completeness of 
S, there are closed S-trees for each set X1 , 	 ,X,, Yi. Combining these trees yields a closed S-tree for the 
satisfiable set 
X1 , 	 ,Xn, showing that S is unsound. 
1=1 
Having the general Completed Tree Existence Theorem (3.2.1) greatly simplifies proving that a particular 
expansion system is complete. In fact, any countermodel expansion system is complete for finite sets of 
formulas, as the following theorem shows. 
Theorem 3.3.3: Completeness of Countermodel Expansion Systems 
If S is a countermodel expansion system, and a finite set S of formulas is unsatisfiable, then there is a 
closed S-tree for S. 
Proof 
I show the contrapositive of the theorem: if there is no closed S-tree for S then S is satisfiable. 
By the Completed Tree Existence Theorem, there is a completed tree for S. By assumption, this tree must 
be open and so contain an open branch A,. The set of formulas U on A. is S-saturated and not explicitly 
inconsistent. Since S is a countermodel expansion system, there is a model which satisfies each formula 
in U. Since S c U the model satisfies each formula in S. 
In the rest of this section I will justify the soundness and completeness of the particular expansion 
systems I introduced in Section 3.1, using this Theorem for completeness. All these proofs are 
straightforward. I omit the proofs for analytic tableaux, giving only proofs for the less familiar KE. 
Proof of the following theorem can be found in sources such as Smullyan (1968). 
Theorem 3.3.4: Soundness and Completeness of Tab 
Tab is a sound and complete expansion system for propositional logic if the equivalence symbol does not 
appear. 
Showing that the extension of Tab for equivalence is correct is entirely straightforward. 
Theorem 3.3.5: Soundness and Completeness of Tab with equivalence 
Tab extended for equivalence is a sound and complete for propositional logic. 
111 
Theorem 3.3.6: Soundness of KE 
KE is a sound expansion system for propositional logic. 
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(PBp,) 	 13  
13, Ri c 
(pB02) 
	
13  
132 I 132c 
Proof 
I must show that all the expansion rules in KE are sound in propositional logic. The soundness of the 
rules in fact follows easily from the semantics of propositional logics. 
(A) Suppose a model satisfies a. Then it must also satisfy al and a2 . 
(B1) Suppose a model satisfies 13 and pi'. Since it satisfies 13 it must satisfy either p, or 132. It certainly 
doesn't satisfy 131 so the model satisfies p2. 
(B2) Suppose a model satisfies 13 and I32c. Since it satisfies 13 it must satisfy either p, or 132. It certainly 
doesn't satisfy 132 so the model satisfies p,. 
(PB) Given any formula X, any model satisfies either X or Xc. 
Theorem 3.3.7: Completeness of KE 
KE is a countermodel expansion system. 
Proof 
Suppose we have a KE-saturated set of formulas U which is not explicitly inconsistent. 
First I show that there is a model satisfying each propositional formula in U. We can define a 
propositional model simply by: 
for propositions P, M satisfies P if and only if 1P e U. 
A propositional model is defined by such a definition as long as no proposition must be both true and 
false according to the definition. By assumption, U is not explicitly inconsistent so the above definition is 
consistent. 
Now I show that any model M satisfying each atomic formula in U satisfies each formula X in U. (An 
atomic formula is a signed formula OP or 1P for a proposition P.) 
I show this by induction on the structural complexity of X. 
The least complex formulas are atomic formulas. By assumption, M satisfies all atomic formulas. 
For the induction step, notice that any complex formula is either of type a or 13. 
Consider an a-type formula. U is (A)-saturated so contains both al and a2 . By the induction hypothesis, 
we may assume that M satisfies both al and a2. Then by the semantics of propositional logic, M satisfies 
a. 
Consider a 13-type formula. U is (PB)-saturated so contains either 131 or 131 c. If 131 e U then by the 
induction hypothesis, M satisfies 131 and hence 13. If Pi ' e U then since U is (B2)-saturated then 132 e U. 
Then by the induction hypothesis, M satisfies 132 and hence R. This completes the structural induction 
step, and hence the proof. 
For proof search, the rule (PB) is extremely unpleasant. It sanctions the introduction of any formula at all 
at any point. It may seem, therefore, that KE must be completely unsuitable for proof search. In fact this 
is not true. We can show this by introducing the following branching rules. 
This rule explicitly limits which formulas are allowed to introduce new branches. It is obviously sound 
because it is a special case of (PB). 
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Looking back at the completeness proof of KE, you can see that the induction step for 13-formulas only 
requires the use of the rules (PB131) and (B2). Exactly the same proof, and a symmetric argument 
swapping 1 and 2, gives the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.3.8: Completeness of analytic KE 
The expansion system containing the rules (A), (B2) and (M I ) is a countermodel expansion system. So 
is the expansion system containing (A), (B1) and (PB(32). 
111 
A suitable name for either of these expansion systems is "analytic KE". The name "analytic" indicates 
that each expansion rule can only introduce a subformula (or the complement of a subformula) of a 
formula that is already on the branch. 
Theorem 3.3.9: Soundness of KE extended for equivalence 
All the KE expansion rules for equivalence are sound. 
Proof 
This is straightforward, and I will not give proofs for all eight rules. As examples I will pick two rules, 
chosen by coin tosses, and prove them sound. 
If a propositional model satisfies IX = Y and it satisfies OY then it must certainly satisfy OX. 
If a propositional model satisfies OX = Y and it satisfies lY then it must certainly satisfy OX. 
1=1 
Theorem 3.3.10: Completeness of KE extended for equivalence 
KE extended for equivalence is a propositional countermodel system. 
Proof 
The earlier completeness proof for KE can be used with the difference that equivalences are neither a or 
(3-type formulas. Adding equivalences leads to another case in the induction step. This is as follows. 
Consider an equivalence type formula lx Y. U is (PB)-saturated, so contains either 1X or OX. If lx E U 
then since U is (1E+L)-saturated, lY E U. By the induction hypothesis, M satisfies X and Y, and hence it 
satisfies X = Y. Alternatively, if OX E U then since U is (1E-L)-saturated, OY E U. By the induction 
hypothesis, M does not satisfy X or Y, and hence it does satisfy X = Y. 
The induction step for a formula OX = Y is similar. 
111 
For formulas without equivalences, I observed that the completeness proof showed that only the rules 
(B2) and (PB(31 ) were necessary. With equivalences, we must allow (PB) to act on X in either lx = Y or 
OX Y. However, the completeness proof above shows that only this extension of analytic (PB) and the 
left handed equivalence rules are necessary for equivalence. 
Section 3.4: Finite Complete Trees 
Of course we cannot prove completeness for an arbitrary logic and expansion system. In the last section I 
gave a partial result which can be of help in proving completeness. In this section I show that if there is a 
closed S-tree for a set of formulas, then there is a finite closed S-tree. The proof is the standard one, using 
Konig's Lemma. The result will be very useful to me. Later in this thesis I will show the completeness 
of new expansion systems by transforming closed trees in an earlier system. The fact that a closed tree 
may be assumed to be finite will be of great help in these transformations. 
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First, I quote Konig's Lemma. A proof can be found in most books on first order logic. Fitting (1990b), 
for instance, proves it as Theorem 2.7.2. 
Definition 3.4.1 (finitely branching tree) 
A tree is finitely branching if every node has only a finite number of children, including the 
possibility that a node has no children. 
Theorem 3.4.2: Konig's Lemma 
If a finitely branching tree contains an infinite number of nodes, then it has an infinite branch. 
Theorem 3.4.3: Finite Closed Tree Theorem 
For any expansion system S and set of formulas S, if there is a closed S-tree for S, then there is a finite 
closed S-tree for S. 
Proof 
First note that no expansion system allows infinite branching. So any S-tree is finitely branching. 
Now consider a closed S-tree for S. Every branch is closed, and must become so at a finite point. So we 
could prune every branch at the point at which it first becomes closed. In the resulting tree, every branch 
would be finite. Then, by Konig's Lemma, the whole tree must be finite. 
Section 3.5: Positions in Expansion Trees 
In the later parts of this thesis, when I wish to discuss transformations of one tree into another, I need to 
know more about formulas than just the formula itself. For example, I will need to distinguish between 
formulas introduced by propositional rules, those introduced by rules for universal quantifiers, and those 
introduced by rules for existential quantifiers. In general, once we replace the use of formulas by the use 
of positions, we can tell from the occurrence of a position in a tree the expansions used to introduce that 
position and its parents. 
Notation 
The name "position" comes from Wallen (1989). There, the name arises because formulas 
are replaced by positions in a formula tree. 
There is another reason for the use of positions, although one that I will not exploit in this thesis. The 
argument applies if an expansion system contains branching rules. Suppose, for example, that it is 
necessary to apply two independent branching expansions. Then after the first is applied, the second must 
be applied once for each new branch. This, as Wallen (1989) argued, leads to considerable "notational 
redundancy". That is, the same details have to be repeated many times in a tree. By replacing the use of 
formulas by positions, we can avoid this need. At least notationally, we only have to perform each 
expansion once. Whenever the expansion is needed, we can refer, perhaps using a pointer, to the single 
place where the actual expansion is carried out. This idea was used by Boyer and Moore (1972), who 
called it "structure-sharing". 
Formal Details of Positions 
First, I assume that we have some way of referring to different occurrences of formulas in a tree. Such a 
way would be to write out the tree on paper and refer to an occurrence's location on the page. For a 
particular expansion tree T ,I will call the set of all occurrences of formulas in T, "Occ" . 
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I can now define an equivalence relation —T on Occ, where p —T q is to be read as "p is the same position 
as q". I also define a binary relation «, where p «q is read as "q is a subposition of p". 
Definition 3.5.1 (—,T ) 
Given T , —T is the smallest binary relation on Occ which satisfies: 
1 	 —T is an equivalence relation. 
2 	 Suppose the same expansion rule is applied to (X1I , 	 ,X)d yielding (Y1, 	 , Yil ) and to 
(Xi, 	 yielding (Y?, 	 ,Y2,1 ). If each 171 and 177 are occurrences of the same formula and 
if each X; —T X7, then, for each j, 17)- —T 
I can now talk about equivalence classes of Occ under -T . 
Definition 3.5.2 (Position, Subposition, <K) 
Given T, a position in T is an equivalence class of Occ under —T . The set of all equivalence classes 
(i.e. the set of all positions) is called PT (or simply P if is understood). 
Notationally, I will refer to elements of P as p, p 0, p 1,p 2, etc. 
If positions (X1, 	 ,X„) are expanded to yield (Y1, ... ,17,7 ) then for each i and j, Xi « 171. We say 
that )7i is a subposition of Xi . 
For the rest of this thesis, I shall often refer to positions instead of formulas. This should cause no 
confusion, since positions have been defined so that each occurrence of each position is associated with 
precisely one polarised formula. 
Following Wallen (1989), I can define two functions 
lab : P Formulas 
pol :P 	 0, 1] 
where lab(p) gives the label (the associated formula) of a position p and pol(p) gives its polarity. 
It is useful to regard positions as having the same type as the polarised formula they represent. So for 
instance if, for some position p, lab(p)= PAQ and pol(p)=0, then p would be of type f3. 
Notation 
Often the principal fact that I will be interested in about a position is its type. Where this is 
so, I will refer to the position by its type, possibly with a disambiguating superscript. So I 
might refer to an a position as a, and a [3 position as 13. 
On other occasions, I will be interested not in the type of a position, but in the type of the 
expansion that introduces a position. I will call this the secondary type of the position. Here 
again, I will use this to refer to the position. For example, in the case of the expansion system 
Tab, I might refer to a position as al , a2, 131 , 132. 
Wherever I wish to consider the subset of positions in P of a certain type, I will name this set 
by "P" with the appropriate superscript. For instance, I might refer to Pal as the set of 
positions of secondary type al. 
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Chapter 4 
Expansion Systems for Restricted Quantification 
In the earlier chapters I have introduced syntax and semantics for restricted quantification and a general 
way of expressing tree based proof systems. In this chapter I show how a simple extension of 
propositional expansion systems can be made which is always sound. However, it is not always 
complete, so I give a sufficient condition for its completeness. This sufficient condition, that every set of 
restrictions in a restriction theory must have a least Herbrand model,1 has arisen in the work on resolution 
by Biirckert (1990a) and the work on substitutional reasoning by Frisch (1989). 
The extension of propositional proof systems I introduce in this chapter has two essential features. First, 
the expansion rules for quantifiers are unary; that is they never split a branch into two. This means that 
they do not change the basic structure of proofs. Second, in the extended expansion systems, the 
restriction theory is only referred to by the side condition on one of the quantifier rules. This means that 
there is a clear syntactic separation of the restriction theory from the rest of a logic, a separation that 
computer implementations can take advantage of. 
Completeness of the extended systems I introduce in this chapter only holds for countermodel 
propositional expansion systems. This is rather interesting. Although countermodel propositional 
expansion systems are defined purely propositionally, it turns out that this is an important property for 
restricted quantification. Essentially, the countermodel property allows us to delve sufficiently into the 
structure of formulas to use the quantifier rules whenever we need to. In non-countermodel expansion 
systems we may not be able to do this. Later in this thesis I show that further conditions are required of a 
restriction theory before we can extend a non-countermodel propositional system to restricted 
quantification. 
In fact in this chapter I introduce a number of expansion systems, corresponding to different combinations 
of conditions attached to the quantifier rules. Fortunately, I need only prove soundness and completeness 
once: soundness for the freest system and completeness for the most controlled. 
In Section 4.1 I introduce the new expansion rules for restricted quantification. Because of side 
conditions attached to these rules, they are in fact not expressible as expansion systems as defined in 
Chapter 2. I discuss this issue in Section 4.1.1. In Section 4.2 I give examples of using the extended 
expansion system. In Section 4.3 I show that the new rules are sound, and in Section 4.4 that they are 
complete. In Section 4.5, as a diversion, I show that the same proof system is correct for more restriction 
theories if the definition of branch closure is extended. 
Section 4.1: Expansion Rules for Restricted Quantification 
I will now introduce the expansion rules that will be the central object of study in this thesis. 
These rules will have associated with them various side conditions. A side condition associated with an 
expansion rule means that wherever the rule is applied in a tree, the side condition must be satisfied at 
that point. I will also have assumptions that must be checked with reference to a whole tree, for example 
that all 8-expansions of the same position introduce the same name. I will call these global conditions. 
My use of side conditions is a little inconvenient with respect to my earlier discussion of expansion 
systems. Fortunately, the difficulty is slight and I shall mention how to get over it when I need to. 
From now on I consider the following expansion rules: 
1  I formally define least Herbrand models in Section 4.4.1. 
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(7) 
yo (t) (6) 
8  
60(a) 
61-(a) 
  
Quantifier Expansion Rules 
Notation 
If S is any propositional expansion system, I will use "ES " to refer to the expansion system 
containing all the expansion rules of S, as well as (y) and (6). 
Recall the definition of positions that I introduced in Section 3.5. The new expansion rules mean that 
new types of positions and subpositions may arise. 
Notation 
Following the notation of Section 3.5, where I am interested in the type of a position, I might 
refer to it as y or S. If I am interested in the secondary type of a position, I will refer to such 
positions as yo(t), 80(a), or 6,-(a). If the name a or term t is unimportant then I will omit it. 
Although not strictly defined as in Section 3.5, I will also regard yr(t) as a subposition of a 
position 7. 
As indicated in Section 3.5 I will use, for example, P7 to refer to the set of positions of type 7 in 
P, and P7' to refer to the set of positions of secondary type y,. in P. 
The side conditions I wish to consider for the moment are listed below. 
Definition 4.1.1 (Side Conditions (4) (2) (3) (4)) 
(i) applies to 6-expansions: 
a is a new name that has not appeared on the branch up to the point of the 6-expansion. 
(2) applies to 7-expansions: 
R 7,(t) where R is the set of E-atoms on the branch up to the point of the 7-expansion. 
(3) applies to 7-expansions: 
t contains only names that have been introduced by 6-expansions on the branch up to the 
7-expansion, except possibly the name e. 
(4) There is a well defined and one to one function f:P8 Names such that f(8) is the name intro-
duced into any immediate subposition of S. That is, for each 6-type position 6 n P, if 80(a) n P 
then . f(6) = a. 
Note that (4) is a global condition that must be checked over whole tree simultaneously. 
Notation 
To indicate which side conditions apply, I will decorate the name of the system ES with the 
names for the side conditions. For example, "ES(124)" refers to the expansion system whose 
expansion rules are those of S together with (7) and (6), and in which the side condition (1) 
applies to 6-expansions, (2) applies to 7-expansions, and (4) applies globally. 
This chapter and the next four chapters are devoted to studying the proof system I have just introduced, or 
proof systems derived from it. There is an important reason for this. The underlying theory E is only 
used in the side condition (2). As a result, there is a complete separation between reasoning within and 
outwith the theory E. 
Given a propositional expansion system S, I wish to show the soundness and completeness of the 
corresponding expansion system ES with some set of side conditions applying. Completeness will only 
be possible when S is a countermodel expansion system. I turn to non countermodel expansion systems 
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later. 
I wish to prove correct several different sets of side conditions. To avoid giving several repetitive proofs, 
I will proceed as follows. I will show the soundness of the system ES(/2). For all the other systems I 
consider, a tree in that system will also be a ES(12) tree, and so the soundness of ES(12) applies. Then I 
will show the completeness of ES( 1234 ). Since a ES( 1234 ) tree will be a tree in all the other systems I 
consider, completeness of all these systems will follow. 
Section 4.1.1: Side Conditions Expressed as Expansion Rules 
Although I express the conditions as side conditions, two of them can be expressed as expansion rules 
quite simply, namely (2) and (3). However, in each case, the rule would have to be expressed by 
enumerating (somehow!) a very large collection of possible schemas. Because this would be so tedious it 
is best not to do it at all. The main point is that it could be done in principle, so the expansion rule (y) 
with (2) and/or (3) built in may be regarded as an ordinary expansion rule. 
The expansion rule with (2) built in could be represented by a large collection of schemas: 
8 ri(a 1)  
o r2(a 2)  
6;.'(a„) 
7  
70(t) 
There would have to be one such schema for each possible way of ensuring that: 
8,.(a 1), 8,(a 2), • • • 81;(an) 	 7r(t) 
Similarly for the condition (3) we could have a large number of schemas: 
b; (a t)  
8r2(a 2)  
There would be one schema for every case where each name in t is in some ai or is E. 
The two side conditions could be combined. 
Unfortunately the side condition (t) cannot be expressed as an expansion rule. It relies on negative 
information, that a certain name has not appeared yet. Expansion rules cannot express this because there 
is no mechanism for ensuring that all formulas on a branch are used in an expansion. Similarly, it is not 
possible to express (4) as an expansion rule. For this reason, before giving the completeness theorem I 
will discuss how the new conditions on trees affects the Completed Tree Existence Theorem, which will 
in fact still hold. 
For the sake of simplicity, I will still refer to systems with these side conditions as expansion systems. 
The proofs I give will take account of the slight problems raised above where necessary. 
Section 4.2: Examples 
In the following table, I consider the modal logic K and the modal logics in which exactly one semantic 
condition holds. For each condition, I give the characteristic axiom for that condition. 
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Some Modal Logics 
Logic Semantic Condition Characteristic Axiom 
K 	 none 	 D(A DB) D (111/1 D DB) 
D 	 seriality 	 DA D OA 
T 	 reflexivity 	 EA D A 
KB 	 symmetry 	 A D DOA 
K4 	 transitivity 	 DA D DDA 
To use ES for modal logics, it seems that we must first translate the modal formula to a E-logic. This 
removes completely all modal syntax, leading to aesthetically unpleasing proofs. Fortunately, a simple 
fact saves us from needing to do this. The translation from modal logic into E-logic acts on the structure 
of the formula in exactly the same way as the expansion rules do. This means that we need only apply the 
translation one step at a time, simultaneously with doing a single expansion. Indeed, when we get down 
to atomic formulas, the translation is trivial and we do not even need to apply it! However, we need to 
extend the syntax of derivations slightly. The translation function always needs a world argument, and 
we must supply this. To do so, I will introduce a binary relation " I I-" between worlds and polarised 
formulas. If w is a world and X a polarised formula then w II- X is read as "w forces X" or as "X is true at 
world w". At the start of the proof, we need to supply the translation function with a starting point. I will 
use "E". 
The argument from the previous paragraph could be applied to derive an expansion rule for each modal 
connective. This would result in a special purpose theorem proving method for modal logics. 
I present proofs in ETab(u) of the characteristic axioms in the appropriate theories. 
Characteristic axiom of K with the empty theory. 
Ell-  0 D(ADB) D (DA D LB)  
Eli- 1 D(ADB) 
E1H ODA D DB 
Ell- 1 DA 
ODB  
111-0B 
ER1 
11H lADB  (i) 11H lA  
11H OA 	 11H 1B 
0 	 0 
(i) (2) is satisfied since c 1 appears on the branch. 
Characteristic axiom of D with E = seriality. 
E1H 0(DA DOA)  
Ell- 1 EA 
E1H 0 0A  
next (E) II- 1A 	 ., (n) 
next (E) II- OA  
O 
(ii) (2) is satisfied since ERnext(e) is forced by seriality. 
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Characteristic axiom of T with E = reflexivity. 
£11- 0(EA DA)  
1L1A 
eII-OA  
c11- lA  
0 
(iii) (2) is satisfied since reflexivity forces cRe. 
Characteristic axiom of KB with E = symmetry. 
D DOA)  
lA 
Ell- 0 DOA 
111- 0 OA 
ER1  
ell-OA  
0 
(iv) (2) is satisfied since c R1 appears on the branch and symmetry ensures that ax 1 	 1Re. 
Characteristic axiom of K4 with E = transitivity. 
ell- 0 (CIA ODA)  
c 1 1- 1 DA 
c11-0111111A  
111- 0 OA 
6 R 
21F-OA 
1 fR, 2  
211- 1 A  
0 
(v) (2) is satisfied since e RI appears on the branch and transitivity ensures that cyc 1, 1 R 2 .L, 1 Re. 
It should not be assumed that all modal logics can have their characteristic axiom proved in this way. For 
example, the modal logic S4.3 has an accessibility theory that cannot be written in Horn clauses and fails 
the least Herbrand model property. No proof for its characteristic axiom could be constructed in ES(z2) 
for any sound expansion system S. In Chapter 9 I introduce a proof system that can be applied to such 
logics, and in Section 9.2 give the characteristic axiom of S4.3 as an example. 
Section 4.3: Soundness of ES(12) 
The definition of soundness of an expansion system means that I need only check that the two rules (7) 
and (6) are each sound, where the side conditions (i) and (2) hold. Although (6) with the side condition (i) 
is not, strictly speaking, an expansion rule, the distinction is unimportant in this context. 
Theorem 4.3.1: Soundness of (y) 
(7) is a sound expansion rule if the side condition (2) holds. 
Proof 
Suppose we have a set S containing a formula y that may be expanded under the rule (y) to yield 70(t). 
Suppose also that S is satisfiable, and in particular that it is satisfiable in a E-model M = < D,I> under an 
assignment A. That is, 7" = t. 
By the side condition (2), R kL Vt), where R is the set of restrictions in S. Since M is a E-model of S, M is 
a E-model of R and hence of 7,(t). That is, 7,-(t)LA  = t. 
(iv) 
(v) 
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We have that yl'A = t and that yr(t)" = t. By the definition of semantics of s-logic, and since A is 
certainly a variant of itself, yo(t)" = t. Therefore M and A satisfy S, yo(t), which was what was wanted. 
Theorem 4.3.2: Soundness of (8) 
(8) is a sound expansion rule if the side condition (1) is satisfied. 
Proof 
Suppose we have a set S containing a formula 8 that may be expanded under the rule (8) to yield 80(a). 
Since the expansion must satisfy the side condition ()), we know that the name a does not appear 
anywhere in S. Suppose also that S is satisfiable, and in particular that it is satisfiable in a E-model 
M = < D,I> under an assignment A. Then 8" = t. 
By the definition of semantics of E-logic, there is an assignment B such that 4'13 = t and 8,," = t. Suppose 
that the outermost variable x in 8 is mapped to d n D by B. 
Now, I define a new interpretation J. J is defined to be exactly the same as I except that J maps a to d. 
Since a appears nowhere in S and S is satisfied by I, S is satisfied by J. Furthermore, 80 (a)J' A = 80(x)I,B = t 
and 8,.(a)" = 8r(x)" = t. Therefore M' = <D,J> and A satisfy 5, 80(t), which was what was wanted. 
Section 4.4: Completeness of ES(1234 
Recall that ES(1234 ) is the expansion system containing the rules in S as well as the rules (y) and (8) which 
must satisfy the conditions (i), (2), (3), and (4). In this section I prove the completeness of ES(1234 ) 
provided that E satisfies what I call the "least Herbrand model property" (defined in this section) and that 
S is a countermodel expansion system. Of course if we drop one or more of the side conditions then the 
resulting proof system is still complete. In particular, the completeness of 1,S(1234 ) is enough to show the 
completeness of ES(12), ES(123), and ES(/24 ). 
In Chapter 9 I introduce suitable proof systems if the least Herbrand model property does not hold. 
As well as a condition on E„ completeness requires that S be a countermodel expansion system. 
Completeness fails on very simple examples in non-countermodel systems. 
Example (failure of ES(1234 ) in non-countermodel systems) 
Resolution serves as a typical example of a non-countermodel expansion system. This example is so 
simple that the precise details of a resolution system are unimportant, as are the details of the restriction 
theory (it may be empty, for example). Note that I am only considering the propositional resolution rule. 
Consider the formula 
3x,p(,) f v 3). , p(y) f 
Of course this formula is unsatisfiable, and could be shown to be so by (say) EKE(/234 ). However, the 
resolution rule cannot apply to the formula since there are no other formulas present. Also, the rule (8) 
cannot apply since the dominating connective is propositional. Therefore no resolution proof can be 
found. 
This example shows that the propositional resolution rule cannot, naively, be extended to deal with 
restricted quantification using the rules I have introduced. Frisch (1991) has shown how resolution can be 
extended for a class of restriction theories: I arrive at a similar conclusion by a different route in Chapter 
8, though I do not consider resolution explicitly. 
End of Example 
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Because of the conditions (/) and (4) the Completed Tree Existence Theorem does not apply directly, as it 
did in Chapter 2. So first I discuss the slight changes needed in its proof. 
Theorem 4.4.1: Completed Tree Existence Theorem for ES(1234 ) 
There is a completed ES(1234) tree for any finite set of formulas S. 
Proof 
The central feature of the earlier proof of this theorem was that if an expansion is possible in U then it is 
possible in Uu {X} if X is a formula introduced from U by a different expansion. This property holds 
trivially for expansion rules as defined earlier. As the rule (y) with the side conditions (2) and (3) can be 
seen as an expansion rule, it causes no problems. Also, (4) causes no problems: it gives us a function f, 
and if 6 E U it sanctions the introduction of 60(f(6)) from both U and U, X. 
The only problem then is the side condition (1) for the rule (6). But suppose 6 may be introduced from U: 
that is 6 E U and the name f(8) does not appear in U. If a propositional expansion rule applies to introduce 
X then it introduces no new names and the 6-expansion is still valid. If (y) applies then, from (3), X 
contains no names not in U, and hence not f(6). If (6) applies then unless it applies to 6 itself, it applies to 
some other position and by (4) introduces a different name. In either case the 6-expansion still is 
applicable to Uu {X} . 
The rest of the proof is as before. 
Section 4.4.1: Least Herbrand Models 
One essential feature of the expansion rules I have introduced is the unary nature of the (y) rule. If it were 
a branching rule then the proof system would be more difficult for humans to use, and the proof-
theoretical arguments I give in this thesis would be more difficult and probably weaker. In both cases this 
would be because extra branching structure would be introduced into expansion trees, making them much 
more difficult to deal with and reason about. Therefore it is crucial to know when the (7) rule is 
satisfactory. It is always sound, given (2), but ES(/234 ) is only complete for certain theories E. To 
describe these theories, I will introduce the notion of a least Herbrand model. 
Definition 4.4.1.1 (Herbrand model, least Herbrand model) 
A Herbrand model is a model in which the domain consists of the variable free terms, and in which 
the interpretation function is the identity: the interpretation of any term is that term itself. 
A Herbrand model is a least Herbrand model of a set R of E-atoms iff the only E-atoms true in the 
model are the logical consequences of the set R (that is p is in the least Herbrand model iff R p). 
Definition 4.4.1.2 (least Herbrand model properties) 
E has the least Herbrand model property if any set of variable free E-atoms has a least Herbrand E-
model. 
E has the weak least Herbrand model property if any set of variable free E-atoms either is E-
unsatisfiable or has a least Herbrand E-model. 
Theorem 4.4.1.3: Least Herbrand Uniqueness 
If a least Herbrand model exists for a set of literals, it is uniquely defined on all formulae containing only 
those literals. 
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Proof 
A model is defined by its assignment of truth to literals. Since this is fixed by the definition of least 
Herbrand model, the model is fixed. 
Least Herbrand models are in fact very familiar, since anything constructed by pure Prolog is a least 
Herbrand model. This follows from: 
Theorem 4.4.1.4: Horn Clauses and the Least Herbrand Model Property 
(i) If E is written in Horn clauses, then E satisfies the weak least Herbrand model property. 
(ii) If E, is written in definite Horn clauses, then E satisfies the least Herbrand model property. 
Sketch Proof 
I will sketch the argument given by Lloyd (1984, up to Theorem 6.2). First observe that E-atoms may be 
considered as clauses, and indeed as facts, and therefore adding them to E leaves a set of Horn clauses (in 
(i)) or definite Horn clauses (in (ii)). 
One can identify a Herbrand model with the set of variable free atoms true in that model. Then one can 
show that, if E is in Horn clause form, the intersection of a set of Herbrand models for E, is also a 
Herbrand model for E. But 0 is a consequence of E if and only if 0 is true in all Herbrand models of E. 
Therefore, if E has any Herbrand model, the intersection of all Herbrand models for E will be a least 
Herbrand model. This proves (i). 
Part (ii) is a simple Corollary of (i), from the observation that the set of all variable free atoms is a 
Herbrand model of E, if E is written in definite Horn clauses. 
To illustrate the concept further, examples abound were the least Herbrand model property fails. For 
example, suppose E is: 
number(X) 	 even(X) v odd(X)) 
Then even the single atom 
number(n) 
does not have an least Herbrand E-model. If it did have a least Herbrand model then either "even(n)" or 
"odd(n)" would have to be a E-consequence of E and number(n), which is ridiculous. 
The converse of Theorem 4.4.1.4 is not true. There are non-Horn theories which satisfy the least 
Herbrand model property. For example, take the simple theory: 
p(X), p(X)• 
This is not a Horn clause, having two literals after the arrow. However an equivalent theory can certainly 
be written in Horn clauses, namely: 
p(X). 
Indeed any theory satisfying the least Herbrand model property can be written in Horn clauses.2 I will not 
prove this here as the point is not central to this thesis. However, it does mean that one can safely equate 
the concept of the least Herbrand model property with the ability to be written in definite Horn clauses. 
2 I am grateful for a conversation with Wilfred Chen that clarified this point for me. 
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Section 4.4.2: Completeness Theorem 
There are two aspects to proving the completeness theorem. First I show how, given an open complete 
branch, I can define a (well-defined) E-model. Then I show that this model in fact satisfies every formula 
on the branch. I will prove these separately because I will later wish to prove completeness for other 
proof systems, and it will turn out that only the well-definedness of the model will need to be reproved. 
Definition 4.4.2.1 (Mx, E-model for a branch) 
Suppose that X, is a branch in a ES tree, containing the set of formulas U and set of restrictions R. In 
that case, Mx = <D,I> is a E-model for the branch X if: 
1. D is the set of all terms built using function symbols from the constants and names that appear 
anywhere in U; and 
2. I applied to constant symbols and names is the identity function; and 
3. I applied to a n-place function symbol f gives the function defined by3  
t„) = f(t i , 	 t„) 
4. for any y-type formula y on the branch, and any term t arising on the branch, Mx satisfies the 
associated restriction 7,(t) if and only if R 7,(t); and 
5. for any P, an L-atom, M satisfies P if and only if 1P e U; and 
6. Mx is a E-model. 
Part (4) of the definition means that there may be many models Mx for a branch. However, they will only 
differ on restrictions that are unimportant to satisfying the set of formulas on the branch. 
Lemma 4.4.2.2: Branch Model Lemma for ES( 1234 ) 
If E satisfies the least Herbrand model property, and X, is an open complete branch in a ES(/234 ) tree then 
there is at least one E-model Mx for the branch X. 
Proof 
By the least Herbrand model property, R has a least Herbrand E-model Mo. The E-atoms required to be 
true (or false) by part (4) of Definition 4.4.2.1 are all contained (or not contained) in Mo. We can extend 
Mo simply by defining Mx by (5) of Definition 4.4.2.2 for L-atoms. This does not affect any E-atoms, so 
Mk is a E-model. It is well defined since any first order logic model is well defined given the definition of 
which atoms hold in it. 
1=1 
Theorem 4.4.2.3: Completeness of ES(1234 
If E, satisfies the least Herbrand model property, and S is a propositional countennodel expansion system, 
and a finite set of formulas S is not satisfiable, then there is a closed ES( 1234 )-tree for S. 
Proof 
I show the contrapositive. That is, assuming that there is no closed ES(1234 )-tree for a set of formulas S, I 
show that S is satisfiable. The first step is to use the Completed Tree Existence Theorem to give us a 
completed ES(1234 )- tr e e for S. Since this tree cannot be closed, it contains an open, complete, branch. 
Call this branch X, and the set of formulas on it U. Suppose the set of all restrictions that appear in U is R. 
From the Branch Model Lemma there is a E-model for the branch: I assume we pick a particular E-model 
Mk. 
3 Note that I has no visible effect when applied to a term. 
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Since S is a propositional expansion system, no expansion rule in S can introduce a formula with greater 
quantifier depth than its parents. Also, the expansion rules for quantifiers (y- and 8-type formulas) 
introduce formulas of strictly smaller quantifier depth. These two facts imply that if we consider all 
formulas in U of less than a certain quantifier depth, that set must be ES(1234 )-saturated. This is crucial to 
the following induction argument. 
It remains to show that for any polarised formula X in X, Mx satisfies X. I proceed by induction on the 
number of quantifiers in X. 
The base follows from propositional completeness. That is, if X is quantifier free, then we consider all 
formulas in U containing no quantifiers. This set is S-saturated, open, and contains X. Since S is a 
countermodel expansion system Mx satisfies X. 
As the induction hypothesis I assume that all formulas X containing only a certain number k of quantifiers 
are satisfied by Mx. For the step I first consider quantifications containing k +1 quantifiers, and then all 
formulas containing k +1 quantifiers. 
Any quantification is either a 7-type formula or a 6-type formula. 
Consider a 7-type formula 7 appearing on the branch, and any element of the domain - that is any term t. 
Now Mx satisfies yr(t) if and only if R kE y JO. So if Mx satisfies yr(t), then R kE 7,40, and the expansion 
rule for 7-type formulas applies to y, with image yo(t). By definition of D, every name in t appears in U, 
and so the expansion satisfies (3). Since U is saturated under the expansion rule for 7-type formulas, 
yo(t) e U. By the induction hypothesis, 70(t) is satisfied by the model. This establishes that for all domain 
elements t such that yr(t) holds, 7o(t)  holds. Hence Mx satisfies 7. 
Consider a 8-type formula 6 appearing on the branch, and the name f(6) given to us by (4). Suppose that 
80(f(6)) and 6,(f(5)) do not appear in U. Then certainly no other 6-expansion on the branch can introduce 
the name f(6) from (4). But then no 7-expansion on the branch could introduce f(6), as each 7-expansion 
satisfies (3). But then U, 6,4f(6)), 60(f(6)) would be a possible expansion from U and the expansion would 
satisfy (4) and (/). Since U is ES(1234 ) saturated, we know that 8r(f(6)), 60(f(8)) E U. By the induction 
hypothesis, both formulas are satisfied by Mx. Hence Mx satisfies 8. 
To complete the induction step, we look at U in a new way. We consider only the propositional rules in 
S, but as well as any atom, we regard any quantification as an atomic proposition. We can do this since 
no propositional rule can act on a quantification. We know from the induction base that each atom is 
satisfied in Mx. From the induction hypothesis and the arguments of the previous two paragraphs, we 
know that Mx satisfies each quantification containing k +1 or fewer quantifications. Thus, regarding Mx as 
a propositional model, it satisfies all the formulas we are treating as atomic. As I observed earlier, the set 
of formulas in U with k +1 quantifiers or fewer is S-saturated. Hence, since S is a countermodel expansion 
system, all formulas containing at most k+1 quantifications are satisfied by Mx. 
This completes the induction step, and hence the completeness theorem. 
Section 4.5: A Slightly More General System 
The theorem I have just proved will form the foundation for all the work in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
However, I wish to prove a slight generalisation of the theorem in the case that E satisfies only the weak 
least Herbrand model property. In Chapter 9 I will generalise still further, and the following result will be 
a better starting point than the previous one. 
The only change I wish to make is to allow for the possibility that a branch may contain an explicit 
contradiction given by the restrictions on a branch. In terms of Section 4.4.1, the change is to allow goal 
clauses into the restriction theory a,. Everything will be the same except that I must use a more liberal 
definition of closure of a branch, which I call "a-closure". 
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Definition 4.5.1 (E-closure) 
A branch in a ES tree is E-closed if either it is closed or if the set of restrictions on the branch is E-
unsatisfiable. 
Changing the definition of closure technically invalidates much of the work I have done up to now. 
However, everything is alright because E-closure is a monotonic property: if a branch is E-closed then any 
extension of it is E-closed. All relevant properties of closure carry through. 
The crucial point is to prove the Branch Model Lemma for the new version. Indeed, after that the proof 
of the completeness theorem will be identical to the earlier proof. 
Lemma 4.5.2: Branch Model Lemma for ES(1234 ) with E-closure 
If E, satisfies the weak least Herbrand model property, and X is an open complete branch in a ES(1234 ) tree 
then there is at least one E-model Mk for the branch X. 
Proof 
By the weak least Herbrand model property, either R is E-unsatisfiable or it has a least Herbrand E-model. 
But if R were E-unsatisfiable then X would be E-closed, which it is not. Therefore R has a least Herbrand 
model Mo. The E-atoms required to be true (or false) by part (4) of Definition 4.4.2.1 are all contained (or 
not contained) in Mo. We can extend Mo simply by defining Mk by (5) of Definition 4.4.2.2 for L-atoms. 
This does not affect any E-atoms, so Mk is a E-model. It is well defined since any first order logic model 
is well defined given the definition of which atoms hold in it. 
Theorem 4.5.3: Completeness of ES(1234 ) with E-closure 
If E satisfies the weak least Herbrand model property, and S is a propositional countertnodel expansion 
system, and a finite set of formulas S is not satisfiable, then there is a E-closed ES(1234 )-tree for S. 
Proof 
The proof is the same as that of Theorem 4.4.2.3. 
Example (the use of s-closure) 
A simple clause that we may wish to introduce is that for irreflexivity, which in first order logic is 
expressed as: 
and as a goal clause is: 
For example, we may consider the modal logic containing irreflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. It is 
not surprising that this logic is not familiar from the literature, since the formula E f is valid! This is 
shown by the following tree which uses E-closure: 
s I I- OEf  
E a 
a II- Of  
0 
The branch is E-closed because the single restriction c a is unsatisfiable in the chosen theory. From 
symmetry we can deduce from it a E. From transitivity we can then deduce c 9z, c, contradicting 
irreflexivity. 
End of Example 
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Chapter 5 
Alphabetical Monotonicity and Non-Vacuity 
In Chapter 4 I proved that for any restriction theory satisfying the least Herbrand model property, and any 
propositional countermodel expansion system S, the proof system ES(12) is sound and complete; and 
indeed it remains so if any combination of the conditions (3) and (4) are added. This result is very useful 
because of the simplicity of the proof system and the generality and simplicity of the conditions that 
make it true. 
For automated proof search, three of the side conditions from Chapter 4 cause potential problems. The 
side condition (2) might require the use of the exact set of restrictions on a branch. Therefore it might be 
very important where exactly on a branch a y-expansion is applied. Similarly the side condition (3) uses 
the fact that a particular set of names is on a branch, again being highly dependent on where the 
expansion is applied. The condition (/) requires a certain name not to be on a branch, again dependent on 
the placement of the application. The last of these problems is familiar from classical unrestricted first 
order logic. I discuss it further later in this thesis. In this chapter I address the first two of these 
problems. 
The feature of this chapter is the introduction of a new side condition (5) to replace (2) for y-expansions. 
Instead of using the set of restrictions on a single branch, (5) uses the set of restrictions on an entire tree. 
In fact the implications go further. Where using (s) is sound, we may use any set of restrictions that is a 
superset of the restrictions on the branch and a subset of the restrictions on the whole tree. In other 
words, except that we must use at least all the formulas on the branch, we have a free choice of the set of 
restrictions we may use. The order dependence arising from (2) has been eliminated. In Chapter 7 I show 
how this can be used to derive a matrix characterisation of validity. 
In this chapter I give two sufficient conditions for the soundness of (s). The first condition, called 
"alphabetical monotonicity" is sufficient if (3) is also used. However, (3) also introduces some order 
dependence, raising problems discussed further in Chapter 7. So I also give a second condition, called 
"non-vacuity", which is sufficient whether or not (3) is used. Non-vacuity turns out to be more 
interesting than alphabetical monotonicity. I show in Chapter 6 that, where both hold, non-vacuity is 
easier to prove directly than alphabetical monotonicity. Also, in Chapter 8 the result on non-vacuity from 
this chapter serves as a basis for deriving proof systems for restricted quantification for any expansion 
system, not just countermodel ones. Also non-vacuity, in a slightly different form, has turned up before 
in the literature: it is essentially the same as Frisch's (1991) use of "E-satisfiability". 
The greater order independence achieved when non-vacuity holds is shown to be of importance in 
Chapters 7 and 8. The basic reason for this is that with non-vacuity, reasoning about quantifiers can be 
completely separated out from propositional reasoning. Put simply, instantiation commutes with 
propositional logic, as I show in Chapter 8. This observation is not at all original with me, but is implicit 
in Frisch (1991) and indeed dates back to Hailperin who writes (1957b, page 114): 
"... one readily surmises that the difficulties stem from the admission of vacuous ranges for 
the variables. Accordingly, then, by requiring our variables to have non-vacuous ranges we 
should be able to restore the desired manipulative freedom - such a limitation to non-vacuous 
ranges is, moreover, quite natural since in most significant deductive systems the variables 
have non-empty ranges." 
If we could indeed require variables to have non-vacuous ranges then I would not need to discuss 
alphabetical monotonicity at all. However, examples such as non-serial modal logics show that 
sometimes it is necessary. 
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Section 5.1: The Expansion System ES(1345) 
In this section I introduce a new proof system, called ES(1345 ), which is similar to ES(1234 ) but with a 
different side condition on 7-expansions. The main usefulness of ES(1345) is its role as the basis of the 
matrix characterisation of validity I develop in Chapter 7. However, presenting it now clearly shows its 
interesting features. Furthermore, it separates the theoretical development into stages making that 
development, I trust, easier to understand. 
The only difference between ES(1345) and ES(/234 ) is that a new side condition (5) replaces (2). To define 
the new side condition I need a preliminary definition. 
Definition 5.1.1 (LHME(T)) 
If E satisfies the least Herbrand model property and T is a ES expansion tree, define 
LHME(T) 
as the least Herbrand E-model of the set Ps'. That is, it is the least Herbrand model of all the E-
literals introduced by 8-expansions anywhere in T. Such a model exists by the least Herbrand 
model property, and is unique by the Least Herbrand Uniqueness Theorem. Recall that the 
definition of least Herbrand E-model means that p e LHM E(T) if and only if P6' p. 
I now define the system ES(4345). The conditions (1), (3), and (4) are as defined in Chapter 4. 
Quantifier Expansion Rules for ES(i345) 
(7) 
70(0 (6) 
	
80(0 
8r(a) 
 
Definition 5.1.2 (Side Condition (s)) 
(5) applies to 7-expansions: 
provided 7,(t) E LHML(T) 
The condition (s) is curious: it is a local check that requires global information to be confirmed. This 
chapter is dedicated to the consideration of the theoretical problems this raises. 
The proof systems using (s) instead of (2) do not seem to of great significance in themselves. However, 
they would be preferable to implement than the system of Chapter 4, since any proof tree in them is a 
proof tree in the earlier system, but not vice versa. There is a nice way of seeing the difference if you are 
familiar with Prolog. One might choose to implement the expansion rule (8), which introduces onto a 
branch an explicit restriction, by asserting (in the Prolog sense) the restriction, and using Prolog to do 
reasoning in the restriction theory. If one did this, however, on moving to a different branch one would 
have to retract (in the Prolog sense) any restrictions no longer on the branch. This is an expensive 
operation. However, in the proof systems of this chapter one need not be careful about where in a proof 
tree restrictions come from: indeed it is sound to use all restrictions. That is, when moving from one 
branch to another one would not have to retract anything. 
Earlier, it was much easier to prove the soundness of ES(1234) than the completeness. By contrast, the 
problem now is the soundness of ES(1345). Because it is easier to satisfy the condition (s) than (2), 
completeness is easy given the proven completeness of ES(1234 ). I will deal with this first. 
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Theorem 5.1.3: Completeness of ES(1345 ) 
If is a E-fonnula for a theory E that satisfies the least Herbrand model property, then: 
if (1) is E-valid then there is a closed ES(1345) tree for 0. 
Proof 
By the Completeness Theorem of ES(1234 ), there is a closed ES(/234 ) tree T for 0. But by definition of the 
side conditions (2) and (s), if a y-expansion satisfies (2) then it certainly satisfies (s). So 7 is also a 
ES(1345) tree. 
Completeness is trivial, but soundness is not. Indeed, for some theories E soundness can fail. An example 
is the modal theory consisting of symmetry and transitivity. 
Example (Failure of soundness of ES(1345 
Suppose E contains only the clauses for symmetry and transitivity. Consider the modal logic formula 
which translates into E-logic as: 
(Vx:E ,„ t) n Oy:Eficy t) 
In an attempt to show its validity, We can look for a closed ETab(1234 ) tree for this formula, but we 
cannot find one. If we try, we come up with: 
0 (Vx :ERx t) A (3Y :E y 
t 
Ot  
E R a  
0 
This tree is not expandable, because on the right hand branch, for no term t (including the name E) does 
0 k, ER t, so no possible y-expansion can satisfy the condition (2) in ES(/2). So the tree is not closed. 
Indeed this is the only tree there is for the original formula, so the original formula is not valid. 
We can find a closed tree if we allow ourselves to introduce positions that are in LHME(T). In particular, 
note that the above tree contains the E-literal ER a. The least Herbrand model of { E R a contains E R E as 
the following proof shows: 
	
ERa aRE 
	 (Symmetry) 
ERa,aRE ERE 
	 (Transitivity) 
Given this, we can extend the above tree to produce a closed ES(1345) tree for the original formula 
0 (Vx:, x t) n Oy :c y t) 
0 VX:ERA, t 	 0 3y 	 y t 
0 t 	 Ot 
ERa 	 OO 
O 
The introduction of Ot on the right hand branch satisfies (s) because ERE is in LHM E(T). 
End of Example 
So ETa0(1345) is unsound and in general ES(1345) can be unsound. The next question is, can we 
characterise when ES(1345) is sound and when it is not? I do not know of a simple characterisation of the 
soundness of ES(t345). Instead, I will proceed as follows. First, I will provide a characterisation of the 
0 qy :E y t 
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soundness of ES(/345 ). This will be essentially trivial since it just demands that the conditions (5) and (2) 
are equivalent for a given E. This is not very helpful. However, it does provide us with a benchmark. 
Then I will show that there are two much simpler sufficient conditions that guarantee the soundness of 
ES(134 5 ) for a particular theory. In Chapter 6, I shall show that these conditions are met for a wide range 
of restriction theories. 
Definition 5.1.4 (Negative Monotonicity Condition) 
Given that E satisfies the least Herbrand model property, and that 0 is a restricted E-logic formula, 
E satisfies the Negative Monotonicity Condition at if and only if, 
for any ES(134 5 ) tree T for 0, and for any expansion of 7 to 70(t) in T, then 
	
R Mt) 	 7,-(t)e LHM 	 ), 
where R is the set of E-formulas on the branch up to the 7-expansion. 
Notation 
I chose the name "Negative Monotonicity" for this condition because it demands that, once 7 is 
available to be reduced, the negative fact that 7,.(t) is not satisfied is not affected by anything 
else that can happen in the tree. 
The example above gives an example of a theory that fails to satisfy negative monotonicity. On the right 
hand branch of the tree, we have R as the empty set 0, and 0 X, c RE. However, because E x  a appears on 
	
the right hand branch, we have that eRce LHM 	 ). In this case, in the above definition we must set 
(1) = 0 (VX :6 x 	 (3), ,,Ry t), 
7= 0 3y,E ycy t, and 
t = E. 
Later in this chapter I introduce conditions on theories, namely "alphabetical monotonicity" and "non-
vacuity" that both imply that negative monotonicity holds. In Chapter 6 I show that many theories satisfy 
these conditions, and hence negative monotonicity. 
The Negative Monotonicity Condition justifies the soundness of ES( 134 5 ) rather trivially. 
Theorem 5.1.5: Soundness of ES( 1345 ) 
If 4'  is a restricted E-formula for a theory E that satisfies the least Herbrand model property, and E 
satisfies the Negative Monotonicity Condition at 0, then 
if there is a closed ES(t345) tree for 0, then 4' is E-valid. 
Proof 
Suppose T is a closed ES(/345) tree for di. Consider any 7-expansion of 7 to yo(t). We know, from the 
condition (5) that yr(t) e LHM E(T ). Then, by the contrapositive of the Negative Monotonicity Condition, 
R kE 7,(t), where R is the set of E-formulas on the branch up to the 7-expansion. So the expansion satisfies 
the condition (2). Hence 7 is a ES(1234 ) tree, and the result follows from the soundness of ES(1234 ). 
The Negative Monotonicity Condition is rather unpleasant because it involves consideration of all trees 
for a particular formula. Fortunately, there are much simpler sufficient conditions which ensure that the 
Negative Monotonicity Condition is satisfied for a wide range of formulas of theories. In particular, these 
sufficient conditions will be enough for all formulas of order sorted logics (at least for order sorted logics 
as I have defined them in Section 2.6), and for all formulas of a wide range of modal logics. 
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Section 5.2: Alphabetical Monotonicity and the Soundness of ES(1345) 
For ES(1345) to be useful we must be able to show its soundness relatively easily. I doubt that many 
would consider that showing the Negative Monotonicity Condition is relatively easy. To do so for a 
particular 0 potentially involves using a great deal of knowledge about the structure of trees in ES(1345). 
In this section, I define a condition which uses less information about the structure of trees, but which 
implies the Negative Monotonicity Condition. I will call this condition "alphabetical monotonicity". The 
theoretical point about alphabetical monotonicity, which I will make in this section, is that it is a 
sufficient condition for the soundness of ES(/345). The pragmatic point, which I will make in Chapter 6, 
is that alphabetical monotonicity holds for a wide range of E-logics. 
Notation 
In the name "alphabetical monotonicity", the word "monotonicity" arises exactly as in the 
Negative Monotonicity Condition. I use the word "alphabetical" to emphasise that the 
condition uses names instead of the use of positions in the Negative Monotonicity Condition. 
I need to set things up for the definition of alphabetical monotonicity. This will involve making 
definitions that capture some features of trees. Having done this it will be possible to forget that we were 
talking about trees at all, at least for the purposes of proving alphabetical monotonicity. 
Elements of P8' share two principal features. Firstly, they are all E-atoms. Secondly, each arises at the 
expansion of a 8-formula. That is, they arise in the expansion of OVx, p(x) 0 or Ex ,p(x)0. Now, there is 
nothing in the definition of E-logic to demand that x must appear in p(x). However, for the purposes of 
alphabetical monotonicity I will demand this. This does not affect expressibility of E-logic at all, as the 
following argument shows. Suppose that p(x) is an instance of a n place predicate not containing x. Then 
we can add to E an n +1 place predicate p', put x in the last argument position and replace p(x) by p'(x) in 
0. If we add suitable clauses to E, expressing the equivalence of p(x) and p'(x), the E-validity of 0 will be 
unchanged. The following clauses would work: 
p(x) 	 p'(x) 
p'(x) 	 p(x) 
For alphabetical monotonicity, I wish to get away from considering trees. Instead, I will consider just 
sets of E-literals having certain properties. These properties will be closely modelled on the properties 
that sets of E-literals have in a tree. 
Now I am assuming that at each 8-expansion, the introduced name appears in the introduced restriction. 
If we are considering a tree, we can look at which name is introduced. However, I wish to get away from 
considering trees. This means that I have to introduce some mechanism for deciding which names 
correspond to the introduced name. To do this, I will assume that, given a set of literals R, there is a 
function 
new : R —> Names 
such that for any element p of R, new(p) represents a new name in p. From my assumption, I may assume 
that new(p) appears somewhere in p. 
The next step is to observe that for some 0, it is not possible to introduce a new name into all argument 
positions in a E-predicate. For example, consider 0 arising from the translation of modal logics into E-
logic. The translation of 10v is, for some previously introduced name r, 13x,Ex xv. Similarly, the 
translation of OLIN! is OVx:gx 	 On reducing either of these by (8), the introduced name can only arise in 
the second argument position of R. I shall say that only the second argument position of R is eligible. 
For the purposes of alphabetical monotonicity, I will assume that each E-predicate has a certain number 
of (and certainly at least one) eligible argument positions. 
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Another concept I will use is that of name-acyclicity. By name acyclicity I mean that a set of restrictions 
can be ordered so that the new name in each restriction has not appeared in an earlier restriction. It is 
easy to show that sets of restrictions in ES(i345) proofs satisfy this condition. The reason I put this into 
the hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity is that later I will define a stronger condition called "non-
vacuity", and I will use name acyclicity to show that non-vacuity implies alphabetical monotonicity. The 
concept of name-acyclicity will have further importance when I discuss non-vacuity. 
Definition 5.2.1 (name-acyclic) 
A set of restrictions R is name-acyclic given a function new : R Names if R can be ordered as 
{ p i , p2, 	 } such that for each i, the name new(pi ) does not appear in any any earlier restriction pj  
with j < i. 
Definition 5.2.2 (hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity) 
Sets of E-atoms R, R', the function new, and the E-atom 7r(t), together satisfy the hypotheses of 
alphabetical monotonicity, iff: 
(i) for each E-atom p in R and R', the name new(p) appears in p in an eligible argument position; 
and 
(ii) new does not map two different elements of R, 	 to the same name. That is, the function 
new : R u R' Names is one to one; and 
(iii) no name in R is a new name in R'. That is, names(R) n new(R') = 0; and 
(iv) no name in 7,-(t) is a new name in R'. That is, names (7,-(0) n new(R') = 0; and 
(v) the set R u R' is name-acyclic given new. 
Definition 5.2.3 (alphabetical monotonicity) 
E satisfies alphabetical monotonicity iff, 
for each set of E-atoms R, R', function new, and E-atom 7r(t) which satisfy the hypotheses of 
alphabetical monotonicity: 
if R 	 7r(t) then R, 	 7r(t). 
The reason for this somewhat complex definition is to make the condition as weak as possible while still 
mimicking the role that positions play in trees. This makes the following proof essentially trivial. 
However, the proof is still worth doing because I will show later that alphabetical monotonicity is not too 
difficult to demonstrate. In particular, if we can prove that alphabetical monotonicity holds without using 
all the hypotheses, we can safely ignore the extra ones. I will only need to use (v) when I introduce 
"non-vacuity", and show that it implies alphabetical monotonicity. Non-vacuity will often be extremely 
easy to show, and will also give rise to a better matrix characterisation of validity than alphabetical 
monotonicity. For the moment, though, back to the subject at hand 
Theorem 5.2.4: Soundness of ES(1345 ) 
If E satisfies alphabetical monotonicity, and if every 8-expansion in any ES(1345) tree of 0 introduces a 
name only into an eligible position, then E satisfies the Negative Monotonicity Condition at 0. 
Proof 
Consider any expansion of y to yo(t) in a ES(1345 ) tree for 0. If R is the set of restrictions on the branch 
at the point of expansion, I must show that if R 	 y.(t) then 7r(t) LHME(T), or equivalently that 
Psr 	 yr(t). To do this I show how to satisfy the hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity. 
Define R' = P6r — R, and the function new on R, R', by that new(8,(a))= a. 
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Now, the sets R and R', the function new, and the atom yr(t) satisfy the hypotheses of alphabetical 
monotonicity, as the following arguments show: 
(i) This is satisfied by the definition of new and the assumption in the statement of the theorem. 
(ii) new is one-to-one since the condition (4) is satisfied in 7. 
(iii) Any name in R must be introduced by a 6- or a 7-expansion on the branch. But any y expansion only 
introduces c or a name already on the branch, by (3). So any name in names(R) is either c or must 
have been introduced by a 8-expansion on the branch. That is, names(R) c new(R)u{ E}. But as new 
is one-to-one, and R and R' are disjoint, new(R)nnew(R') = 0, as required. 
(iv) Since (3) is satisfied, each name in yr(t) appears in R. 
(v) A simple ordering for 6,(a) E P8' will do. We say that 6,1 is earlier in the ordering than 6,2 if either 
6,1 appears on a more leftmost branch than 6,2, or if their leftmost appearance is on the same branch 
but 6,1 appears higher on that branch. Now consider the first occurrence of some restriction 6,2 e P6' 
containing a name a associated with a different position 8,1 . The name a can only arise in 6,2 by an 
earlier y or 6 expansion on the branch 6,2 appears in, since (4) is satisfied. Furthermore, if it arises 
because of a y-expansion then it must be introduced by the introduction of a 5-expansion since (3) is 
satisfied. In either case the 8-expansion introducing 8,1 (a) must appear before 6,2 on the branch. This 
argument applies in particular to the leftmost occurrence of Sr, and so 8,1 is earlier in the ordering 
than 6,2. This applies to any positions 6,1 and 6,2, and so implies that the set of restrictions is indeed 
name-acyclic. 
As the hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity are satisfied, and E is assumed to satisfy alphabetical 
monotonicity, we know that if R X, yr(t) then R, 	 yr(t). By definition, Ru = P6', and so 
alphabetical monotonicity gives us exactly what I needed to show. 
Section 5.3: Non-Vacuity and the Soundness of LS(/45) 
Alphabetical monotonicity ensures that (5) is in fact equivalent to (2) whenever a (7)-expansion is applied. 
However, it requires that the condition (3) hold everywhere in a tree. Later, when I develop the matrix 
characterisation of validity, this requirement will cause problems. Therefore, I now show how a stronger 
condition on E, can be sufficient for the soundness of an expansion system containing (s) but not (3). 
Recall that the expansion system ES(14s) is the expansion system containing the propositional expansion 
rules from S, the rules (y) and (8), and the side conditions (1), (4), and (s). The completeness of ES(145) is 
trivial, since we have that ES(/24 ) is complete, and any ES(424 )-tree is also a ES(445)-tree. 
Theorem 5.3.1: Completeness of ES(145) 
If (1) is a restricted E-fortnula for a theory E that satisfies the least Herbrand model property, then: 
if 4  is s-valid then there is a closed ES(145) tree for (I). 
Soundness is not at all trivial. Indeed, soundness fails for the empty theory! 
Example (Failure of soundness of ES(145)) 
Suppose E is empty, and that a p is a one-argument E-predicate. Consider the signed formula 
I (Vx, p(x) I) ( (]y:p(y ) t) V t) 
This formula is certainly satisfiable. It is satisfied by any E-model in which p is false of everything. We 
can look for a closed E,Tab(124 ) tree for this formula, but we cannot find one. If we try, we come up with: 
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1 (Vx,p(x) I) ^ ( Oy:p(y) t) v t) 
1 (Vx: p(x) 0 
1(3y :p(v) t) v t 
1 	 t 
It 
1t  
p(a)  
1f 
O 
The introduction of if on the left hand branch satisfies (2) because p(a) is present on the branch. 
This tree is not expandable, because on the right hand branch, for no term t (including the name c) does 
0 h, p(t), so no possible y-expansion can satisfy the condition (2) in ES(12). The tree is not closed. Indeed 
this is the only ETab(/24 ) tree there is for the original formula. 
If we allow ourselves to introduce positions that are in LHME(7), we can extend the above tree to produce 
a closed LTab(145) tree for the original formula: 
1 (ex:p(x) f) 
 A  ( (3y :p(y) t) v t) 
1 (Vx :p(x) f) 
10y:po,) t) v t 
1 	 t 	 1 t  
	
1t 	 1f  
	
p(a) 	 0 
1f 
O 
The introduction of if on the right hand branch satisfies (5) because p(a) is in LHME(7). 
End of Example 
So ETab(145) is unsound and so in general ES(145) can be unsound. The next question is, can we 
characterise a range of cases when ES(/45) is in fact sound? 
I will now present a condition on E that ensures that ES(145) is sound. This is done by showing that if the 
condition is satisfied and there is a closed ES(145)-tree for a set of formulas, then there is a closed ES(124)-
tree for that set of formulas. The result follows from the soundness of ES(124 ). The next chapter contains 
examples of proving that the condition holds. 
Notation 
I call the condition "non-vacuity". This is because the problem revealed above was that an 
empty domain was possible on one branch, but not on another. By ensuring that an empty 
domain is never possible, the problem disappears. The actual condition generalises this idea. 
Non-vacuity is a much simpler condition to state than alphabetical monotonicity, and this is reflected in 
the fact that it is much easier to prove (where true) as I will show in Chapter 6. 
As for alphabetical monotonicity, I will use the notion of eligible argument positions in E-predicates. 
Now I will assume that each E-predicate has exactly one eligible argument position. Earlier I assumed 
that each E-predicate had at least one eligible position. All the logics I consider in this thesis satisfy this 
assumption, and makes the definitions and proofs easier. One could easily do very similar work without 
the assumption. 
Notation 
I will write p(t ;to) to indicate that p takes the vector of arguments t in non-eligible positions and the 
argument t o in its eligible position. 
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Definition 5.3.2 (Non-vacuity) 
E satisfies non-vacuity iff, 
for each E-predicate p and for each vector of arguments t, there is some term to such that, with 
the possible exception of all the names in to appear in t, and such that 0 h, p(t;t0). 
The empty theory (used in the example above) is a particularly simple case where non-vacuity fails to 
hold. With nothing in E we certainly cannot prove that 0 h, p(t;t0). More complex theories failing non-
vacuity arise in modal logics. In particular, logics which are non-reflexive and non-serial fail it. So in the 
theory containing just the clause for transitivity, namely 
OVRX A xRy 	 wRy, 
we cannot prove 0 k E tgc to for any t or to. 
Modal theories containing seriality satisfy non-vacuity. The clause for seriality is: 
w Rnext(w). 
Non vacuity holds since the only eligible argument position in fIK. is the second one, and for any t we can 
show 0 kE tR next(t). Further examples where non-vacuity holds are given in Chapter 6. 
I show, in two steps, that ES(/45) is sound if non-vacuity holds. First I will show that if E satisfies non-
vacuity then it must also satisfy alphabetical monotonicity. Then I will use this result to show the 
soundness of the expansion rule (7) given the side condition (5). However, this soundness will rely on an 
extra condition: that the restrictions in a proof are name-acyclic. It is unpleasant to have to enforce this 
extra condition. Fortunately, however, the most important use I make of the soundness of LSO 45) is in the 
derivation of a matrix characterisation of validity (in Chapter 7): in that context name-acyclicity is 
guaranteed by conditions that are essential for other reasons. I first need to make a simple observation. 
Notation 
When dealing with assignments, I will write "t a" or "(t) a" to indicate the application of the 
assignment a to the term t. If al and a2 are both assignments, then "a l a2 " indicates the 
assignment resulting if al is applied followed by a2. Finally, I will write, for example, 
[a 1 :=t 1 , a 2 := t2 ] to indicate the assignment in which a 1 is replaced by t i and a 2 is replaced 
with t 2. 
Observation 5.3.3 
For any set R of E-atoms, E-atom p, and assignment a of names to terms, if 
R p 
then 
(R)a (p)a 
Proof 
An easy way to see this is to use the fact that E is expressed in ordinary first order logic. By 
substitutivity, if R kE p then ( R kE p) G. But by definition, E contains no names. Therefore (E )a = E, 
giving the desired result. 
The next lemma illustrates the crucial use of my earlier definition of a set of restrictions being name-
acyclic. The rest of the proofs in this section will rely on this lemma. 
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Lemma 5.3.4 
If E satisfies non-vacuity, and R and R' are sets of restrictions with associated function new such that 
RuR' is name-acyclic, then there is an assignment a of new names in R' to terms built up from the new 
names in R, constants, and the name e, such that 
(R) G 	 (R') cy 
Proof 
Firstly, consider any names in R and R' that do not appear as new names somewhere. Any such names 
play no special role and we may assign them arbitrarily, for instance to the special name e. Let Go be the 
assignment assigning all such names to e (or the empty assignment if there are no such names). 
Because the set is name-acyclic, we may order RuR' as 
p i (t i ;a 1 ), p2(t2 ;a2), 
where each t is a vector of terms and each ai is a single name new(pi) such that ai does not appear in any 
t• for j 
We build up an assignment a from Go, al ,G2, ... We start with Go, as defined in the first paragraph. We 
construct Gi+1  from Gi as follows. 
If pi+i +1 ai+i ) e R then we set Gi+i = Gi. 
Otherwise pi±i 	 ai±i ) e R'. Because the set of restrictions is name-acyclic a1+1 is new, and by 
construction Gi does not assign anything to ai+1 . So (pi±i (4+1 ; ai+1 ))Gi = pi+1 ( (4,1 )Gi ;a1+1 ). By non-
vacuity, there is some term ti+1, containing only names in (Ii+I )Gi or e, such that 
0 	 p +1 ( (ti+I )Gi ;ti+i ) = (pi+i ( t ai +1 ) ai ) [a; +1 :=t1 +1 ] 
In this case set Gi+1  = Gi [ai+1 := ti±1 ]. 
The assignments Gi can be combined into a single assignment a = [a 1 := t 1, a2 := t2, 	 ] so that (a1) G = ti. 
We have that if pi n R' then 0 h, (pi) G, so 
(R) G kE (R') G 
Corollary 5.3.5: Non-vacuity implies alphabetical monotonicity 
If E satisfies non-vacuity then it satisfies alphabetical monotonicity. 
Proof 
Consider any sets of E-atoms R and R', function new, and E-atom yr(t) satisfying the hypotheses of 
alphabetical monotonicity, and additionally satisfying my assumption that each E-predicate has exactly 
one eligible argument position. From part (v) of these hypotheses, R u R' is name-acyclic. From Lemma 
5.3.4 there is an assignment G such that 
(R) h, (R') a. 	 (1) 
Suppose that R, 
	
Yr(t). Then by Observation 5.3.3 
(R, R')cs ZL (yr(t))cs 	 (2) 
(1) and (2) together imply that 
(R)a (7r(t))a 
But by the hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity, and since each a, = new(p,), R and 7,(t) contain no 
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occurrence of any ai if pi e R'. Therefore (R)a = R and (7,(t))u = yr(t). Hence, R V() and E satisfies 
alphabetical monotonicity. 
Lemma 5.3.4 is certainly false for a set of restrictions that are not name acyclic. For example, the modal 
theory containing only seriality satisfies non-vacuity (as I show in Chapter 6). Consider the two sets of 
restrictions R = 0 and R' = { a fiz. b, b R  a } . Although from seriality we have that 0 aRnext(a) and 
0 b Rnext(b), no assignment a can satisfy both restrictions simultaneously. Although the main theorem 
of this section, Theorem 5.3.7, relies on Lemma 5.3.4, I have not yet been able to establish that it is 
necessary, as well as sufficient for the theorem. That is, I do not have an example where allowing non 
name-acyclic proofs allows the construction of closed trees for invalid formulas. 
The soundness proof I am about to give is based on viewing a branch in a ES(145) proof as a disguised 
version (by some assignment a) of a branch in a ES(12) proof, which we know to be sound from Chapter 
4. To this end the following observation is crucial. 
Observation 5.3.6 
If S is a set of E-formulas and G is an assignment of names to terms, then S is E-satisfiable if (S)a is. 
Proof 
Say (S)G is satisfied by a E-model M = < D,I>. We can base a new interpretation function J on I to 
provide a model for S. Simply define J by: 
for names a, cri = [(a)u ]I ; and 
for functions f, fi is defined by jf(t , 	 , tn)iJ = (f(t , 	 ,t„))G 	 and 
for predicates P, PJ is defined by [P(t 1 , ... 	 = [ (P(t 1 , 	 JO) a . 
Then the model < D, J > serves as a model for S. 
Theorem 5.3.7: Soundness of ES(145) given non-vacuity 
If S is a sound propositional expansion system, E satisfies non-vacuity, and there is a closed ES(145) tree 
for S in which the set of restrictions introduced by 6-expansions is name-acyclic, then S is s-unsatisfiable. 
Proof 
I prove the contrapositive: that if S is E-satisfiable there is no closed tree for S. 
Suppose that T is a ES(145) tree for S. Then for each branch A, let 112,, be the set of restrictions introduced 
by 8-expansions on the branch. By Lemma 5.3.4, and the assumption that PS' is name-acyclic, for each 
branch X there is an assignment 62, from names not introduced by 6-expansions on X such that: 
	
(Rh) ax 
	 (138' ) 	 (1) 
If X, and ji are different branches we can demand that the assignments ax and 6g agree on names appearing 
on the common part of the two branches. To see this, note that from the proof of Lemma 5.3.4 to 
construct GA, we need to find terms to assign to each name a introduced by 6-expansions on different 
branches. In each case we choose names such that 0 h, (p(a))Gx. But if a name appears on the common 
	
part of two branches and is assigned by either ax or 	 then that name is not introduced by a 6-expansion 
on the common part of X and t. But since the name appears on the common part of the branch, which is 
above the separate parts, and since each 8-expansion satisfies (/), no expansion on either branch can 
introduce that name. So we can construct both GA, and GI, by descending the branch, choosing a suitable 
assignment for each name jointly until the two branches separate. 
Now we can look at each branch A, under the assignment ax. I show that if U is the set of formulas up to a 
certain point on the branch k, then the application of the expansion rule, viewed under the assignment 6), 
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is a sound one. Reexpressing this precisely: if (U)ax is E-satisfiable, {X1 , 	 } c U, and 
X1 
Yi I • • • I Ym 
is an application of an expansion rule, then 
for some i, (Uu{ Yi pax is E-satisfiable. 
First note that the expansion viewed under a is a correct expansion of (U)ax, if we ignore side conditions. 
The only case to check is that of a branching propositional rule. But a propositional rule introduces no 
new names, and for any branch Xi descended from 	 (Yi)csx, = (Yi)csx because of the earlier demand that 
each ax is identical on names in a shared part of a branch. 
The second task is to show that the expansion viewed under cy is a sound one. Since propositional rules 
are sound without side conditions, we are left only with quantifier rules. Also, the new name introduced 
by a 8-expansion will be unchanged by the assignment ax and will be new on the branch. Therefore any 
8-application will satisfy (1) and so is sound (by Theorem 4.3.2). 
The tricky case is that of a 7-expansion. Since the original y-application must satisfy (s), P6 	 yr(t). 
From (1), (Rx)ax kE (yr(t))ax. Now, Rx is the set of restrictions on the whole branch X, which can be a 
superset of the set of restrictions Ru contained in U. But (Ru)ax, (Rx — Ru)ax, new defined in the usual 
way, and (yr(t))45x satisfy the hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity. E satisfies alphabetical 
monotonicity because it satisfies non-vacuity (Corollary 5.3.5). So by alphabetical monotonicity, 
(Ru)ax (yr(t))ax. Therefore the (y) application viewed under the assignment ax in fact satisfies the side 
condition (2), and so is a sound application as shown by Theorem 4.3.1. 
Now consider the tree T, whose root is the set S containing no names. Then for any assignment, S = (S)a. 
Then for some branch X, and associated assignment ax and set of formulas U, by the soundness of the 
expansion rules under ax, since (S)ax = S is E-satisfiable, (U)ax is E-satisfiable, and by Observation 5.3.6, 
U is E-satisfiable and so cannot be closed. So if S is E-satisfiable there is no closed ES(145) tree for S. 
1=1 
Although I have shown that ES(145) can be sound, this is at the expense of demanding name-acyclicity. 
This is a global condition on proof trees, rather like (4). In later proof systems the condition will be 
subsumed by other conditions. That is, the usual problem of ensuring the soundness of existential 
instantiation will arise: in solving this, for example as I do in Chapter 7 with Bibel's reduction orderings, 
one ensures name-acyclicity anyway. 
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Chapter 6 
Proving Alphabetical Monotonicity and Non-vacuity 
I have shown in Chapter 5 how alphabetical monotonicity and non-vacuity justify the soundness of 
ES( 134 5 ) and 1,S(145) respectively. In this chapter I discuss how these conditions can be proved for a given 
theory E. I discuss non-vacuity in Section 6.1 and alphabetical monotonicity in Section 6.2. As 
alphabetical monotonicity is implied by non-vacuity (Corollary 5.3.5), it is only necessary to consider 
theories where non-vacuity fails. 
The proofs of non-vacuity in this chapter are very much easier than those of alphabetical monotonicity. 
This is interesting. Non-vacuity seems to win on all counts over alphabetical monotonicity: it is easier to 
prove; it implies alphabetical monotonicity anyway; and when it is satisfied we can throw away (3). It is 
this last property that is most important, playing a significant role in matrix characterisations of validity 
(in Chapter 7), where a nicer matrix system is possible than where only alphabetical monotonicity holds, 
and being essential for instantiation rules (in Chapter 8). It is not obvious to me why this important 
condition should be so easy to prove. 
Section 6.1: Proving Non-vacuity 
If we can prove non-vacuity for a theory E, then the proof system ES( 14 5 ) is sound, and this is a property 
we are very interested in. Fortunately, non-vacuity is often a very easy property to prove. In this section 
I show how to prove it for serial modal logics and for sorted logics with non-empty domains. These 
proofs will be very easy, contrasting with the proofs of alphabetical monotonicity I give later in the 
Chapter. 
For convenience I repeat the definition of non-vacuity. 
Definition 5.3.2 (Non-vacuity) 
E satisfies non-vacuity iff, 
for each E-predicate p and for each vector of arguments t, there is some term to such that, with 
the possible exception of E, all the names in t o appear in t, and such that 0 h, p(t;t 0 ). 
Section 6.1.1: Non-vacuity in Sorted Logics 
Consider non-vacuity for sortal logics in Frisch's (1989) framework. Frisch's syntax and semantics are 
essentially the same as mine, except that all E-predicates must be monadic (that is, of one argument). 
This includes, for example, order-sorted logics. Where E-predicates are monadic, non-vacuity becomes a 
triviality. That is, in all cases p takes only one argument so the quantification over vectors of arguments t 
is empty. Non-vacuity is equivalent to the demand: 
for each E-predicate p, there is some term t such that 0 h, p(t). 
Rephrasing this in the language of sorts, one derives the following theorem. 
I As I mentioned in Chapter 5, I am ignoring the problem of ensuring name-acyclicity. This is unnecessary in Chapter 
7 where it is subsumed by another check used there. 
-54- 
Theorem 6.1.1.1: Non-vacuity for Sorted Logics with Non-empty Domains 
If a sorted logic contains sorts s ,s 2, 	 sn and a sort theory E, then the sort theory satisfies non-vacuity 
iff the sort theory ensures that the domain of each sort si is non-empty. 
Section 6.1.2: Non-vacuity in Serial Modal Logics 
Serial and reflexive modal logics satisfy non-vacuity. For the first order variants, we must demand that 
the domain in each world is non-empty. The proof of these facts is extremely simple, and I give it below. 
It is interesting to note the extreme ease of these proofs compared to the difficulty of proofs of 
alphabetical monotonicity for modal logics, yet these proofs cover a wider range of logics. Because of 
these results, we need only consider alphabetical monotonicity in non-serial modal logics and in this 
thesis the only such modal logics I have considered are K, K4 and KB. 
Theorem 6.1.2.1: Non-vacuity for Serial Modal Logics with Non-empty Domains 
All the modal theories containing either reflexivity or seriality, and which ensure that the domain of each 
world is non-empty, satisfy non-vacuity. 
Proof 
For modal theories we assume that only the second argument position of R is eligible, and the first 
argument position of in. I will show that non-vacuity holds by considering first in and then R. 
If the theory E ensures that the domain of each world is non-empty, then for any world w there is a term 
t(w) such that 0 kE t(w) in w. 
If the theory E contains reflexivity, then for any world w we have that 0 w R w. If E contains seriality, 
then instead we have that 0 w R next (w). In either case we have some term as required by non-vacuity. 
Section 6.2: Proving Alphabetical Monotonicity 
The intention of my work is to make it as easy as possible to establish the correctness of a variety of 
interesting proof systems. For instance, now we can read off the soundness and completeness of ES(134s) 
for any countermodel expansion system S, if the relevant theory satisfies alphabetical monotonicity and 
the least Herbrand model property. In Chapter 7 this result will lead to a matrix characterisation of 
validity. It is trivial to observe that a theory is expressible in Horn clauses and therefore satisfies the least 
Herbrand model property. Unfortunately, proving alphabetical monotonicity for a given theory is not 
trivial. So it is desirable to have a further range of results which give easy conditions to check if a theory 
satisfies alphabetical monotonicity. Any such result must rest on the global properties of the theory: it is 
not enough, for instance, that each clause satisfies alphabetical monotonicity as their combinations may 
not do so. For instance, the combination of transitivity and symmetry fails alphabetical monotonicity (see 
Section 5.3) while each on its own satisfies it. 
I can see no general way of deciding alphabetical monotonicity. So in this section I demonstrate that a 
range of theories satisfy alphabetical monotonicity. I am able to give one general result which shows that 
alphabetical monotonicity holds if the clauses satisfy certain properties. This result, which I call the 
"Marking Theorem" takes advantage of common features of proofs of alphabetical monotonicity, 
meaning that a comparatively simple check is all that is required for a particular theory. A simple 
corollary of the Marking Theorem gives a simply checked syntactic property which is sufficient for 
alphabetical monotonicity. I call this property "Reverse Range Restriction". Reverse range restriction 
holds in the theories of some modal logics and in a large number of sorted logics, including order sorted 
logics. Although the Marking Theorem only provides a sufficient condition to satisfy alphabetical 
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monotonicity, not a necessary one, it is enough for all the theories I consider in this section. 
In Section 6.2.1 I discuss the general nature of proofs of alphabetical monotonicity. In Section 6.2.2 I 
show that alphabetical monotonicity holds for the empty theory. In Section 6.2.3 I introduce reverse 
range restriction, although I leave the proof to the next section. I use reverse range restriction for the 
modal theory of symmetry and order sorted logics. In Section 6.2.4 I prove the Marking Theorem (and 
reverse range restriction as a corollary) and apply it in Section 6.2.5 to first order variants of the modal 
theory of transitivity. 
Section 6.2.1: The Nature of Proofs of Alphabetical Monotonicity 
Before proceeding, it is convenient to recall the definition of alphabetical monotonicity. 
Definition 5.2.1 (name-acyclic) 
A set of restrictions R is name-acyclic given a function new : R Names if R can be ordered as 
p , p2, 	 } such that for each i, the name new(pi) does not appear in any any earlier restriction pi  
with j < i. 
Definition 5.2.2 (hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity) 
Sets of E-atoms R, R', the function new, and the E-atom -yr(t), together satisfy the hypotheses of 
alphabetical monotonicity, iff: 
(i) for each E-atom p in R and R', the name new(p) appears in p in an eligible argument position; 
and 
(ii) new does not map two different elements of R, R', to the same name. That is, the function 
new : R u R' Names is one to one; and 
(iii) no name in R is a new name in R'. That is, names(R) n new(R') = 0; and 
(iv) no name in 7,(t) is a new name in R'. That is, names (7,-(t)) n new(R') = 0; and 
(v) the set R u R' is name-acyclic given new. 
Definition 5.2.3 (alphabetical monotonicity) 
E satisfies alphabetical monotonicity iff, 
for each set of E-atoms R, R', function new, and E-atom 7r(t) which satisfy the hypotheses of 
alphabetical monotonicity: 
if R 	 71(t) then R, 	 yr(t). 
As well as being convenient, there is a pedagogical purpose behind recalling these definitions. From the 
completeness of ES(134s) (Section 4.4.2), the soundness of ES(134s) given the Negative Monotonicity 
Condition (Theorem 5.1.4), and particularly the fact that alphabetical monotonicity implies the Negative 
Monotonicity Condition (Theorem 5.2.4), we know that if we can prove alphabetical monotonicity for a 
particular restriction theory E, we can use ES(1345) for that E. However, looking at the definitions above, 
to prove alphabetical monotonicity for E, we need know nothing about ES(1345 ) at all. Where it is 
possible, it is much simpler to prove alphabetical monotonicity, than to prove ES(1345) correct directly. 
In the proofs of alphabetical monotonicity in this section, I will not in fact need to use part (v) of the 
hypotheses at all. Part (v) was necessary in the proof that non-vacuity implies alphabetical monotonicity 
(Corollary 5.3.5), but in all the examples in this section, parts (i) to (iv) will be strong enough for the 
result without (v). 
I will use UR-resolution (Unit Resulting resolution) as a tool for proving alphabetical monotonicity. 
UR-resolution is complete for sets of Horn clauses (stated, for example in Eisinger and Ohlbach 1989), 
2 Wos (1988) cites (McCharcn et al 1976) as the original source for UR-resolution. 
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and I will only consider theories in Horn clause form. 
In the context of Horn clauses, UR-resolution is a very natural procedure. The idea is simply that to 
prove p from R given E, one uses clauses in E in a forwards direction. That is, given a clause 
B1, . Bk H, one concludes H if we already know each B1, either because it is in R or because we have 
already proved it. The only complication is that rather than just matching B1 against a literal in R, we 
must unify it. Anyone with any familiarity either with PROLOG or resolution theorem proving will know 
what this involves, and I will assume such familiarity with unification throughout this chapter. 
The use I make of UR-resolution is as follows. I will consider a hypothetical UR-resolution proof of 
R,12' 	 p, which will be list of deductions of the following form, each based on a clause from E: 
B 	 H 1  
B?, 	 Bm2 	 H 2  
B ?, B3, . B3 	 H 3  ni 3 
B r; , 13 1, 	 Bm" 
where each B has been unified either with an element of R, R' or an earlier conclusion Hk, and where Hn 
has been unified with p. (Note that m, is allowed to be 0, i.e. clauses containing only a head and no body 
are allowed.) 
Given such a proof, I will be able to show that there is another one in which no element of R' is used. (I 
will do this by induction on the length n of the proof.) 
Section 6.2.2: Alphabetical Monotonicity for Empty Theories 
The easiest theories to prove alphabetical monotonicity for are empty theories. 
Theorem 6.2.2.1: Alphabetical monotonicity for empty theories 
If E is empty then E satisfies the least Herbrand model property and alphabetical monotonicity. 
Proof 
Since E is empty it is trivially in Horn clause form and hence satisfies the least Herbrand model property. 
Now suppose that we have R, R', new, and yr satisfying the hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity. 
Since E is empty and R and R' contain only atoms: 
R, 	 yr iff yre RUR' 
But if the hypotheses for alphabetical monotonicity are satisfied then new(Ie)nnames(yr)= 0 and so 
yr R'. So yr c RuR' if and only if y,. e R. This gives us, as required by alphabetical monotonicity, that 
R, 	 h, yr iff R kE7r 
Although E being empty is a trivial property, non-trivial logics have empty theories. For example, in the 
modal logic K no demands are made on the accessibility relation, and hence when we translate K into a 
E-logic, E is empty. Also, in simple sorted logics (discussed in Section 2.6), the only syntactic extension 
to predicate logic is the attachment of sorts to variables. Unless we do demand that some sorts must be 
non-empty, the restriction theory will be empty. (If we demand that all sorts are non-empty then non-
vacuity will be satisfied, as discussed in Section 6.1.) 
-57- 
Even where, as here, the proofs of alphabetical monotonicity are easy, the resulting proof systems still 
allow us to take full advantage of the parts of the semantics of the logic that are easy to reason in. Indeed, 
in the case of the empty theory, of course those parts of the logic are trivial to reason in. 
Section 6.2.3: Reverse Range Restriction 
In this section I give a sufficient condition for alphabetical monotonicity which is easy to check. There is 
a tradeoff between ease of checking sufficient conditions and the number of cases that the conditions 
cover. At one extreme is the trivial proof in the previous section for empty theories, but of course not 
many theories are empty. At the other extreme is the full definition of alphabetical monotonicity, which 
trivially covers all cases but is difficult to check. In this section I give a first intermediate point along this 
continuum, which can be characterised syntactically very easily. This is enough to prove that the modal 
theory for symmetry satisfies alphabetical monotonicity, as well as the theories for many sorted logics. In 
this section I will omit the proof that this condition does imply alphabetical monotonicity, since I prove it 
as an easy corollary of a more general condition that will cover more theories but be less easy to check in 
general. 
The condition I introduce in this section is called "Reverse Range Restriction". It applies to theories E 
expressed as a list of Horn clauses (where each m1 may be 0): 
C1  B 1 B 1 	 . B 1 	 H 1  1, 	 2 , • • 	 m i 
C2 : B j, 	B y,... 13,n2 2 	 H 2  
C fl : 
Definition 6.2.3.1 (Reverse Range Restricted) 
A clause C' is reverse range restricted if each variable that appears in any Bi also appears in Hi. 
A theory E is reverse range restricted if each clause in E is reverse range restricted. 
Examples 
The following clauses are all reverse range restricted 
p(x) q(x) 
q(c) 
q(x) 
p(c,x) p (d,y) —> q(x,y,z) 
None of the following clauses are reverse range restricted. 
p(x) q(c) 
p(x) q(y) 
p(c,x) p(c,y) q(c,y,z) 
Notation 
The name "Reverse Range Restricted" is derived from Manthey and Bry's (1988) use of the 
term "Range Restricted" with respect to their theorem prover "SATCHMO". Their definition 
of "Range Restricted" is exactly the reverse of my definition: C is range restricted if every 
variable that appears in IP appears in some Bj. 
That reverse range restriction implies alphabetical monotonicity can be seen very easily, although I omit a 
formal proof in this section, giving it instead as Corollary 6.2.4.4. Consider any UR-resolution proof that 
R, 	 p. If any restriction from R' is used by any clause from E, then it contains a name not in p. By 
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reverse range restriction, that name appears in the conclusion of the clause. But then if that conclusion is 
used in another clause, the conclusion of that clause contains a name not in p. And so on, meaning that 
every conclusion derived from an element of R' contains a name not in p. So p must be derived without 
the use of R', so R kE p. 
Section 6.2.3.1: Modal Logic Theories Satisfying Reverse Range Restriction 
Of the clauses that are used in propositional modal theories, reverse range restriction is satisfied by 
seriality, reflexivity, and symmetry. However, transitivity does not because in the clause 
(w1x A xlCy ) —> w Ry, 
x appears in the body but not in the head of the clause. 
As corollaries of the Reverse Range Restriction Theorem we obtain alphabetical monotonicity for the 
modal logics consist of any combination of seriality, reflexivity, and symmetry. However, since either 
seriality or reflexivity is enough for non-vacuity, the only interesting theory that we get alphabetical 
monotonicity for is symmetry alone, corresponding to the modal logic KB. 
Since the varying domain and constant domain variants of first order modal logics do not introduce any 
new clauses into the logic, alphabetical monotonicity holds for these variants of the modal logics with 
theories containing seriality, reflexivity, and symmetry: that is, the modal logics D, T, KB, DB and B. 
This holds whether or not we demand that the domain of each world is non-empty. 
The clauses for descending domains and for cumulative domains do not satisfy reverse range restriction. 
However, recall that the cumulative domain and descending domain clauses imply each other given the 
clause for symmetry, as I mentioned in Section 2.5.2. Furthermore, their combination yields the same set 
of valid formulas as the constant domain variant. Therefore, reverse range restriction is enough to show 
alphabetical monotonicity for any of the first order variants of the symmetric modal logics. 
Section 6.2.3.2: Order Sorted Logics 
Recall from Section 2.6 that the clauses in a restriction theory which arise from order sorted logics are of 
one of the following three forms. 
sort 2(x) —> sort i(x) 
sort i(x 1) A sort 2(x 2) A • ' • A sortn (xn) 	 sort 0(f(x 1,x 2, . . 
sort i(t) 
The first type of clause is an expression of part of the sort ordering, the second is a sorted function 
declaration, and the third clause expresses the non-emptiness of a sort (where t is a name-free term built 
up from E-constants and E-functions). 
All these types of clauses are definite Horn clauses, so any resulting restriction theory will satisfy the least 
Herbrand model property. Furthermore, all three types of clause are reverse range restricted. In each case 
every variable in the body of clause appears in the head. Hence alphabetical monotonicity holds for order 
sorted logics. If we demand that every sort is non-empty then non-vacuity will hold, but alphabetical 
monotonicity holds whether or not we do this. 
Section 6.2.4: The Marking Theorem 
Unfortunately reverse range restriction, although very easy to check, is not satisfied by many theories 
which do in fact satisfy alphabetical monotonicity. However, the idea behind reverse range restriction 
can be used in a more subtle form. The idea is to keep track of new names in order to show that they 
would have to arise in p, which is impossible. In reverse range restriction this was formalised by 
demanding that all names appearing in the body of a clause also appeared in the head. To formalise a 
-59- 
similar idea in a more general way I introduce "marked literals". 
Definition 6.2.4.1 (Marked Literal) 
Given a set of E atoms R and an associated function new, I will say that a E-literal is R-marked if it 
contains an occurrence of a name in new (R). Similarly, a name is R-marked if it is an element of 
new (R) and a term is R-marked if it contains an R-marked name. 
Notation 
Given a E-literal p(t i ,t 2, 	 tn) I will sometimes want to indicate which argument or 
arguments are marked. I shall do this by dressing the appropriate argument with a hat. For 
instance if the third argument of four were marked, I would write p(t 1 ,t 2,13,t 4). In a modal 
theory using the accessibility relation I might write a R b to indicate that b was marked. 
To enable the definition of marked literals to be used efficiently, I assume that, for each E-literal, only 
certain argument positions may be marked. I will call these positions markable. Markable positions play 
a similar role in proofs of alphabetical monotonicity to the role that eligible positions played in the 
soundness proof of ES(1345 ) given alphabetical monotonicity. For the proof of the Marking Theorem I 
will use as an invariant property that if the conclusion of a clause is marked, it is marked in a markable 
position. 
Definition 6.2.4.1 (Markable argument position, obeys marking) 
Any eligible argument position in a E-predicate must be markable. 
Suppose that each E-predicate contains a certain number of markable argument positions. For a set 
of E-atoms R and associated function new I will say that an E-atom obeys R-marking if either it is 
not marked or it is marked in a markable argument position. 
For example, consider the modal accessibility relation R. Suppose we demand that only the second 
argument position is markable. If a and a 2 are unmarked and 12 1 and b 2 are marked, then a Ra 2, 
a l R17 1 , and 131 9032 all obey marking. On the other hand, 17 1 Ra i does not obey marking because the 
literal is marked, but not in a markable position. 
Definition 6.2.4.2 (Obeys marking) 
A definite E-clause obeys marking if for any set of E-atoms R and associated function new (where 
new(p) is always in an eligible argument position in p), and for any instance of the clause: 
if every antecedent literal obeys R-marking then the conclusion does; and 
if some antecedent literal is R-marked then so is the conclusion. 
An example of proving that a clause obeys marking may help to explain the concept. Examples of literals 
obeying marking or not were given above, and simply involved basic observation to check. Checking that 
a clause obeys marking is rather more complicated, since we must deal with any set of E-atoms R. As an 
example (taken from the proof of Theorem 6.2.5.1), consider the clause for transitivity, 
xRy,yRz 	 .x!kz 
As usual, the second argument of R is the eligible argument position. Assume that it is also the only 
markable argument position. Now to show that this clause obeys marking, we must consider any possible 
instance of it and any possible set R. It is enough to consider only instances of the clause in which both 
antecedent literals obey R-marking. Apart from the trivial case in which neither is R-marked, this leaves 
two cases: that the first or second argument is marked. Since we assume they obey marking, they must be 
marked in the second argument position. 
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(i) If the first antecedent literal is R-marked, the instance of the clause is of the form: 
xRy ,yRt- --TR? 
Here, the consequent xR7 is both R-marked and R-marked in a markable position, and hence both 
parts of the condition for the clause to obey marking are satisfied. 
(ii) If the second antecedent literal is R-marked, the instance of the clause is of the form: 
xRy ,yRt xRt 
We assumed that y fk,t obeys R-marking• hence it is R-marked also in its second argument position: 
that is t is R-marked. Again, this means that both parts of the condition for the clause to obey 
marking are satisfied. 
Theorem 6.2.4.3: Marking Theorem 
If it is possible to define markable argument positions for every E-predicate such that every clause in E 
obeys marking, then E satisfies alphabetical monotonicity. 
Proof 
First, assume that we have defined the markable argument positions so that every clause in E-obeys 
marking. 
Given the soundness and completeness of UR-resolution for theories expressed in Horn clauses, it is 
enough to show that: 
With the same preconditions as the theorem and alphabetical monotonicity: for any n, if there is a 
UR-resolution proof of length n of R,R' p then there is a UR-resolution proof of R kZ p. 
I prove this by induction on the length of the UR-resolution proof. 
Induction Base 
If there is a proof of length 0 of R,R' p then p u R or p u R'. But any element of R' is R'-marked, and 
by the hypotheses of alphabetical monotonicity, p is not R'-marked. Hence p n R, so R kE p. 
Induction Step 
The induction hypothesis is if there is a UR-resolution proof of length k of R,R' p then there is a UR-
resolution proof of R k p. I must prove the same thing for k+1. 
Say we have a proof of R,R' p of length k+1. 
If the proof involves no R'-marked literals then, since every literal in R' is R'-marked, the proof is also a 
proof of R p, and I am finished. 
Otherwise, suppose some R'-marked literal is used in the proof. 
Observe that every literal in the proof obeys R'-marking. One can see this by a simple induction 
argument since: 
every literal in R is not R'-marked and hence obeys marking; and 
every literal in R' is trivially R'-marked; and 
every E-clause obeys marking, so every derived literal obeys marking. 
In particular, if we consider the last conclusion of a clause in which a R'-marked literal was used, that 
conclusion must be R'-marked itself. As this was the last use of a R'-marked literal, the conclusion 
cannot be used later in the proof. Neither can this conclusion be p, the final conclusion of the proof, since 
p is not R'-marked. As the clause's conclusion is neither the final conclusion of the proof nor is used 
again in the proof, we can omit the clause completely from the proof. Doing this provides a UR-
resolution proof of R,R' p of length k. By the induction hypothesis there is a UR-resolution proof of 
R p. 
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The sufficiency of reverse range restriction can now be proved as a simple corollary of the Marking 
Theorem. If E satisfies the reverse range restriction then we can make it satisfy the hypothesis of the 
Marking Theorem simply by making every argument position in every E-predicate markable. With every 
argument position markable, any literal obeys marking trivially. So the definition of a clause obeying 
marking reduces to its second case: that if an antecedent literal is marked then so is the conclusion. This 
condition is sure to be satisfied if every variable in the body of the clause appears also in the head. 
Reverse range restriction ensures exactly this. 
Corollary 6.2.4.4: Reverse range restriction implies alphabetical monotonicity 
If E satisfies reverse range restriction then E satisfies alphabetical monotonicity. 
The Marking Theorem has another useful corollary. If E satisfies the assumptions of the Marking 
Theorem, then so does any subtheory of E, and so the subtheory satisfies alphabetical monotonicity. This 
means that we need only prove the Marking Theorem for maximal theories which satisfy it. 
Corollary 6.2.4.5: Subtheory Corollary of the Marking Theorem 
If a theory Eo contains a subset of the set of clauses in E, and E satisfies the conditions demanded by the 
Marking Theorem, then Eo satisfies alphabetical monotonicity. 
Proof 
We may use the same markable positions for Eo as for E. As every clause in E obeys marking, then so 
does every clause in Eo. So, by the Marking Theorem, Lo satisfies alphabetical monotonicity. 
This corollary means that the Marking Theorem can fail on theories which satisfy alphabetical 
monotonicity. This is because there are sets of clauses which satisfy alphabetical monotonicity, but 
contain subsets of clauses which fail alphabetical monotonicity. Indeed, there are rather trivial examples 
where this happens. There are also non-trivial examples. For instance, as I showed in Section 5.1, 
ETab(/345 ) is unsound where E is the combination of symmetry and transitivity, so this theory must fail 
alphabetical monotonicity. On the other hand, if we add reflexivity the theory satisfies non-vacuity and 
so alphabetical monotonicity. 
Section 6.2.5: Examples of Modal Theories Satisfying the Marking Theorem 
In this section I consider first order variants of modal theories containing transitivity: the results for 
propositional modal logics can be derived simply by using the subtheory corollary of the Marking 
Theorem. I consider first the combination of transitivity and descending domains, then the combination 
of transitivity and cumulative domains. As for the propositional modal logics, these results are enough 
for the constant and varying domain variants of first order logics since these do not introduce any clauses 
into the theory. 
Theorem 6.2.5.1: Alphabetical monotonicity for transitivity + descending domains 
Any combination of the clauses for transitivity and descending domain satisfies alphabetical 
monotonicity. 
Proof 
I will use the Marking Theorem and the Subtheory Corollary. 
There are two E-predicates: the accessibility relation i.  and the domain predicate in. The eligible position 
in is the second argument position, while for in only the first argument position is eligible. I make these 
the only markable positions. Schematically, I will indicate the markable positions as: 
-62- 
x Ry 
 
in w 
The clauses in E are 
xRy ,Y Rz 	 xRz 	 (1) 
xRy,ziny 
	
zinx 	 (2) 
By the Marking Theorem, it is enough to show that each clause (1) and (2) obeys marking. 
(1) Assuming that both antecedent literals obey marking, there are two cases to consider: that the first 
and second antecedent literals respectively are marked in their second position. 
(i) xRy , y R 7 	 xR7 
Then the conclusion is marked in its second position, as required. 
(ii) xRy , y R t 	 xRt 
But if y R t obeys marking then it must be marked in its second position. So t is marked, and 
so the conclusion is marked in its second position, as required. 
(2) Again there are two cases to consider. 
(i) xRy , tiny 	 I in x 
Then the conclusion is marked in its first position, as required. 
(ii) xR:17 , tiny 	 t in x 
But if tiny obeys marking then it must be marked in its first position. So t is marked, and so 
the conclusion is marked in its first position, as required. 
Theorem 6.2.5.2: Alphabetical monotonicity for transitivity + cumulative domains 
Any combination of the clauses for transitivity and cumulative domain satisfies alphabetical 
monotonicity. 
Proof 
Again by the Marking Theorem and the Subtheory Corollary. 
As well as the eligible positions in R and in, I will make the second argument position of in markable. 
Schematically: 
x R y 
.;.‘c in w 
x in iv 
The clauses in E are 
xR. y ,v1z 	 x Rz 
xlcy,zinx 
	
ziny 
For (1) and (2) I must show that the clause obeys marking For (1) the proof is as in the previous 
theorem, as the change to the in predicate do not affect that clause. It remains to show that (2) obeys 
marking. 
(2) Assuming that both antecedent literals obey marking, there are now three cases to consider, 
corresponding to each possible markable position in the antecedent. 
	
xRy , in x 	 tiny  
Then the conclusion is marked in its first position, which is a markable position. 
(i) 
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(ii) xfIKS7 , t in x 	 tin y 
Then the conclusion is marked in the second position, which is a markable position. 
(iii) ,c^ 	 , t in x^ 	 tiny  
But if x^ 
 R  y obeys marking then it must be marked in its second position. So y is marked, and 
so the conclusion is marked in its second position, which is a markable position. 
Section 6.3: Summary 
In this chapter I have given proofs that a number of theories satisfy non-vacuity and/or alphabetical 
monotonicity. (Recall, from Corollary 5.3.5, that the satisfaction of non-vacuity guarantees the 
satisfaction of alphabetical monotonicity.) Also I have given some sufficient conditions for the 
satisfaction of these properties: these sufficient conditions are much easier to check than the definitions of 
the properties given in Chapter 5. 
In particular, I showed that non-vacuity holds in sorted logics where each sort is non-empty, and all first 
order variants of serial and reflexive modal logics where each world has a non-empty domain. Also, 
alphabetical monotonicity holds for all sorted logics of the kind described in Section 2.6, and for all first 
order variants of the modal logics K4 (where transitivity alone holds) and KB (where symmetry alone 
holds). 
It is interesting to note that proofs of alphabetical monotonicity tend to be much harder than proofs of 
non-vacuity. This reflects the fact that non-vacuity is a much simpler concept. Yet non-vacuity is much 
the more desirable property, because it gives much greater order independence of expansion rule 
application in an expansion tree. In the next chapter, where matrix characterisations of validity are 
derived, this difference will be of great importance. 
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Chapter 7 
Matrix Characterisations of Validity 
Given the work on expansion systems for E-logics in this thesis, we now know how to determine the 
validity of formulas. Picking one of the systems I have discussed, perhaps ES(145), we search for a closed 
tree. There is another way of expressing what we are doing. Recalling that each tree has associated with 
it a set of positions, we could say that we search for a set of positions for which there is closed tree. If we 
use the expansion system, this is an uninteresting change of definition. However, if we take the new 
definition seriously, we can look for ways of determining if there is a closed ES(145) tree without actually 
constructing one. Examining this is what I do in this chapter. 
The arguments I use in this Chapter are Wallen's (1986, 1989) arguments for deriving matrix 
characterisations of validity from tableaux based proof systems. Although the arguments I use are not 
new, the results I obtain are new, representing a generalisation of Wallen's (1989) matrix 
characterisations in two directions: I provide matrix characterisations in the context of restricted 
quantification and so for a wider range of logics than Wallen considered; and I formally derive matrix 
characterisations from any propositional countermodel system, thereby defining a variety of analogues of 
Wallen's matrices. 
In Chapter 5, we saw that ES(/ 43) may only be used if non-vacuity holds. Where non-vacuity fails but 
alphabetical monotonicity does, we may use ES(/343 ). However, for the considerations in this chapter the 
condition (3) causes problems. Therefore I deal in Section 7.1 with theories where non-vacuity holds, 
while in Section 7.2 I consider theories where non-vacuity fails but alphabetical monotonicity holds. 
In Section 7.3 I introduce informally one way one might represent matrices as derived from analytic 
tableaux. In Section 7.4 I discuss the advantages of matrix characterisations of validity over the 
expansion systems they are derived from. 
Section 7.1: Matrix Characterisations of Validity with Non-vacuity 
In deciding if there is a closed ES(145) tree for a given set of positions, there are two issues to deal with. 
First we have to determine if there is a closed tree, and then if there is a closed tree for that set of 
positions which is a LSO 4.3) tree. I will show that these two issues can be dealt with separately. That is, 
given a set of positions, it is enough to determine if there is any ES(145) tree for that set of positions and if 
the set of positions gives rise to any closed tree. It turns out that these two conditions ensure that there is 
a closed ES(143) tree for that set of positions. 
Until now, I have considered sets of positions to be defined in terms of trees. However, we can entirely 
reverse this idea and consider trees to be defined in terms of sets of positions. This has one major 
advantage for proof search. For each set of positions there are many trees. Therefore we reduce the 
number of entities to consider. I now define what I mean by a tree for a set of positions. 
Definition 7.1.1 (Tree for a set of positions) 
If P is a set of positions then 2 is a tree for P iff P is exactly the set of positions arising in ,r . 
I now need a simple definition, akin to the definition of a complete tree, but taking P into account. 
Definition 7.1.2 (P-complete branch, tree) 
A branch in 7 is P-complete iff every possible application of a expansion rule to it has either 
already been applied on the branch, or introduces a position not contained in P. 
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A P-complete tree is one in which every branch is P-complete. 
Although many ES(445) or ES(/345 ) trees may be trees for the same set of positions, the structure of these 
trees is not at all simple. The side conditions (4) and (3) mean that the order in which expansions occur is 
important. The structure of all complete trees for a set of positions becomes immensely much simpler if 
we ignore these ordering issues. Determining closure of a tree can be done independently of determining 
whether the tree satisfies the side conditions. To this end, I use a proof system without any side 
conditions. 
Given a propositional expansion system S, the expansion system ES is the system containing all the 
propositional rules of S together with the quantifier rules (y), and (6). These latter rules are as defined in 
Chapter 4, but with no side conditions. Not only does ES have exactly the same expansion rules as 
ES(145) and ES(1345 ), but whether or not a tree is closed does not depend on the order of application of the 
expansion rules. The following theorem demonstrates this. 
Theorem 7.1.3: Order Independence Theorem for ES 
For a given set of positions P, if there is a closed ES tree for P, then every P-complete ES tree for P is 
closed. 
Proof 
Suppose that 7 1 is any P-complete tree for P and that 72 is a closed ES tree for P. It is enough to show 
that any complete branch in 7 1 contains a superset of the formulas on some branch in 72. 
Picking a particular complete branch containing formulas U in 71 , I work by induction through the 
structure of the tree 7 2. The base is easy, since the root of 7 1 and 7 2 is the same and the root belongs to 
every branch of every tree. 
Now suppose that the set of formulas V on a branch to some node in 72 is a subset of U. If the branch is 
P-complete I have finished. If the branch is not complete, then some expansion rule must be applied. But 
since V c U, the same expansion could be applied to U. As U is the set of formulas on a P-complete 
branch, the expansion must have been applied on the branch. Therefore the new formulas on at least one 
of the new branches are already contained in U. 
The Order Independence Theorem has the crucial consequence that to determine the the existence of any 
closed tree we need only check an arbitrary P-complete ES tree. Indeed, with the definition below, we 
need merely check that each "path" is closed. Of course this definition is not suitable for direct 
implementation. For more sensible discussions of paths see Bibel (1987) or Wallen (1989). 
Definition 7.1.4 (path) 
The set of formulas on a P-complete branch in any ES tree for P is called a P-path. 
The title of the chapter refers to a "matrix characterisation of validity", a phrase borrowed from Wallen 
(1989). A matrix is now easy to define: however I shall not consider suitable representations for matrices 
or suitable algorithms for dealing with them. 
Definition 7.1.5 (matrix) 
A matrix for a set of formulas is (some suitable representation for) a set of positions P for that set 
together with the set of all P-paths. 
The problem of finding a closed tree has been reduced to that of checking all paths in a matrix for closure. 
For much more on representing matrices and paths, and testing all paths for closure, see Bibel (1987) or 
Wallen (1989). But we still have to determine whether or not there is some ES tree which is also a tree in 
a sound proof system. That is: given P, is there a tree for P which satisfies (4), (4), (s), and, if appropriate, 
(3)? 
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Now the principal reason for my introduction of the side condition (5) is apparent. Unlike the highly 
order dependent condition (2), the order of expansions in a tree does not affect (s) at all. To check a 7- 
expansion introducing 70(t), we must check that yr(t) is LHM-present. But being LHM-present is defined 
only in terms of P. Thanks to the work in Chapter 5, that was easy! Similarly, (4) is defined solely in 
terms of P. 
All that remains is checking the satisfaction of (/) and (3). For the rest of this section, using arguments 
due to Wallen (1986, 1989), I show how we can deal with this. I will make two simple observations 
about when one position must appear after another on any branch in which they both appear, if (/) or (3) is 
to be satisfied. I will then define a binary relation < in terms of P, and show that if there is some tree for 
P satisfying (1) then < must be irreflexive. It will turn out that in fact the irreflexivity of < is also a 
sufficient condition for (/) to be satisfied in some P-complete tree. If we know that the set of complete P-
paths is closed, we know that the P-complete tree is closed, from Theorem 7.1.3. 
In fact there is a subtlety in the argument I will give. The intuitive justification for the irreflexivity of < 
does not quite work in ES(/45). I need the extra condition (3). So in fact I will show that < is irreflexive if 
there is a ES(/345 ) tree for P. On the other hand, I will show that if < is irreflexive then there is a P-
complete LSO 45) tree, although perhaps not a LS(1345) tree. This subtlety is precisely the reason why I 
defined non-vacuity. Recall that if E satisfies this condition, ES(145) and ES(/345 ) are equivalent, and the 
two proofs I give are sufficient. Unfortunately, there are important theories, such as the empty theory, 
which do not satisfy non-vacuity. For those, a more complicated approach is necessary, which I leave 
until the next Section (7.2). 
Notation 
Given two positions p t and p 2, the correct informal reading of "p t < p 2" is 'for any 
occurrence of 1, 2 in a tree for P, 1, 1 must have appeared earlier on the same branch". Less 
long windedly, one might say "p 2 must appear after p I ", although perhaps keeping in mind 
that this loses some nuances of the longer version. 
It is convenient to define two binary relations to express the information each observation gives us about 
the ordering of expansions, and a third to combine the first two. 
The first observation is that no position can appear on a branch if it is a subposition of a formula that has 
not yet appeared on a branch. I have already defined a binary relation to express this, in Definition 3.5.2. 
For convenience I recall the salient part of the definition. 
Definition 3.5.2 (<1K) 
If p 2 is a subposition of p 1 , then we write p « p 2. 
The second observation applies if two positions both introduce the same name and one is a 80-type 
position 80(a). If so, then the other cannot also be a 80-type position if (4) is satisfied, and so it must be 
70(t). But certainly if t contains a, then 80(a) position must come before y0(t) on any branch if we are to 
satisfy (/). This is formalised by the binary relation E. 
Definition 7.1.6 (E) 
Given a set of positions P, Cp (or just 	 if P is understood) is the smallest binary relation on P 
satisfying: 
if a 60-type position 60(a) and a y0-type position Yo(t) both belong to P, and a appears 
anywhere in t, then 80(a) Ep 70(t). 
Having defined two binary relations on P that tell us about the order of expansions, we can combine the 
information they contain and call the resulting binary relation "<". 
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Definition 7.1.7 (<) 
< is a binary relation on P that is the transitive (but not reflexive) closure of « and E. 
Symbolically, 
< =def « L.) E 
It is easy to show that < must be irreflexive. Remember the intuitive reading of "p<q": that q must appear 
after p. But if pap then p must appear after itself, which is absurd. This is the basis for the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 7.1.8 
If T is a ES(1345) tree for a set of positions P, then < is irreflexive. 
Proof 
First note that if p«q then p appears on every branch that q appears on. The same holds for pEq because 
if it did not then the y-expansion introducing q would break (3). Also, on every branch on which they do 
appear p must appear higher, by the observations which motivated the definitions of « and C. 
Now suppose, for a contradiction, that for some p i , we had p 1 <p i  . Then there would be positions 
P 1, P2, • 'Pk, Pk+1 = pi, such that for each i, either p, «1,1+1 or p, C pi+i . Consider any branch on which, 
say, pk+i appears. Then, from the first paragraph, pk must appear higher on the branch. Similarly, 
pk-1, 	 , p 2 must appear higher on the branch than pk±i . Indeed p i must appear higher on the branch 
than pk+1. Since p i = pk+i, this is impossible, and we have a contradiction. The supposition that < is not 
irreflexive is impossible. 
I will now show how, if < is irreflexive, to construct a P-complete tree satisfying (1). This tree will not 
necessarily satisfy (3), even though I assumed that (3) was satisfied for the previous lemma. The tree is 
constructed by always introducing <-minimal positions. With this result, and the previous one, the 
importance of the irreflexivity of < becomes clear. 
Definition 7.1.9 (<-minimal, satisfies <) 
A position p is <-minimal in a set of positions if there is no q in that set such that q < p. 
At any point in a ES tree, an expansion satisfies < if and only if any positions it introduces are <- 
minimal in the set of positions that may be introduced at that point. (The definitions of < and the 
expansion rules ensure that if one position a expansion introduces is minimal then all are.) 
Lemma 7.1.10 
If a set of positions P for a set of formulas S is such that < is irreflexive, then there is a P-complete ES-tree 
for S in which each expansion satisfies <. 
Proof 
We construct a ES-tree by starting with S. At each node, certain expansions only introduce positions in P 
and positions that have not yet appeared on the branch. Say that U is the set of positions which can be 
introduced by these expansions. If in fact U is empty, then the branch is P-complete. Otherwise, we 
choose an expansion which only introduces positions which are <-minimal in U. If there is choice of 
expansions, any arbitrary choice will do. To show that any resulting tree is P-complete, it is enough to 
consider a node for which U is non empty, and to show that the method allows at least one expansion to 
be applied. But since U is finite and < is irreflexive, there must be some p in U which is <-minimal in U. 
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Lemma 7.1.8 showed that the irreflexivity of < is necessary for the existence of a complete tree satisfying 
(1). Perhaps surprisingly, it is also sufficient, as the following lemma shows. 
Lemma 7.1.11 
If T is a P-complete ES tree satisfying <, then every 6-expansion in satisfies (/). 
Proof 
Consider any 8-expansion introducing 60(a). It is enough to show that no 7-expansion earlier on the same 
branch can introduce a term t containing a. Suppose, for a contradiction, that 70(t) were <-minimal in the 
set U of formulas that could have been introduced, but that t contains a. Now 60(a) E y0(t) and so 
60(a) < 70(t). For 70(t) to be <-minimal in U, 60(a) cannot belong to U. But then 60(a) must be a 
subposition of some position p in U, as otherwise it could not appear on the branch. Then p«60(a) and 
60(a) E yo(t) and by transitivity, p <70(0. This contradicts the supposition, which was what was wanted. 
Where non-vacuity holds, the preceding arguments can be put together rather simply, given that (4) and 
(5) can be checked globally. The result is a generalisation of Wallen's matrix characterisations of validity 
for modal logics, excepting the logics K and K4 where non-vacuity fails. 
Theorem 7.1.12: Matrix Theorem with Non-vacuity 
If E satisfies the least Herbrand model property and non-vacuity, and S is a finite set of formulas, then S is 
s-unsatisfiable if and only if there is a matrix for S with a set of positions P for S satisfying: 
(i) eachP-path is closed; and 
(ii) there is a one to one function f :138 Names such that if 80(a) E P, f(6) = a; and 
(iii) < is irreflexive; and 
(iv) for each y0(t) E P, yr(t) E LHME(P). 
Proof 
(If) 
Suppose that the conditions are satisfied. By (iii) and Lemmas 7.1.10 and 7.1.11 there is a P-complete ES 
tree T satisfying (1). From (ii) and (iv), 'T also satisfies (s) and (4). Since 'T is P-complete, the set of 
formulas on each branch is a P-path. By (i) all these are closed, so each branch in 7 must be closed. 
Therefore T is a closed ES(/45) tree. 
At this point it is necessary to use the soundness of LSO 45) given non-vacuity, as shown in Theorem 
5.3.7, enabling us to deduce that S is s-unsatisfiable. There is another condition on Theorem 5.3.7, 
however, which is that the set of restrictions in T (that is, the set Pk) must be name-acyclic (Definition 
5.2.1). Fortunately, the irreflexivity of < ensures this: we can order PS` in any way that respects the 
partial order defined by <. For suppose, for a contradiction, that in such an ordering 61.1 (a1) appeared 
before 6,2(a 2) but that the name a2 appeared anywhere in 6)- (a i ). Then a2 would have been introduced by 
some 7-expansion introducing 70 of which 6). was a subposition. That is, 70 « 6). Also, by definition, 
E 70. But then 6r2 < 6,1, which contradicts our supposition. So indeed P8r is name-acyclic and so 
Theorem 5.3.7 can be applied. 
(Only if) 
By the completeness of ES(1345) given non-vacuity (Theorem 5.3.1), there is a closed ES(/345) tree for S, 
associated with the set of positions P. From the Order Independence Theorem (7.1.3), each P-path is 
closed. This gives us (i). Since 	 is a ES(/345 ) tree, (ii) and (iv) are satisfied. From Lemma 7.1.8, < is 
irreflexive, giving us (iii). 
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Section 7.2: Matrices where Non-vacuity Fails 
The proof of the Matrix Theorem with non-vacuity relies on the soundness of ES(145). This only holds if 
non-vacuity does. The essential feature of the proof systems that makes matrices a sensible idea is the 
use of the side condition (5) since it does not rely on the position of an expansion to determine its 
satisfaction. Without non-vacuity, the only proof system containing this side condition is ES(1345). Since 
important logics fail non-vacuity, such as the modal logic K and sorted logics with possibly empty sorts, I 
now turn to deriving a Matrix Theorem for these logics. The difference with the previous case is that we 
must worry about satisfying (3) given a set of positions. 
The problem with paths as I defined them before is that positions such as y0(t) can arise on a path even if t 
contains names that are not on the path. This means that no ES(1345 ) tree could be built containing a 
branch for that path, since (3) would never allow yo(t) to be introduced. The solution is in fact extremely 
simple. We just ignore such positions when testing the closure of a path. We could redefine paths to take 
account of (3). However this would reintroduce some order dependence in the construction of paths, 
going against the spirit of matrices. Instead it is sufficient to build paths as before, but ignore formulas in 
paths that could not satisfy (3). 
I must derive a syntactic test for a path corresponding to a closed branch when (3) applies. Fortunately, if 
a set of positions is not expandable, it is easy to show that all <-minimal positions that could be 
introduced by a ES rule have a certain syntactic property. I show this in Lemma 7.2.1. When < is 
irreflexive, this is enough because in a set of positions, any position is <-greater than some <-minimal 
position. So the syntactic check becomes checking that every position involved in closing a path is not 
<-greater than some position which has the property that ensures it could not be introduced. All this 
should become clearer as the details are filled out below. 
Lemma 7.2.1 
Suppose that V is the set of positions on a P-complete branch in a ES(3) tree, and that U is the set of 
positions on a complete ES branch extending V. Then each <-minimal position in U — V is of the form 
yo(t), where t contains a name a that is not introduced into a So position 80(a) in U. 
Proof 
First, any <-minimal position in U — V could be introduced by a ES expansion since it would not be a 
subposition of any other position in U — V. Hence if it cannot be introduced into V it is because it arises 
from a 7-expansion breaking (3). So any <-minimal position in U — V is yo(t) and contains a name a that is 
not in V. But the name a cannot appear in 80(a) c U — V, as otherwise by definition 80(a) E yo(t) making 
yo(t) non <-minimal. 
1=1 
When < is irreflexive we derive a test for whether or not a position in a path can appear in a 
corresponding branch in a ES(1345 ) tree. After all, if < is irreflexive then every position has a <-minimal 
position that is <-less than it. The following definition captures this idea. 
Definition 7.2.2 (satisfying (3) in a path, (3)-closed path) 
If U is a P-path for S, and p is a position in U, then p satisfies (3) in U iff for each yo-position 70(t) in 
P such that yo(t) = p or yo(t) < p, every name a in t is either e or appears in some so-position 
80(a)E U. 
If U is a P-path for S, then U is (3)-closed iff it contains two complementary positions p and q which 
satisfy (3) in U. 
This is all that is needed to provide a matrix characterisation of validity if non vacuity fails but 
alphabetical monotonicity does not. Everything else is as it was in Section 7.1. This characterisation of 
validity applies to the modal logics K and K4, logics which Wallen (1989) dealt with but which were not 
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captured in Section 7.1. 
Theorem 7.2.3: Matrix Theorem without Non-vacuity 
If E satisfies the least Herbrand model property and the alphabetical monotonicity, and S is a finite set of 
formulas, then S is E-unsatisfiable if and only if there is a matrix for S containing a set of positions P for S 
satisfying: 
(i) eachP-path is (3)-closed; and 
(ii) there is a one to one function f :P6 —> Names such that if 80(a) e P, f(8) = a; and 
(iii) < is irreflexive; and 
(iv) for each yo(t) E P, yr(t) E LHME(P). 
Proof 
(If) 
We construct any P-complete ES(3) tree T . From (ii) and (iv) 'T satisfies (s) and (4). Extend T to a P-
complete ES tree 7 Consider any complete branch V in T and any complete extension U of it in 
Lemma 7.2.1 implies that any <-minimal position in U—V does not satisfy (3). As < is irreflexive from 
(iii), for any position in U—V, some <-minimal position is <-less than it. So no position in U—V satisfies 
(3). But U is (3)-closed from (i) and so contains two complementary positions that satisfy (3). These two 
positions must be in V, and hence V is closed. Therefore T is a closed ES(1345) tree. As in the proof of 
Theorem 7.1.12, the set of restrictions in 'T is name-acyclic. Since E satisfies the least Herbrand model 
property and alphabetical monotonicity, ES(t345) is sound (Theorem 5.2.4). Therefore S is E-
unsatisfiable. 
(Only if) 
By the completeness of ES(1345 ) given alphabetical monotonicity, there is a closed ES(1345 ) tree for S, 
associated with the set of positions P. Any branch V in this tree is closed. Consider any path U 
containing V. Since each 7-expansion satisfies (3) every position yo(t) in V satisfies (3) in V, and since 
VcU, in U. Thus we get (i). We obtain (ii), (iii) and (iv) as in the Matrix Theorem with non-vacuity. 
Section 7.3: An Example: Matrices Based on Tableaux 
I have avoided giving any explicit representation for a matrix. In this section I give an example of how 
one might represent a matrix, at least on paper. I have chosen Tab as the starting point because the 
resulting matrix characterisation of validity is very close to Bibel's (1987) connection method. I will not 
present proofs that my definitions are correct. If you are interested in representing matrices and checking 
that all paths are closed, you should turn to Wallen (1989) or Bibel (1987). 
First I define one way of constructing matrices. 
Propositional Matrix Construction Rules 
If a formula X is a literal then X is the matrix for itself. 
If M I is the matrix for al and M2 is the matrix for a2 then [ M1 
If M1 is the matrix for p, and M2 is the matrix for 132 then m2 
M2] is the matrix for a. 
is the matrix for p. 
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M(132) 131 P2 
	 M( (3) 
Tableau Expansion Rule 	 Matrix Construction Rule 
a 	 [ M(al) M(a2)1 
a2 
al 
Definition 7.3.1 (Paths through a Matrix) 
{X is the unique path through the literal X. 
If it1 is a path through M1 and n2 is a path through M2 then it U it2  is a path through [ Ml M2] .  
M1 
If ni is a path through M1 then ni is also a path through M2 
 
Ml 
If it2 is a path through M2 then n2 is also a path through M2  
Example (Running example from Chapter 3) 
A propositional matrix, for a formula without equivalences, is no more than a different syntax for the 
formula itself. For example, recall the running example from Chapter 3. 
l(PvQ)A (Pv-1Q)A (-1PvQ)A (-iPv-iQ) 
A matrix for this is: 
[1Q1 [o61 [1Q] [ 
There are sixteen paths through this matrix. For example the path picking out the top element in each 
submatrix is 
{1P}u {1P} U {OP} u {OP} = {1P, OP} 
while the path picking out the bottom element in the first and fourth columns and the top element in the 
second and third columns is 
{1Q} U {1P} U {OP} U {0Q} = {1Q, 1P, OP, OQ} 
In this example of course all the paths are closed. 
End of Example 
I should emphasise that the order in which submatrices appear in either a column or row is unimportant.' 
This follows from the order independence theorem (Theorem 7.1.3). One can think of a matrix as a 
skeleton tableau. Each expansion has been applied, removing the unexpanded formulas to leave only the 
expanded formulas. All that remains to make a tableau is to choose an order to apply the expansions in. 
This can be seen by a simple comparison of the tableau rules and matrix construction rules. 
The matrix construction rules are just the tableau rules turned through 90°! 
Matrices for restricted quantification are more complex. Where propositional matrices in a sense merely 
rewrite the formula, a first order matrix does more. In a tableau, the (7) rule may apply many times. A 
matrix records this information, as well as telling us which terms are introduced on each occasion. The 
central feature of a matrix is retained: it still expresses the order independence of expansions. 
I I thank John Derrick for pointing out that this completely breaks the analogy with mathematical matrices (personal 
communication). 
-72- 
Now it is important to recall that a matrix is defined with a set of positions P, and that P contains (by 
definition) the information about how each y-position is expanded. 
Matrix Construction Rules for Restricted Quantifiers 
If a quantifier position y or 6 has no subposition in P then it is the matrix for itself. 
If a 6-type position 6 has a subposition 60(a) in P then the matrix for 60(a) is the matrix for 6. 
If a y-type position y has subpositions yo(t 1), 	 , yo(tu) in P, and Mi is the matrix for yo(ti ) then 
[ 	 • Md is the matrix for y. 
The definition of path need not be changed. 
Note that the restrictions 'yr and 6, do not appear in a matrix. Even more clearly now, reasoning in the 
restriction theory has been separated from logical reasoning. At least where non-vacuity holds, one can 
calculate the least Herbrand model for a set of positions P and whether each y-expansion represents an 
expansion satisfying (5) without reference to the matrix. 
Example 
Consider the formula 
V x (P(x) AQ(x)) D (( Vy P(y)) A (VZ Q(z))) 
This can be proved valid by the following simple matrix for the formula with polarity 0. 
[ 1 P (a) 1 Q(a) 1 P(b) 1 Q(b) [ Q(b)11 
The two paths through the matrix are 
P(a), 1 Q(a), 1 P(b), 1 Q(b), 0 P(a)} 
{1P (a), 1 Q(a), 1P (b), 1 Q(b), 0 Q(b)} 
End of Example 
Matrices in the first order case contain information both about how many times a y-type position is 
expanded, and which terms are introduced each time. The second of these is somewhat out of place: the 
choice of which terms are introduced should be made by a process of unification. This could be achieved, 
as Wallen does, by introducing variables instead of terms at universal instantiation and demanding that a 
suitable assignment of terms to variables be found. However, the first is fundamental: the difficulty of 
deciding the multiplicity (in Wallen' s terminology) of a y-position is precisely why the first order 
connection method is undecidable. 
Section 7.4: The Reasons for Studying Matrices 
In the development of this chapter, I have not discussed why the development is worth studying in the 
first place. The treatment I have given makes the relationship with automated theorem proving difficult 
to see, for instance my definition of matrices as "some suitable representation for" the set of all complete 
paths. The reasons for studying matrices in the way I have done in this chapter are simple: Wallen 
(1986, 1989) has shown how matrices derived in this way from analytic tableaux lead to analogues of 
Bibel' s connection method, and Bibel (1982, 1987) has shown that his connection method is of great 
interest to automated theorem proving. The application of matrix characterisations of validity to 
automated theorem proving was first discussed by Prawitz (1960, 1969). 
As well as the link with the connection method, Wallen has given three reasons why matrix 
characterisations of validity should be more computationally sensitive than the initial tableaux 
characterisation. These are that the matrix characterisations remove notational redundancy, that they 
reduce the order dependence between rule applications, and that they provide naturally for connection 
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rather than connective based search. 
The first advantage of a matrix characterisation of validity is that they eliminate some notational 
redundancy in tableaux. This was achieved by the use of positions, introduced in Section 3.5, which 
removed the need to represent separately different occurrences of the same formula. This gives a major 
saving of space in a computer implementation. In this thesis I have used a slightly different notion of 
position to Wallen to simplify my proofs. Wallen's more representational notion of position is partly 
inherited from Boyer & Moore's (1972) use of "structure-sharing". 
A second advantage is that the problem of order dependence between expansion rules is eliminated. I 
have emphasised this point throughout Chapters 5 and 7. One way of looking at it is to point out that we 
can apply rules in some canonical order to produce a possibly unsound derivation. Then we can apply 
special tests to see if an equivalent sound derivation exists. Implementing these tests is considerably less 
expensive than the alternative in the tableau proof system, which is to search through many possible 
derivations looking for one in which the ordering of expansions comes out right. This is particularly 
helpful compared to some proof systems for modal logics, such as those described by Fitting (1983 
Chapter Two, 1988) in which application of certain rules represents a choice which may be wrong: if it is 
wrong then a lot of work is wasted. 
The third advantage is that, given a matrix, to check for it being closed we have to check each path for 
closure. This means that search can be directed by looking explicitly for pairs 00 and 10, that is by 
looking for connections. This is a notable improvement on the situation in the tableau system, where at 
any point we have available for search only the top connectives in that sequent, giving us no information 
on which formula should be expanded next. This emphasis on connection-based rather than connective-
based search is the central feature of Andrews' (1981) and Bibel's (1987) work on automated proof 
search. 
The three advantages I have sketched certainly apply to a matrix characterisation of validity based on 
analytic tableaux. This means that the work in this chapter can be seen as a generalisation of Wallen's 
(1989) matrix characterisations of validity, generalising from particular (modal) restriction theories to 
arbitrary theories satisfying certain conditions. 
The three advantages discussed above apply equally to other expansion systems such as KE. Therefore 
the work in this chapter generalises Wallen's (1989) results in another way: I have shown how to derive 
analogues of his matrix characterisations of validity starting from other proof systems. This is useful 
since it is desirable to derive computationally sensitive proof systems based on, for example, KE. Since 
D'Agostino (1990) has shown that KE is preferable in some ways to tableaux, we might derive a better 
proof method than the connection method. There are two problems which limit the immediate usefulness 
of my results. First, it is non-trivial to derive an automated theorem proving method from matrix 
characterisations of validity. This is particularly so in the general case since I have not discussed how 
matrices should be represented, the presentation in Section 7.3 being limited to matrices based on 
tableaux only. Second, it is natural in a tableaux based system to use propositional expansions on each 
branch as much as possible, and Wallen's representation of matrices effectively assumes that this is done. 
However, in other proof systems this is not so. In KE for example, one certainly should not apply the 
splitting rule (PB) as much as possibly, and this applies to a lesser extent if one uses analytic (PB). Since 
my definition of a matrix demands that any expansion applied on one branch must be applied on all, we 
cannot avoid this. It is possible that the advantages D'Agostino shows that KE has will be lost if we 
enforce this demand, but this requires further investigation. At least the work in this chapter represents a 
significant first step in adapting Wallen's methods to proof systems such as KE. 
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Chapter 8 
Instantiation in Restricted Quantification 
The two expansion rules (y) and (6) allow us to form instances of restricted quantifications, given certain 
conditions. However, they only allow us to form instances in a formula if the formula itself is a 
quantification. This is why completeness only held for countermodel expansion systems. A 
countermodel expansion system guarantees to provide us with an explicit quantification which we can 
then apply (y) or (6) to. This formed the crucial part in the completeness proof, enabling the induction 
step to be extended from all quantifications of a certain depth to all formulas containing quantifiers of that 
depth. However, other expansion systems, such as resolution, do not allow this. 
To extend non-countermodel expansion systems to restricted quantification, we need rules which allow us 
to instantiate quantifiers as subformulas of a propositional formula. The reason I have delayed discussing 
this problem is that the conditions under which sound expansion rules for instantiation can be introduced 
are much more restricted than the conditions under which the simpler rules (y) and (6) are sound. The 
new rules are sound only if the restriction theory satisfies non-vacuity. 
The new instantiation rules are quite natural, and essentially the same as the old rules. Instead of only 
applying to quantifications, though, they apply to any formula, replacing any outermost quantification by 
an instance of it. This means that we are ignoring the propositional structure of the formula. So the 
instantiation rule can only be sound if, in some sense, the propositional structure and the quantificational 
structure can be completely separated. The proofs will rely on swapping the order of quantification rules 
and propositional rules, and showing that this can be done within the proof systems. That is, I show that 
quantification rules and propositional rules permute. 
Exactly what it means to permute two rule applications requires careful definition, and varies depending 
on the type of rules in question. I introduce and define each type of permutation as I need them in the 
proofs in this chapter. 
The transformations I use in Section 8.2 and Section 8.3 have an interesting feature. In Section 8.2 they 
are only sound if the condition (3) is absent. In Section 8.3 they are only sound if (3) is present. This is 
not contradictory, as it may seem at first sight. These transformations play a proof theoretical role: they 
are used to justify EInstS(/345) and EInstS(/ 45). We are not interested in applying transformations to real 
expansion trees. Since I showed in Chapter 5 that ES(1345) and ES(145) are equivalent if non-vacuity holds, 
we may choose freely whether to demand (3) or not. 
Section 8.1: New Expansion Rules for Instantiation 
Notation 
Given formulas X and A, I will use the notation X[A] to indicate that A occurs once in 
particular position in X. This notation is from Bundy (1983). For convenience the notation is 
applicable if A does not appear at all in X. A may appear elsewhere in X, but X[A] refers only 
to one occurrence. If I have earlier mentioned X[A], and B is another formula, then X[B] 
indicates the formula X with the relevant occurrence of A replaced by B. 
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New Quantifier Expansion Rules 
(7-Inst) 
	
X[7]  
X[Yo (0] (6-Inst) 
X[6]  
kW) 
X[6 0(a)] 
   
where 7 and 6 are outermost quantifications in X[7] and X[6] respectively. 
Notation 
If S is any propositional expansion system, I will use "EInstS" to refer to the expansion 
system containing all the expansion rules of S, as well as (y-Inst) and (6-Inst). 
The same side conditions are applicable, but I only wish to consider (/), (3), (4), and (5). I repeat these as 
a reminder. 
(/) applies to 6-expansions: 
a is a new name that has not appeared on the branch up to the point of the 6-expansion. 
(3) applies to 7-expansions: 
t contains only names that have been introduced by 6-expansions on the branch up to the 7- 
expansion, except possibly the name r. 
(4) There is a well defined and one to one function . f:P6 Names such that f(6) is the name introduced by 
into any immediate subposition of 8. That is, for each 6-type position 6 n P, if 60(a) e P then 
f(6) = a. 
(s) applies to 7-expansions: 
provided yr(t) e LHM L(T) 
I will show in this chapter that if E satisfies the least Herbrand model property and non-vacuity, then 
EInstS(/45) is sound and complete given any sound and complete propositional system S. To do this, I 
pick a particular propositional system, Tab, and show in Section 8.2 that ElnstTab(145) is sound and 
complete given the conditions on E. In Section 8.3 I show that we can permute the instantiation rules 
fully with propositional rules in EInstTab(/45). In particular, we can move all instantiations to the top of a 
tree, separating completely the first order and propositional reasoning. The propositional reasoning in 
such Tab-trees may be replaced by reasoning in any other sound and complete propositional expansion 
system, giving the desired result. 
Section 8.2: Soundness and Completeness of ElnstTab(145) 
Lemma 8.2.1 
If there is a finite closed EInstTab(145) tree for a set of formulas S (with a name-acyclic set of restrictions), 
then there is a finite closed ETab(i43) tree for S (also with a name-acyclic set of restrictions). 
Proof 
As a first step I note that if there is a closed EInstTab(/45) tree then there is one in which each branch 
contains complementary formulas which are either both literals or both quantifications. The only case to 
consider is a branch is closed because of a- and 3-type formulas. But it is easy to check from the 
definition of uniform notation that any a-type formula's complement is a 13-type formula, and furthermore 
that a = 13 1 and a2c = 132. So we may expand any such branch as follows: 
a 
al 
a2  
131 	 132 
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If this expansion is repeated until it is no longer possible, the result is a tree which is closed as desired. 
Now suppose we have a closed EInstTab(145) tree 70, which is not a ETab(145) tree, and in which each 
branch is closed either by literals or quantifications. It must contain an application of (y-Inst) or (6-Inst) 
which is not an application of (y) or (6). Since the instance of 7 or 8 must be outermost, the (Inst) rule 
must apply to either an a- or 13-type formula. This gives four cases. Depending on the case, apply one of 
the four transformations I define below to the subtree below the application of the (Inst) rule. The 
transformations makes the application of (Inst) apply to a structurally simpler formula. After repeating it 
enough, the application of (Inst) can only apply to quantifications: it is then an application of either (y) or 
(8), which are known to be sound. 
Note 
In giving the transformations below, I will pretend that the 7 or 6 subformula of a or (3 occurs 
in both al and a2 or P I and 132. This simplifies the presentation, although in fact the 
quantification may only appear once. I do this because I do not need to be careful about this, 
except in one case, where 8 appears in a, when I must distinguish between the two 
possibilities. 
The first transformation moves an application of (7-Inst) downwards if it applies to an a-formula. 
a[7]  
al [7] 
az [7]  
a[y] 	 at  [w(t)] 
a[70 (0] 	 a2 [io (t)] 
where 	 is the same as 7 except that any application of the (a) rule to a[70(t)] in T is deleted 
in T'. 
The next transformation moves an application of (7-Inst) downwards if it applies to a 13-formula. 
13[y] 	 13[7]  
13[70(0] 	 131 [7] 	 132 [7]  
131[7o(t)] 	 132[7o(t)]  
7 1 	 7 2  
where 7 1 is the same as 7 except that any application of the ((3) rule to 13[y0(t)] introducing 
131 [yo(t)] and 132 [1,0(0] in 7 is deleted in T' and the subtree below that point replaced by the 
subtree below 131[70(0]. 72 is defined similarly except that the subtree below 132 [70(t)] is used. 
The third transformation moves an application of (6-Inst) downwards if it applies to an a-formula. 
Because of the side condition (/) I must distinguish between the cases where 5 appears in al and in a2 . 
a[5]  
al [8] 
a2  
8r(a) 
al [8o(a)] 
or 
a[8]  
al 
a2 [8]  
8r(a) 
a2 [6o (a)] 
where we choose the transformation according to whether 8 appears in a l or a2 ; 
and where 7' is the same as 7 except that any application of the (a) rule to a[60(a)] in T is 
deleted in 	 . 
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The last transformation moves an application of (6-Inst) downwards if it applies to an 13-formula. 
	
R[8] 
	 [8]  
	
P[88ro:(a) 	
i3 
 ) 	 6r(a) 	 6,-(a) 
i [8] 	 132 [8]  
Pi 	 [60(a)] 	 P2 	 [80(a)] 
7 1 	 7 2  
where T 1 is the same as T except that any application of the ((3) rule to 13[60(a)] introducing 
[8o(a)] and 132 [8o(a)] in 7 is deleted in T' and the subtree below that point replaced by the 
subtree below 131[60(a)]. 7 2 is defined similarly except that the subtree below 132[60(a)] is 
used. 
Note 
This transformation would not necessarily be sound if (3) were demanded. 6 can only appear 
in one of (3i and 132. This means that the new branch below the other 13i no longer contains the 
6-expansion (recall that I assumed that the transformation above does not indicate that the 8-
expansion appears on both branches). Then if some 7-expansion appears on that branch and 
introduces the same name a as the 6-expansion, the 7-expansion would no longer satisfy (3). 
In each case it is easy to check that, since the original application of the (Inst) rule satisfies (/), (4), and 
(5), the new applications will. Therefore the result of the transformation is a new EinstTab(/45) tree 7 . 
This transformation may be repeated if there are still applications of (Inst) that are not applications of (7) 
or (6), giving trees 71, 7 2, . . . But it may only be repeated finitely often, and when it cannot be repeated 
we end up with a ETab(/45) tree 7n. It only remains to show that 'T n is closed. 
The only way that T i could be closed and 7 i+i not closed is if the closure depends on the formula 
removed. The only formula that the transformations remove from a branch are, in the four cases, cc[70(01, 
13[yo(t)], a[80(a)], or 13[80(a)]. But none of these formulas are literals or quantifications, and we chose To 
to be closed by literals or quantifications. Therefore each 7, is closed. 
As to the preservation of name-acyclicity: none of the transformations affect the set of restrictions in the 
tree, so name acyclicity is unaffected. 
Theorem 8.2.2: Soundness and Completeness of EInstTak/45) and EInstTab(1345) 
If E satisfies the least Herbrand model property and non-vacuity, and S is a set of s-formulas, then E is 
unsatisfiable if and only if there is a closed EInstTab(145) tree for S containing a name-acyclic set of 
restrictions. 
Proof 
(Completeness) 
As seen in Chapter 4, given the least Herbrand model property, ETab(1345) is complete. But any 
ETab(/345) tree is also a EInstTab(/345) tree as well as a EInstTab(/45) tree containing a name-acyclic set 
of restrictions. Therefore these latter two proof systems are also complete. 
(Soundness) 
From Lemma 8.2.1, if there is a closed EInstTab(145) tree for S containing a name-acyclic set of 
restrictions then there is also a closed ETab(14.5) tree for S containing a name-acyclic set of restrictions. 
From Theorem 5.3.7, ETab(/45) is sound given non-vacuity, so S must be unsatisfiable. Any ETab(/345) 
tree is also a LTab(145) tree so soundness applies to ETab(/345) too. 
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Section 8.3: Soundness and Completeness of EInstS(/45) and EInstS( /345 ) 
The reason I chose to use a specific expansion system, Tab, in Section 8.2 is that I can generalise 
Theorem 8.2.2 to apply to any expansion system S. Note that this includes expansion systems which are 
not countermodel expansion systems, and with which I have been unable to deal so far. 
In this section, I demonstrate the soundness of EInstS(145) in Theorem 8.3.1. In Lemma 8.3.2 I show how 
to move all applications of the instantiation rules to the top of a proof in EInstS(/345 ), and use this in 
Theorem 8.3.1 to demonstrate the completeness of LInstS(145) and EinstS(/345 ). 
As in Section 8.2, that a EInstS(145) tree contains a name-acyclic set of restrictions is necessary for 
soundness. However, it is tedious to repeatedly mention this since none of the transformations of trees in 
this section affect the set of restrictions in a tree at all: I omit further mention of this in the proofs in this 
section. 
Theorem 8.3.1: Soundness of EInstS(/45) and EInstS(/345 ) 
If S is a sound propositional expansion system, and E satisfies non-vacuity and the least Herbrand model 
property, then EInstS(/45) and EInstS(/345 ) are sound. 
Proof 
I show that any application of the rules (y-Inst) and (8-Inst) is sound in any finite closed EInstS(/45) tree. 
Suppose, for a contradiction, that there was an example of an unsound application of one of the (Inst) 
rules on a branch of a EInstS(/45) tree containing formulas U which are satisfiable, introducing a new 
formula X such that U,X was unsatisfiable. Also suppose that the set of restrictions appearing in the entire 
tree was R. We can easily construct a EInstTab(/45) tree in which the formulas U appear on one branch, R 
on another and in which all other branches are closed. For example, considering U and R as conjunctions 
of the formulas in them, the following formula works: 
(Uv(RAf)) 
One branch of the EInstTab(145) tree closes trivially, as it contains f. To the other branch we can do the 
unsound application of (Inst) giving U,X and then close that branch somehow since U, X is unsatisfiable 
and EInstTab(/45) is complete. Therefore there is a closed LlnstTab(145) tree for the original formula. 
This contradicts the facts that EInstTab(/45) is sound and U is satisfiable. Hence there can be no unsound 
application of either (y-inst) or (8-inst). 
Thus EInstS(/45) is sound. But any EInstS(/345 ) tree is also a EInstS(/45) tree, so EInstS(/345 ) is sound too. 
1=1 
Lemma 8.3.2 
If there is a finite closed EInstTab(/345 ) tree for a set of formulas S then there is a finite closed 
EInstTab(/345 ) tree for S in which no propositional rule is applied before an instantiation rule on any 
branch. 
Proof 
As in the proof of Lemma 8.2.1, I demonstrate the existence of a tree needed by the theorem by applying 
suitable transformations to the first tree. 
In the proof of Lemma 8.2.1, I mentioned that, given a closed EInstTab(/45) tree, there is another in which 
each branch is closed by either literals or quantifications. The same applies to EInstTab(/345 ), but we can 
go further, finding a tree in which each branch is closed by literals. If a branch is closed by 
quantification, then by examining the uniform notation it must be by complementary formulas y and 
8 = yc. But we can apply the following expansions: 
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7 
6 
6r(a) 
60(a)  
70(a) 
Since (3) and (4) are satisfied throughout the branch, the name a will be new on the branch, satisfying (1) 
and 7r(a) will be the same as or(a) meaning that (5) is satisfied by the 7-expansion. But if 6 = -{ then 
60(a) = yo(a)C. Applying these expansions repeatedly, together with the expansions used in the earlier 
proof, yields a closed ETab(/345) tree in which each branch is closed by literals. 
Now consider any finite ETab(/345) tree in which each branch is closed by literals. Considering it as a 
EinstTab(/345) tree, we can apply one of the following transformations if any application of (Inst) follows 
a propositional rule. 
Notation 
In the following, "c" represents either a 6- or a 7-type position, while "Q0(t)" represents 
either 80(t) or 70(4 I will omit occurrences of "Or(a)" which would appear with Q0(a)  if 
Q = 6. 
The first two transformations deal with the case that the propositional rule does not affect the 
quantificational rule. They move an application of (c2 -Inst) up through an a or p application. 
a 	 a 
X[Q] 	 X[Q]  
ai 	 X[Q0(t)] 
az 	 a l 
X[Q0(t)] 
	 az  
7 	 7 
13  
X[q] 
13  
X[q] 
13  1 132 X[Q0(t)] 
X[Q0(t)] X[Q0(t)] 13i 132 
71 72 71 72 
I have shown the expansion of X[Q0(t)] as happening immediately after the 13-expansion on both branches. 
However, we apply the transformation even if X[Q0(t)] is only introduced immediately on one branch. In 
that case, we replace 7 after transformation by 7 1' in which any expansion of X[Q] to X[Q0(t)] is deleted 
on the other branch. 
The second two transformations cover the possibility that the propositional rule does affect the 
quantificational rule. Intuitively these transformations are the reverse of those used in the proof of 
Lemma 8.2.1. 
a[e]  
al[Q] 
az EQ1  
[(2.o(t)] 
a2 
 [QoW]  
7 
a[Q]  
afQ 0(t1  
at [Qo(t)] 
az [Qo(t)l 
7' 
where 7' is formed from 7 by deleting any use of a1 [Q]. That is, we delete any application of any rule to 
any subposition of a, [Q] up to and including an application of (q-Inst). We replace any application of a 
propositional rule that we have deleted by an application of the same rule to the analogous subposition of 
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ai [Q.o]• 
13[Q] 13[Q] 
131[Q] 132[Q] 13[Q0(t)] 
131 [Q0(t)] f32 Q0(01 131 [(20(t)] 	 132 [Q0(t)] 
Ti T2 1' 	 T2' 
where 	 is formed from 21 by removing any use of (3i[Q] as in the previous transformation. Also, we 
delete any expansion of PR] to 13i [Q0(t)] if the expansion is not immediate as shown here (exactly as we 
did in the earlier transformation through a 13 expansion in this proof). 
All these transformations yield trees which still satisfy the conditions (1345 ). Satisfaction of (4) and (s) are 
unaffected, and (3) is still satisfied because 7-expansions are only pushed up through propositional rules, 
thereby not changing the set of names on the branch: (3) and (4) together ensure that (1) is satisfied. 
Note the essential use of (3). Otherwise, permuting (y-Inst) applications up through 03) applications might 
lead to trees breaking (/), if a name introduced from (y) clashed with a name introduced by some (8)-
application on the other branch below the 13-application. 
We can repeat the transformations until they are impossible: this only happens when no propositional rule 
precedes a quantification rule. 
The only formulas which are removed from a branch by any transformation are oci[Q] or pi[Q], and this 
only happens if it actually contains Q. But if it contains Q then it is not a literal. So no literals are ever 
removed from a branch. Since the original tree is closed by literals, so is the final one. 
Theorem 8.3.3: Completeness of EInstS(/45) and LInstS(1345) 
If S is a complete propositional expansion system, and E satisfies the least Herbrand model property, then 
EInstS(14.5) and EInstS(1345) are complete. 
Proof 
If a set of formulas S is unsatisfiable, I must show that there is a closed EInstS(1345) tree for S, which will 
also be a closed EInstS(/45) tree. Recall that ETab(1345) is complete given the least Herbrand model 
property. So there is a finite closed ETab(/345) tree for S. By Lemma 8.3.2 we can find one in which all 
quantification rules precede all propositional ones. The quantification rules do not split a branch, so after 
their application we have an expanded set S' which can be closed by applications of rules from Tab. 
That is, S' is propositionally unsatisfiable. But we assumed that S is propositionally complete, and hence 
we can find a closed S tree for S'. Putting the quantifications and the S tree together yields a closed 
EInstS(/345 ) tree for S. 
Observe that there is no essential use of the fact that S is an expansion system in the above proof. Indeed 
one could easily prove a similar result for any propositional proof procedure, expansion system or not. 
The point of the work in this chapter is not in fact proof-theoretic, although I have used proof theoretic 
methods to derive it. The point is that I have effectively defined what instantiation is in restricted 
quantification if non-vacuity holds: it can be seen as the process of applying the rules (y-Inst) 	 and (6- 
Inst). 
Section 8.4: A Sketch of Skolemisation 
The proof systems containing instantiation presented in this chapter have two features which make them 
undesirable for direct implementation in automatic theorem proving programs. First, the instantiation 
rules are only allowed to instantiate an outermost quantification in a formula. Second, the instantiation 
rules, as are all quantifier rules in this thesis, are required to introduce explicit names or terms. These two 
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features mean that any implementation of these proof systems would, at each instantiation, have to guess 
a suitable name or term to be introduced. This is a hopelessly inefficient method of choosing terms. Any 
method which allows the choice of term to be more calculated is a great advantage: all work on 
resolution based theorem provers, going back to Robinson (1965) takes advantage of this insight. 
The central feature of resolution theorem proving methods is the use of skolemisation and unification. It 
is particularly desirable to consider the application of these techniques at this point because resolution is a 
non-countermodel expansion system, so the work of Chapters 4 to 7 is not applicable to resolution. 
Fortunately, skolemisation and unification can be incorporated into ground based systems using standard 
methods. Reeves (1987) and Fitting (1990b, Chapter 7) discuss the addition of skolemisation and 
unification to ground based proof systems. In a sentence, the technique is to replace universal 
instantiation by the introduction of a dummy variable, and existential instantiation by the introduction of 
a skolem function of the free variables at that point: the choice of term for a universal instantiation can be 
made at a later stage using unification. 
Unfortunately, Reeves and Fitting's presentation cannot be followed directly here. The problem is that 
the condition (5) on universal instantiation limits those terms that may be introduced. Introducing dummy 
variables instead may lead to adding restrictions via existential introduction that are not justified. For 
example, suppose one had a formula 
VX :Pi(x) qV :P2(x,Y) (I)(X'-V)  
It may not be possible to introduce, say, the name a for x if we cannot prove p(a). However, if one 
introduced a dummy variable for x, x for example, one would have 
(I)(x',Y) 
allowing, with the skolem term f(x) replacing y, the introduction of the restriction 
P2(x‘j(x')) 
It might then be possible to replace x with a, and to use the restriction p2(a,f(a)) to satisfy the restriction 
pi(a). This would be unsound. The satisfaction of p i (x) is a precondition for the introduction of 
p2(x',f(x')): naive skolemisation leads to the possibility of circular reasoning. Frisch (1991, Appendix B) 
shows how this problem may be avoided. In the above circumstances, instead of introducing the simple 
restriction p2(x',f(x')), Frisch adds to the restriction theory the clause 
Pt (x) 	 P2(x',f(x')) 
In the context of this chapter, this could be done equally well. The crucial point that the restriction theory 
must satisfy non-vacuity would not be affected by such clauses, and all such clauses are definite Horn 
clauses, and so do not affect the satisfaction of the least Herbrand model property. Therefore one could 
apply skolemisation and unification to the proof systems in this chapter with little theoretical work. The 
presence of the restriction theory underlying universal instantiation can in some cases be replaced by the 
use of special purpose unification algorithms, as discussed by Frisch and Scherl (1990, 1991). A final, 
minor, point is that the requirement of name-acyclicity as a precondition for soundness would be rendered 
unnecessary by skolemisation, just as it was rendered unnecessary in Chapter 7 by the use of the binary 
relation <I. 
If the above sketch were to be filled out, one would arrive at proof systems which are essentially those of 
Frisch's "substitutional framework" (1989, 1991). Indeed, Frisch (1991, Appendix B) explicitly 
discusses the skolemisation process and the conditions under which it is sound, which are effectively the 
same as my condition of non-vacuity. So the work in this chapter cannot be seen as a significant new 
contribution. However, it is still interesting because it approaches the same problem as Frisch from the 
reverse direction. That is, while Frisch makes skolemisation central and proves its correctness 
semantically, I consider skolemisation as an essentially syntactic process. With respect to skolemisation, 
Frisch's work has the considerable advantage over this work that, unlike this sketch, it is complete! 
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Chapter 9 
A More General System for Restricted Quantification 
In Chapter 4 I proved that two expansion rules, (y) and (6), for dealing with restricted quantification were 
sound. I also showed that adding them to a propositional countermodel expansion system leads to a 
complete system, provided that the restriction theory satisfies the least Herbrand model property. This 
result provided the foundation for all the work in Chapters 5 to 8. 
The least Herbrand model property is not always satisfied, of course. In this chapter I prove complete 
another expansion system given an arbitrary first order restriction theory. The rule (y) is replaced by a 
new rule (y-branch), so called because unlike the old rule, it is a branching rule. Unfortunately, the fact 
that (7) is a linear rule is crucial to the close analogy between classical proof systems for first order logic 
and the proof systems for restricted quantification in this thesis. 
There are compelling reasons for the study of the system I introduce in this chapter. There are a number 
of modal logics whose restriction theory cannot be written in Horn clauses. Examples are counterfactual 
logics and temporal logics. Sequent and tableau style proof systems for the former have been studied by 
de Swart (1983) and me (Gent 1990). Temporal logics have been the subject of more intense study 
because of the natural link between the underlying ideas of time in temporal logics and time in computer 
systems. Authors who have studied the sequent and tableau style proof systems for temporal logics 
include Paech (1988) and Gore (1991). Unfortunately, all these proof systems suffer from the 
computational disadvantages discussed by Wallen (1989) and sketched briefly by me in Section 7.4. A 
further disadvantage of the mentioned work is that special arguments are required to prove correct the 
system for each logic. A mistake in one of de Swart's proof systems went unnoticed for six years until I 
saw it and corrected it (Gent 1990). 
We can expect that, by applying similar methods to those of this thesis, more computationally sensitive 
proof systems could be discovered for temporal and counterfactual logics, and in some generality. 
Whether this is in fact so remains the major problem left open by this thesis. However, the avenue of 
attack is clear. In this chapter I prove correct a proof system that can be applied to logics such as 
temporal logics. This system is closely analogous to that of Chapter 4: indeed the system of Chapter 4 is a 
special case of the new system. The next stage, left undone here, is to apply arguments similar to those of 
Chapters 5 to 8 to the proof systems introduced in this chapter. 
Section 9.1: More General Expansion Rules for Restricted Quantification 
In Section 4.1 I introduced the following expansion rules and side conditions: 
Quantifier Expansion Rules 
Side Conditions 
(/) applies to 8-expansions: 
a is a new name that has not appeared on the branch up to the point of the 6-expansion. 
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yt 
(7-branch) 
 
7,(t1) I 	 • I r Yn 
7()(41) 	
y8(tn) 
(tn ) 
(2) applies to y-expansions: 
R yr(t) where R is the set of E-atoms on the branch up to the point of the y-expansion. 
(3) applies to y-expansions: 
t contains only names that have been introduced by 6-expansions on the branch up to the y-
expansion, except possibly the name c. 
(4)  
There is a well defined and one to one function f:P8 Names such that f(8) is the name introduced by 
into any immediate subposition of 8. That is, for each 8-type position 8 E P, if 80(a) c P then 
JO) = a. 
I showed in Chapter 4 that incorporating these rules into a sound and complete propositional expansion 
system S led to a sound and complete expansion system ES(4234 ) for restricted quantification, if E satisfies 
the least Herbrand model property. Also, in Section 4.5, I showed that we only need to use E-closure 
instead of closure for sound and complete systems if E satisfies the weak least Herbrand model property. 
Now I consider what happens if neither of these two conditions are satisfied. In fact it is only necessary 
to replace the rule (y) and its associated side condition (2). 
New Quantifier Expansion Rule (y-branch) 
Notation 
If S is any propositional expansion system, I will use "EbranchS" to refer to the expansion 
system containing the expansion rules of S, as well as (7-branch) and (6). 
The side condition which will replace (2) is defined below. 
Definition 9.1.1 (Side Condition (6)) 
(6) applies to 7-expansions: 
R kE y rl(t 1) v • 	 v 7rn(tn ) where R is the set of E-atoms on the branch up to the point of 
the y-expansion. 
There are two immediate points to note about the new rule. 
First, it is extremely unpleasant compared to the simple rule (y). A single application can involve 
arbitrary (finite) branching. Also, we must explicitly introduce the subformulas yrt(ti), which before were 
never introduced onto the tree. Furthermore, checking the side condition (6) involves checking the 
provability of a disjunction, effectively meaning that arbitrary reasoning may be involved rather than just 
reasoning within least Herbrand models. 
The second point is that the old rule is a special case of the new one, given the completeness result I will 
show later in this chapter. Consider any application of (y-branch). If E satisfies the least Herbrand model 
property, and R 7(41)v • • • v yrn(tn), then for some i, R 71 (41). Therefore we need not consider any of 
the other branches, and because R h,yri (ti ), we may delete yr (ti ) from the i th branch. So we can make any 
application of (y-branch) into an application of (y) without losing completeness, if E satisfies the least 
Herbrand model property. 
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Section 9.2: Example 
Temporal logics are playing an increasing role in computer science and artificial intelligence. 
Unfortunately, the accessibility theories for temporal logics tend to fail the least Herbrand model 
property. Indeed, there are cases where the theory cannot be axiomatised at all in the predicate calculus, 
for example temporal logics in which the set of times is the set of integers. However, if the accessibility 
theory can be expressed by the predicate calculus then the proof systems introduced in this chapter can be 
used. An example of such a logic is the modal logic S4.3. 
The semantics of the accessibility theory of S4.3 are those of S4, that it must be reflexive and transitive, 
with the additional demand that the accessibility relation must be weakly connected. This condition is 
expressed by the predicate calculus formula 
ew ex eY ( wRx A w RY)D (xRy Vy R x ) 
and by the non-Horn clause 
wRx ,wRY 	 xR)' , X R x 
Intuitively, this condition demands that given any two accessible worlds, one must "come second" in the 
sense of being itself accessible from the other one. The word "weakly" in "weakly connected" indicates 
that two distinct worlds are allowed to be mutually accessible. Given a weakly connected accessibility 
relation, the set of worlds can be seen as a linear sequence of clusters with the property that all the worlds 
in each cluster are mutually accessible. 
The axiom added to S4 to yield S4.3 is 
0(111/1 B) v 	 A) 
As an example of the use of the new (y-branch) rule I will show how this formula can be verified given a 
weakly connected accessibility theory. The following is a EbranchS(/.346) proof of the above formula. 
Ell-  0111( CIA DB)v 	 A)  
Ell-  0111(IIIA D B ) 
Ell-  0 D(EIB DA)  
all-  ODA DB 
E Ra 
all-  111IA 
all-  OB  
blF 011IBDA 
Rb  
blF 111IB 
a R6 	 b R a 
bll-  OA 	 (i) 
1A 	 IB 
(i) The expansion at (i) is an example of (7-branch). It is applied to the two formulas all- 1 EA and 
b 1 OB. The side condition (6) is satisfied because E R a and c R b both appear on the branch and 
E R  a, E R b kE aRbvbRa (given that fie, must be weakly connected). 
Gore (1991) has studied sequent style proof systems for temporal logics including S4.3, presenting 
systems which do not introduce any explicit syntax for times. There is certainly a close connection 
between Gore's system and the system I present here. In particular, as here, expansion of necessity type 
formulas can result in the splitting of a branch. As here, this splitting must be finite but can introduce 
arbitrarily many new branches. The same comments apply to de Swart's (1983) system for VCS and my 
system for VC (Gent 1990). It is plausible that these proof systems avoiding the use of explicit syntax for 
possible worlds and times could be derived from the system presented here, but it is difficult to formalise 
and generalise this intuition. 
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Section 9.3: Soundness of EbranchS(16) 
I have already proved the soundness of the rule (8) in Section 4.3. So, for the soundness of EbranchS(/6) 
given a sound propositional system S, I need only prove the soundness of the rule (y-branch) when the 
side condition (6) is satisfied. The definition of a sound expansion rule is in Section 3.3 and the definition 
of the semantics of restricted quantification is in Section 2.3. 
Theorem 9.3.1: Soundness of (7-branch) 
(7-branch) is a sound expansion rule if the side condition (6) holds. 
Proof 
Suppose we have a set S containing formulas y1 , 	 , y" that may be expanded under the rule (y-branch) to 
yield 7(1)(t 1), 	 , y'At„). Suppose also that S is satisfiable, and in particular that it is satisfiable in a E-model 
M = < D,I> under an assignment A. That is, for each i, lyilI,A t.  
By the side condition (6), R 	 7!- (t 1) v • • v 7:11(tn), where R is the set of restrictions in S. Since M is a E,- 
model of S, M is a E-model of R and hence of yri(t j) v • v yrn(tn). But by the definition of a model, for 
some i, M is a E-model of yri (ti ). That is, [yri (O]i° A = t. But the definition of semantics of restricted 
quantifiers, and the fact that MLA = t, ensure that [y6(0]" = t. Therefore M and A satisfy S, 7ir (t1), 76(4). 
That is, the set of formulas on one of the expanded branches is satisfiable, which was what was wanted. 
Section 9.4: Completeness of LbranchS(/.346 ) 
Proving completeness of the new proof system is not difficult, but slightly more fiddly than the proofs in 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 because now there will not be a single model for a branch Mx. However, at least all 
that is needed is a proof of the relevant formulation of the Branch Model Lemma. After that, exactly the 
same completeness proof as I used in Section 4.4 will do. I should refer you back to one definition used 
here which I have not used since Chapter 4. This is the definition of E-closure (Definition 4.5.1). For 
convenience I repeat the rather more complicated definition of a model for a branch. 
Definition 4.4.2.1 (Ma, E-model for a branch) 
Suppose that 7v is a branch in a ES tree, containing the set of formulas U and set of restrictions R. In 
that case, MA. = <D,I> is a E-model for the branch X if: 
1. D is the set of all terms built using function symbols from the constants and names that appear 
anywhere in U; and 
2. I applied to constant symbols and names is the identity function; and 
3. I applied to a n-place function symbol f gives the function defined by 
fi(t i , 	 tn) = f(t 	 tn ) 
4. for any y-type formula y on the branch, and any term t arising on the branch, Mx satisfies the 
associated restriction 7,.(t) if and only if R 	 7,(t); and 
5. for any P, an L-atom, M satisfies P if and only if 1P E U; and 
6. Mx is a E-model. 
In the following proof I will use the fact that if a set of restrictions is E-unsatisfiable then a finite subset of 
them is E-unsatisfiable. This follows from the compactness of first order logic (see for instance Smullyan 
1968) and because E-unsatisfiability is a judgement of first order logic (recall that I only consider 
restriction theories E that can be expressed in first order logic). 
Notice that for this theorem the notion of E-closure must be used (as defined in Section 4.5) rather than 
the usual notion of simple closure. 
-86- 
Lemma 9.4.1: Branch Model Lemma for ES(1346 ) with E-closure 
If X is an open (not E-closed) complete branch , containing the set of restrictions R, in an ES(1346 ) tree 
then there is a E-model Mx for the branch X. 
Proof 
We can certainly find a first order logic model Mx satisfying parts (1) to (5) of Definition 
4.4.2.1 since any first order logic model is well defined given the definition of which atoms hold in it. The 
only difficulty is to show that MA, must be a E-model, to satisfy part (6) of the definition. I show that the 
supposition that Mx is not a E-model leads to a contradiction. 
Suppose Mx is not a E-model. Then there must be a set of restrictions R' such that: 
no element of R' appears on the branch; and 
each E-model containing Mx contains at least one element of R'; and 
each element of R' is an instance of yr(t) for some position y and term t arising on the branch. 
This implies both that R 	 '0) for each Mt) e R' and that R U 1-17r(t) I yr(t) e 	 is E-unsatisfiable. 
Therefore, by compactness, for some finite subset 7,1 (t i ) , . . . , 77.'1(01 c 	 R 	 7,1 (t i ) v • • • v y'Atn). 
But then the condition (6) is satisfied by an application of the (7-branch) expansion rule to 71, . ,7n 
Since the branch is assumed to be complete, this application must have been applied somewhere on the 
branch, implying that for some i, -4(0 appears on the branch and in R. But we assumed that y (ti ) c 
and that no element of R' appears on the branch. This is a contradiction, as promised. 
1=1 
Theorem 9.4.2: Completeness of ES(1)46 ) with E-closure 
If S is a propositional countermodel expansion system, and a finite set of forinulas S is not satisfiable, then 
there is a E-closed ES(1346 )-tree for S. 
Proof 
The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 4.4.2.3. 
As discussed at the end of Section 9.1, proof systems with the rule (7) can be viewed as special cases of 
the same proof systems with (7-branch). Indeed, when the least Herbrand model property holds, the 
simple argument given earlier converts easily into a completeness proof for systems with (7). Indeed, in 
my technical report (Gent 1991b) I present the system of this chapter first, regarding the system of 
Chapter 4 as a corollary. On the other hand, most of this thesis is devoted on proof systems which use (y) 
and therefore it is more natural to present them independently, as is done in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 10 
Related Work, Further Work, and Conclusions 
In this chapter I put the work in this thesis in context, first by considering related work from the literature, 
and then by making suggestions for future research based on this thesis. Finally, I give some conclusions 
to the whole thesis. 
Section 10.1: Related Work 
In this Section discuss how other work in the literature relates to the work presented in this thesis. I 
structure this discussion by considering how other work relates to the aims, methods, and results of this 
thesis. 
Section 10.1.1: Work with Related Aims 
In this thesis my aim has been to study the link between proof systems for quantified logics and proof 
systems for the underlying propositional logic. I have done this in the context of restricted quantification, 
which easily expresses a variety of sorted and modal logics. I have tried to consider as wide a range as 
possible of propositional proof systems, only restricting the range of propositional systems when this was 
theoretically necessary. 
Of course a lot of work has related quantified proof systems and propositional proof systems: almost any 
work on proof systems for first order logic can be seen in this light. However, very little work has both 
addressed proof systems for restricted quantification, and sought to do this without concentrating on a 
particular propositional proof system. The only significant earlier work doing this is by Frisch (1989, 
1991) and Scherl (1991, Frisch and Scherl 1990, 1991). 
Frisch (1989, 1991) presents "a general framework for sorted deduction". The framework is very similar 
to the framework I have used in this thesis: restricted quantification is used in the presence of a 
restriction theory. Furthermore, showing clearly how close our work is, Frisch requires the least 
Herbrand model property of the restriction theory exactly as I have done throughout the major part of this 
thesis, starting in Chapter 4. Frisch's restrictions must be monadic, as opposed to restrictions of arbitrary 
arity that I allow. However, there would seem to be no significant problem extending Frisch's approach 
to polyadic restrictions. Frisch claims that his framework "provides for a systematic transformation of 
unsorted deductive systems into sorted ones" (Frisch 1991, abstract). Thus Frisch does not commit 
himself to one particular propositional proof system, and in this rests the crucial similarity with my own 
aims. Frisch and Scherl (1990, 1991) show how to extend the approach to deal with modal logics. 
An important feature of Frisch and Scherl's work, that has no parallel in my own thesis, is their 
demonstration of the application of constraint based reasoning to modal logics (Frisch and Scherl 1990, 
1991). In particular, Frisch and Scherl show in a general way how the use of sequences to represent 
possible worlds arises, explaining a common feature of much work on theorem proving in modal logics, 
such as Fitting's (1983, Chapter 8) prefixed tableau, and the work of Wallen (1987b, 1989) and Ohlbach 
(1988a, 1988b). In Appendix 1 I show how sequences can be seen to arise in modal logics, based on the 
work in this thesis. 
Where I have ignored the problems involved in unification, Frisch and Scher] put this centre stage. In 
particular, special purpose unification is required for each different restriction theory, since Frisch shows 
how to reduce reasoning within the theory to just this special purpose unification. This certainly makes 
their work more immediately useful if one wishes to implement a theorem prover, since unification is 
certainly essential to efficient first order theorem proving. On the other hand, for a clear theoretical 
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understanding of the issues involved in lifting propositional proof systems to restricted quantification, I 
see two theoretical advantages to my approach. First, I achieve a greater generality than Frisch. Frisch is 
restricted to analogues of quantified proof systems in which existential quantifiers are skolemised. In this 
thesis I gave matrix characterisations of validity for restricted quantification using an acyclicity test 
instead of skolemisation. Second, my use of "expansion systems" has enabled me to give formal proofs 
of the correctness of extended systems, and precise conditions for correctness to hold, in terms of 
properties of the expansion system and the restriction theory. This contrasts with Frisch's claim that a 
proof of correctness of a proof system for unrestricted quantification can be systematically transformed to 
become a proof of correctness of a proof system for restricted quantification: for instance his correctness 
proof for sorted resolution (1991, section 6) is presented as being merely an example. Frisch does not 
present a general, formal, proof of his claim. This lessens the ease of applying his result, since it might 
not be clear if a particular correctness proof could be transformed in this way. 
Although I have not considered unification, at least my work shows clearly how special purpose 
unification will arise. First, one views unification as a syntactic operation, simply delaying a firm choice 
as to the introduction of specific terms (a view expounded in Fitting (1990b), for example). Unification 
arises out of universal instantiation. But that is exactly where I attached special purpose reasoning in the 
proof systems of Chapters 4, 5, 7, and 8. Special purpose unification arises as the combination of special 
purpose reasoning and the desire to delay the choice of term to introduce. 
Tony Cohn and I have discussed some of these issues further in (Gent and Cohn 1991). 
Section 10.1.2: Work using Related Methods 
There are two aspects of the methods I have used in this thesis that I wish to discuss. The first is the 
methodology used to derive the proof theoretic results in this thesis. The second is the approach of 
theorem proving in modal logics by translating modal logics into first order logic, by expressing Kripke 
semantics. 
The methodology used in this thesis is to derive computationally sensitive, and possibly complex, 
characterisations of validity by proof theoretic arguments applied to a much simpler, but possibly 
computationally unsuitable, proof system. These theoretical arguments aid understanding of the 
relationship between different proof systems. The arguments apply because the expansion rules 
introduced in Chapter 4 are particularly well suited to this development, the reason of course why the 
rules were introduced. This methodology avoids the need for many semantic arguments, which are often 
infinitary, replacing them with arguments applied to proofs, proofs being finite syntactic objects. This 
methodology I have used in this thesis was introduced to me by Wallen, both in person and by his work. 
The methodology is well exemplified by Wallen (1986, 1989) who shows how to develop matrix based 
characterisations of validity from tableau systems. Interestingly, Wallen's formal proofs of matrix 
characterisations for modal logics (1989, Chapter 5) are direct from the semantics of modal logics. In a 
sense, then, my formal proofs in Chapter 7 are new, but the arguments I use in that chapter are entirely 
due to Wallen. Another example of the methodology is given by Pym and Wallen (1990). 
My dependence on the earlier arguments of Wallen is particularly clear in the development of Chapters 5 
and 7. In Chapter 5 I address the problem of reducing some of the order dependence between 
applications of expansion rules which arises from theory reasoning: eliminating order dependence was 
shown to be important by Wallen. In Chapter 7 I exploit the fact that all order dependence arising from 
the theory has been eliminated. I am able to apply Wallen's arguments to derive a matrix characterisation 
of validity. 
The fact that I use Wallen's arguments does not mean that the material in Chapter 7 is not new. My 
decision to study restricted quantification separates me from Wallen and generalises his approach to a 
wider class of logics than he considered in (Wallen 1989). Expressing modal logics using restricted 
quantification makes it quite clear where the extra syntax for dealing with modalities comes from and 
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enables me to apply Wallen's insights more directly than he did himself. 
Mints (1988, 1990) has also used explicit transformation between proof systems to derive new proof 
systems. He derives resolution style proof systems for modal and intuitionistic logic from sequent style 
proof systems. The results are not directly related to mine because of his use of implicit ways of dealing 
with modalities rather than the explicit introduction of names for worlds I have used. Nevertheless, his 
elegant results are another justification of the methodology I apply in this thesis, since a number of other 
resolution systems for modal logics using implicit methods for modalities are all inelegant or use 
unsatisfactory analogues of resolution. Such systems have been proposed by Abadi and Manna (1986), 
Chan (1987), Geissler and Konolige (1987), Farifias del Cerro and Herzig (1988), Enjalbert and Farifias 
del Cerro (1989), and Cialdea (1991). Only Fitting's (1990a) "destructive modal resolution" systems, 
not derived by analysis of other proof systems, can compare with Mints' systems for elegance and 
closeness to classical resolution. 
In this thesis I have particularly emphasised the application of my work to modal logics. The approach I 
have taken to theorem proving in modal logics is to translate modal logics into logics of restricted 
quantification, the restriction theory being chosen according to the conditions on the modal accessibility 
relation. Most work concerning theorem proving in modal logics takes a different approach, using special 
purpose arguments for modalities and possible worlds. Examples include all the methods discussed in the 
previous paragraph, as well as all the methods of Fitting (1983) and Wallen (1989). 
The first work considering explicit translation of Kripke semantics for automated theorem proving is that 
of Morgan (1976). Using a standard first order resolution theorem prover, Morgan was able to prove all 
the modal logic theorems in Hughes and Cresswell (1968). However, Morgan's approach has an obvious 
drawback, in that the full power of resolution theorem proving is brought to bear on reasoning in the 
accessibility theory. Many accessibility theories can be reasoned about very much more efficiently than 
by the undecidable method of resolution. This observation is central in this thesis, where all formulas 
from the accessibility theory go into restrictions on quantifications. Since restrictions are dealt with 
separately by all the proof methods in this thesis, we can take advantage of any simplicities in the 
accessibility theory. 
Ohlbach (1988a, 1988b, 1989, 1990) has studied semantics based translation methods for modal logics. 
Compared to my work he considers a wider variety of translations than the simple translation using the 
accessibility relation I use in this thesis. Ohlbach (1990) studies in depth "functional translations". In 
these, a set of "modal context access functions" exist, the application of each function to a world 
returning some world accessible from the first. Since Ohlbach demands that functions must be total, the 
method is only well suited to serial modal logics. The conditions on the accessibility relation are 
replaced by conditions on the set of context access functions. For example, reflexivity is expressed by the 
demand that the identity function should be in the set of access functions. Translation of a modal formula 
uses ordinary quantification over context access functions. For example, the modal formula 
00(P AO Q) 
would be translated as 
of Vi (P(skfoi, 0)) A 	 Q(4foi og,0)) ). 
In this expression "0" represents the initial world while " o" indicates function composition and the "1," 
terms indicate application of the function to the initial world. 
The reason for the functional translation is that, as Ohlbach puts it (1990, page 4): "Most of these 
properties can be described with equations, which, in a further step, can be translated into a theory 
unification algorithm." The same point is further discussed by Auffray and Enjalbert (1989). 
One drawback of Ohlbach's work is that the target logics for his translation seem to me to be needlessly 
complex, making his results less clear and less easily extensible. For example, in (Ohlbach 1990) his 
target logic is Schmidt-Schauss' (1989) order sorted predicate logic, leading Ohlbach to say "Since 
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Schmidt-Schauss' logic is quite complex, we briefly introduce its main notions." In this thesis I 
deliberately chose a very simple target logic, the logic of restricted quantification presented in Chapter 2. 
I was able very quickly to introduce all its notions. This makes the proof theory of the target logic much 
simpler even though it still provides an explanation for the use of special purpose reasoning in restriction 
theories. A linked drawback of Ohlbach's work is that he only considers resolution style proof systems 
for the target logic. Because of the complexity of the target logics producing analogues of other 
propositional proof methods would not necessarily be simple. 
Farifias del Cerro and Herzig (1990) translate modal logics into "deterministic modal logics", using a 
similar functional translation to Ohlbach's. It is not clear what the advantages are of their new formalism 
over and above the use of the functional translation. 
Frisch and Scherl (1990, 1991), discussed also in Section 10.1.1 of this chapter, translate modal logics 
into a first order logic of restricted quantification. This enables them to use insights from constraint 
reasoning, illustrating how sequence unification arises in modal logic theorem proving. A sequence is 
very similar to Ohlbach's chain of functions. Their work has the advantage over Ohlbach's that they use 
a much simpler target logic, and are not restricted to resolution based proof systems. As I mentioned 
earlier, however, they are restricted to extending first order proof systems that rely on skolemisation. 
The work of Ohlbach and Frisch and Scherl, as well as the work in this thesis, shows that translating 
modal logics into first order logics still allows careful use to be made of the difference between modalities 
and ordinary quantifiers, a distinction lost in methods such as Morgan's. That is, we provide special 
purpose reasoning methods for modal logics using general considerations. Other methods have been 
proposed using explicit syntax for possible worlds, but using special purpose arguments for modalities, 
for example by Wallen and Jackson and Reichgelt (discussed in Section 10.1.3). These proposals do not 
seem to contain any insights that cannot be duplicated in a more general framework such as mine 
Section 10.1.3: Work producing Related Results 
In this section I survey work from the literature whose results are related to results I have produced in this 
thesis. I will do this by working through my thesis chapter by chapter, discussing work relating to each 
chapter. For convenience I provide subheadings indicating which chapter I am discussing. 
Chapter 2 
There is no new work in Chapter 2. I introduce the formalism I use for restricted quantification as well as 
an extension of Smullyan's (1968) uniform notation for it, and discuss how to express modal logics using 
restricted quantification. 
The first work I know of discussing restricted quantification is by Hailperin (1957a, 1957b). Hailperin 
does not consider automated theorem proving, and does not separate syntactically what may appear as 
restrictions and what may not: indeed arbitrary formulas of the predicate calculus may appear. Because 
of this lack of separation Hailperindoes not include a separate restriction theory. This idea may be found, 
for example, in Frisch (1991) or Biirckert (1990a). 
Two aspects of my formalism are worth brief discussion. Unlike Hailperin I demand that all restrictions 
must be atoms rather than arbitrary formulas. It would be perhaps more elegant to allow arbitrary 
formulas 1 and it would make little difference to the work of Chapters 4 and 9. However, knowing that 
restrictions are atoms is convenient for the work of Chapters 5 to 8. The other limitation of my formalism 
is that formulas from the restriction theory may only appear as restrictions. This is to force the separation 
between the restriction theory and the rest of the logic that is the subject of this thesis. However, 
Hailperin makes no such demand, and Cohn (1987, 1989b) has explicitly argued, in the context of many 
sorted logic, that one should allow restrictions to appear anywhere. 
1 and I thank Felix Hovsepian for pointing this out to me. 
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Other formalisms for logics than restricted quantification could be used to study the relation between 
propositional and quantified proof systems. An example is Smullyan's (1970) "Abstract Quantification 
Theory". However, the particular advantage of using restricted quantification is that the notation gives 
explicit access to the underlying theory, which would not be true, for example, if we applied abstract 
quantification theory to modal logics. 
Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3 only two very minor new pieces of work are discussed. The first is my definition of 
"countermodel expansion system", a definition which is new. As noted there, this refines slightly the 
notion of an "expansion system" due to D'Agostino (1990). The usefulness of the definition is shown in 
Chapter 4. The second new work in Chapter 3 is my extension of KE to deal with equivalences. This is a 
case of the obvious thing working. The new rules are very KE-like and it is a very natural extension, 
unlike the usual extension of analytic tableau to deal with equivalences. 
Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4 I showed how to extend any propositional countermodel expansion system to deal with 
restricted quantification, provided that the restriction theory has the least Herbrand model property. I 
know of no work which extends such a variety of propositional proof systems in the presence of such a 
general condition. For example, Frisch (1989, 1991) requires further properties of restrictions, akin to my 
non-vacuity condition. Also, Frisch extends existing first order proof systems rather than propositional 
ones. 
The condition the least Herbrand model property is required is not new. Similar results for proof systems 
of restricted quantification have been presented by Frisch (1989, 1991) and Biirckert (1990a). Recall that 
the least Herbrand model property is guaranteed if the restriction theory can be written in Horn clauses 
without goal clauses (Theorem 4.4.1.4). That Horn clauses are important to the system of Chapter 4, and 
hence to all the work presented throughout Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, represents further enforcement of the 
fact that Horn clauses are essential to computation. As well as the close relationship between Horn clause 
logic and intuitionistic logic, Horn clauses are fundamental to logic programming and Prolog (see for 
example Lloyd 1984). Furthermore, they play a crucial role in algebraic specification in theoretical 
computer science (see for example Wirsing 1990). 
A feature of the work in Chapter 4 is the use of an arbitrary propositional countermodel expansion system 
as the base. Some work has been done which is related if one fixes propositional analytic tableau as the 
base proof system. There is a very close relationship with Fitting's (1972, 1983 Chapter 8) "prefixed 
tableaux" for modal logics. Prefixes play the role of possible worlds, and thus Fitting has introduced 
explicit syntax for possible worlds. Fitting gives prefixed tableaux systems for a wider range of modal 
logics than I consider, or could easily consider, since he presents systems for non-normal modal logics.2 
For those modal logics I can deal with, Fitting's systems could be very easily derived from my system, 
apart from one feature. This is Fitting's use of sequences as prefixes. A simple derivation of prefixed 
tableaux from my system of Chapter 4 would use single names for worlds. The difference can be 
illustrated as follows. In Chapter 4, from a signed formula 1w IFOP one would introduce 1 w' I F- P where 
w is some name and w' is a new name. Fitting however, introduces from 1p IF OP the formula 1 pw P 
where p is some sequence of names and pw' is some new sequence of names (whether or not w' is new 
being unimportant). Then, instead of explicitly referring to first order deductions about the accessibility 
theory, Fitting defines the accessibility relation on the set of prefixes by saying that qR qw for any 
sequence q and name w, and adds the tableau rule 
 
1p DP  
1 q P 
where q is a sequence such that p Rq. 
   
2 Non-normal modal logics are those in which the set of formulas true in a world is not forced to be consistent. 
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Of course the accessibility relation is defined to satisfy extra conditions appropriate to the logic. For a 
longer introduction to prefixed tableaux, and a sketch proof of their soundness and completeness based on 
the work up to Chapter 6 in this thesis, see Appendix 1. Catach (1991) describes an implementation of 
prefixed tableaux-like systems for a variety of propositional modal logics, using a method due to Hughes 
and Cresswell (1968) to make the systems decidable. 
Introducing sequences as prefixes provides a simple representation for the least Herbrand model that one 
would naturally use in my method. Otherwise, there seems to be little to choose between the two 
methods for humans constructing proofs. However, the use of sequences to represent worlds in modal 
logics seems to be important for automated theorem proving, as shown by Frisch and Scherl (1990, 
1991). 
Schmitt and Wernecke (1990) present a tableau proof system for order sorted logic. They present a 
ground proof system (that is, only introducing explicit terms containing no variables) and then discuss 
how to lift it to a system with unification. Their ground system is very easily seen to be an instance of the 
proof systems I present in Chapter 4, and the lifting to unification is standard. The same remarks apply to 
the tableau system presented by Costa and Cunningham (1991) for their action logic. It is interesting to 
observe that Schmitt and Wernecke, by treating order sorted logic as a special case, have missed the wood 
for the trees: they propose as a research problem "What is an adequate general framework for 
establishing results (e.g. soundness and completeness) for variants of many sorted predicate logic?." This 
is a problem that Chapter 4 solves. 
Chapters 5 and 6 
In Chapter 5 I showed how it was possible to reduce the amount of order dependence of rule applications 
in proof trees, by introducing new rules for restricted quantifiers. I defined two new conditions on the 
restriction theory, alphabetical monotonicity and non-vacuity, which I used to show the soundness of the 
resulting proof systems. In Chapter 6 I showed how to prove these new conditions for a variety of 
restriction theories. The new work in Chapters 5 and 6 is not as important as the use I put it to later. 
The importance of alphabetical monotonicity and non-vacuity is their use in eliminating order 
independence of rule applications. It is this that allows the derived proof systems of Chapters 7 and 8 to 
be constructed, in which propositional and quantificational reasoning are largely separated. My 
presentation isolates clearly the process of reducing order independence, which in itself is a contribution. 
The only change to the expansion rules in Chapter 5 is in the side condition on the (y) rule, and this 
change clearly reduces order dependence in the proof system. In Chapter 6, where I discuss proving 
alphabetical monotonicity and non-vacuity, I do not discuss proof systems at all. That is, the conditions 
which enable us to derive new proof systems can be checked without any reference to those proof 
systems. 
I know of nothing similar to the alphabetical monotonicity condition in the literature. On the other hand, 
the non-vacuity condition is very similar to Frisch's (1989, 1991) condition called "E-satisfiability". 
Frisch's condition also plays a very similar role to non-vacuity. E,-satisfiability is required of restrictions3  
for skolemisation to be valid, and skolemisation is the process that separates quantificational and 
propositional reasoning. I make more use of the non-vacuity condition than Frisch does of E-
satisfiability, using it to derive matrix characterisations of validity in Chapter 7 using acyclicity tests 
rather than skolemisation. Hailperin(1957b) also mentioned the necessity of disallowing free variables 
with vacuous ranges in the context of restricted quantification. 
3 Non-vacuity is a condition on E given a set of restrictions, while E-satisfiability is a condition on restrictions given E. 
This reversal is unimportant. 
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Chapter 7 
In Chapter 7 I derive matrix characterisations of validity in the presence either of non-vacuity or of 
alphabetical monotonicity. 
As I discussed in Section 10.1.2 in this chapter, the arguments I use in Chapter 7 are due to Wallen (1986, 
1989). This does not mean that my results are not new. Wallen's arguments were proposed as means of 
deriving matrix characterisations of validity from tableau-style calculi. This is precisely the use I put 
these arguments to. The crucial decision is which tableau-style system to apply the arguments to.4 The 
extension of Wallen's arguments to arbitrary expansion systems in Chapter 7 is not technically difficult 
since expansion systems are tableau-style systems. 
Wallen (1987b, 1989) presents matrix characterisations of validity for various modal logics. Chapter 7 
can be seen as a generalisation of his results in two independent directions. First, I derive analogues of 
matrices for expansion systems other than analytic tableau. Second, my matrix characterisations of 
validity apply to a much wider range of logics than Wallen's. Furthermore, it is only necessary to prove 
alphabetical monotonicity or non-vacuity to derive matrix characterisations for new logics. I do this in 
Chapter 6 for a variety of modal and sorted logics. 
The work of Chapter 6 enables me to give matrix characterisations of validity for all the modal logics 
Wallen considers. The only logic he considers that I do not is the intuitionistic logic J. Since this can be 
expressed by a translation into S4 or Kripke style semantics can be given for it directly, it would be easy 
for to cope with it given my results. 
Unfortunately, the results of Chapter 7 do not allow Wallen's characterisations to be read off as simple 
corollaries.5 The principal difference between our two characterisations for modal logics is Wallen's use 
of sequences as prefixes, rather than my use of names. Note that this distinction is the same as that I 
noted in comparison with Fitting's prefixed tableaux (see the discussion of Chapter 4 in this section). 
This is no coincidence. Indeed, Wallen states that historically his methods were inspired by Fitting's 
(Wallen 1989, page 189). This lack of coincidence is underlined by Frisch and Scherl's (1990, 1991) 
work showing how sequences arise in this context. The work on prefixed systems in Appendix 1 could be 
used as a basis for a new derivation of matrix characterisations of validity very similar to the derivation in 
Chapter 7: the result would be very much closer to Wallen's characterisations than that actually presented 
in Chapter 7. 
Wallen (1989, Chapter 6) explicitly discusses unification problems, which I have not. This and his use of 
sequences certainly makes his work more immediately applicable. Indeed some of Wallen's 
characterisations have been used to implement an automated theorem prover for the modal logic S5 
(Wallen and Wilson 1987). Frisch and Scherl's work should make it easy to introduce sequences and 
sequence unification into the matrix characterisations I present in Chapter 7. 
In a much longer discussion of theory resolution, Stickel (1985) briefly discusses a matrix 
characterisation of validity incorporating special purpose reasoning in a theory. If one used his approach 
for restricted quantification, then restrictions would explicitly appear in the matrix, thus greatly 
expanding the number of paths through a matrix and so the computational cost of checking them all for 
closure. This contrasts with matrices as presented in Chapter 7, where restrictions do not add any paths to 
a matrix, while my characterisation of validity still incorporates special purpose reasoning in the 
restriction theory. 
Petermann (1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1991) has discussed incorporating theories into the connection method at 
much greater length than Stickel. In particular, he considers the problems of lifting Stickel's results to 
4 Indeed, providing the correct tableau-style system was the historical reason for the whole of the development of 
Chapters 4 to 6. 
5 From my study of this issue it seems that they could he read off as complicated corollaries, with extremely tedious 
and unilluminating proofs. They wouldn't really be corollaries then, would they? 
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allow free variables (Stickel's approach was limited to ground proof systems). Petermann also considers 
the problems of incorporating theories with equality, showing in (Petermann 1991) how to incorporate the 
methods of paramodulation (Wos et al 1967), E-resolution (Morris 1969) and RUE-resolution (Digricoli 
and Harrison 1986) into the connection method. Therefore Petermann's work represents a considerable 
advance on Stickel's brief consideration of this subject. 
In comparison with my own work, Petermann's has the advantages of being able to deal with equality and 
of considering the problems of unification: like Stickel I deal only with ground based proof systems. 
Petermann's presentation is much closer to an implementation than mine because he centres his 
discussion on the connection method. Petermann's work should be applicable to other theorem proving 
methods since it is based on a generalisation of Herbrand's theorem. Unlike me, however, Petermann has 
not considered theorem proving for logics of restricted quantification, and this represents the main 
advantage of my work. That is, if formulas from the theory appear in a theorem to be proved, then those 
formulas will appear explicitly in a matrix. Hence, formulas restricting universal instantiation will 
expand the number of paths to be considered. This does not happen in my matrix characterisations of 
validity because restrictions need not appear explicitly in a matrix. However, it is important to observe 
that this kind of problem is not insuperable in every case. For example, Petermann (1990a, 1990b) shows 
how his work can be applied to modal logics. He does this using Auffray and Enjalbert's (1989) 
translation of modal logics into "path-logic". This translation is similar to Ohlbach's functional 
translation discussed in Section 10.1.2. Indeed path-logic is just a variant of first order logic. The 
advantage of using this translation is that modal formulas are translated into ordinary quantifiers rather 
than restricted quantifiers, and so modal connectives do not lead to any new paths. Different modal logics 
are obtained by using different theories about the functions. Interestingly, Petermann (personal 
communication 1991) points out that it should be possible to extend this approach to non-serial modal 
logics since his extension of Herbrand's theorem (1990b) takes account of partial functions. 
In Chapter 7 I showed how Wallen's arguments could be applied starting from expansion systems other 
than tableau. It is not clear how useful this generalisation will be, since I have not investigated its 
usefulness in this context. The results could certainly be directly applied to the expansion system KE. In 
his thesis containing much study of KE, D' Agostino (1990, page 122) states that "some variant of Bibel's 
connection method should prove useful. Similar proof-search procedures for non-classical logics could 
be developed by adapting Wallen's methods." The results in Chapter 7 confirm the claim of the second 
sentence, while leaving open the question of whether they would give a useful variant of the connection 
method. 
Chapter 8 
In Chapter 8 I showed how, if non-vacuity holds of a restriction theory, we can completely separate out 
quantifier instantiation from propositional reasoning. I did this by showing how applications of quantifier 
rules could permute freely with propositional rules. 
Given the result of Chapter 8, any propositional proof system can easily be extended to a first order 
system. Furthermore, we can apply standard techniques for dealing with instantiation, such as 
skolemisation, or Bibel's (1987) reduction orderings. 
Frisch (1991, Appendix B) presents what is effectively the same result as that of Chapter 8, for restriction 
theories in which each predicate is monadic. That is, he shows how skolemisation is possible given his 
condition called E-satisfiability. Demanding E-satisfiability is essentially the same as my own non-
vacuity. Although showing the correctness of a skolemisation process is different to showing how to 
permute instantiation with propositional reasoning, the latter can be derived easily from the former 
simply by regarding ground instances of skolem terms as names. I believe that my presentation of the 
result puts it in a more fundamental light: the central importance is not that skolemisation works but that 
instantiation can be considered separately from propositional reasoning. Skolemisation is an important 
corollary of this fundamental fact. 
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Jackson and Reichgelt (1987, 1988, 1989) present resolution type methods for modal logics. If the sketch 
of skolemisation in Chapter 8 were to be given in full, then most of their systems could be read off as 
corollaries, except for the fact that Jackson and Reichgelt give explicit unification algorithms. However, 
this does not apply to the non-serial modal logics they consider, since the restriction theories for these 
logics do not satisfy non-vacuity, as required in Chapter 8. Unfortunately, Jackson and Reichgelt's 
contribution in this regard is difficult to understand because the difference between their systems for 
serial and non-serial modal logics lies only in the unification algorithm. 
Chapter 9 
Chapter 8 represents the end of the development I started in Chapter 4, the fundamental feature of which 
was that the restriction theory had to satisfy the least Herbrand Model Property. In Chapter 9 I consider a 
similar proof system to that of Chapter 4 for the case that E does not satisfy this property. 
The system of Chapter 9 is unpleasant because universal instantiation introduces new branches in a proof 
tree, and because restrictions from universal statements appear explicitly on the new branches. This is 
analogous to the distinction between total theory resolution and partial theory resolution (Stickel 1985). 
In total theory resolution no new literals are introduced by resolution steps, while in partial theory 
resolution new literals, known as "residues", may appear. 
Proof systems such as that of Chapter 9 have been little discussed in the literature. As well as Stickel's 
theory resolution, there is a close similarity with Bfirckert's (1990a) resolution system for restricted 
quantification. Biirckert adds restrictions explicitly to clauses, conjoining the set of restrictions in two 
clauses when a binary resolution step is performed. To derive the empty clause is not enough, however. 
Instead one must derive enough empty clauses, each with an associated set of restrictions, such that each 
model of the restriction theory satisfies at least one of the sets of restrictions. This demand is very close 
to the rule (y-branch) I present in Chapter 9. Instead of attaching a set of restrictions to each clause, one 
could achieve a similar effect by using different branches and labelling each branch with a set of 
restrictions and demanding that each model of the restriction theory satisfies the restriction on at least one 
branch. This is exactly the system of Chapter 9, except that I do not assume that we are dealing with 
formulas in clause form.6 Bfirckert's system is not a corollary of my general system since I need to 
assume we are dealing with a propositional countermodel expansion system: resolution is not a 
countermodel system. Just as I note that the expansion systems of Chapter 4 are special cases of that of 
Chapter 9 if the least Herbrand model property holds, Biirckert notes that only one empty clause is 
required in this case. Because of this, Btirckert's resolution system can be seen as a generalisation of 
Frisch's (1989, 1991) resolution system (although not of all Frisch's work since Biirckert only considers 
resolution). 
There is a clear connection between the branching expansion system of Chapter 9 and some proof 
systems that have been proposed for modal logics whose accessibility theory cannot be written in Horn 
clauses. Examples include sequent-style systems for counterfactual logics such as those proposed by de 
Swart (1983) and me (Gent 1991), as well as similar systems proposed for modal logics such as S4.3 by 
Gore (1991). All these systems have the common feature that some of the rules applied for modalities 
can cause branching, unlike the usual systems for the usual modal logics (see for example Fitting 1983). 
Unfortunately it is difficult to formalise this connection since the systems I have just mentioned deal with 
modalities using implicit methods without introducing names for worlds. 
6 Blirckert (1990a) does not discuss reduction to clause form or skolemisation, leaving this to his thesis (1990b). 
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Section 10.2: Further Work 
In this section I propose some problems suitable for future research arising out of the work presented in 
this thesis. They can be summarised as follows: 
• To extend the proof theoretical methods applied in the bulk of this thesis to restriction theories 
which fail the least Herbrand model property. 
• To construct a good, general, implementation of the proof systems presented in this thesis, for the 
purpose of enabling researchers to build automated reasoners for a variety of logics very quickly. 
• To investigate the value of matrix characterisations of validity based on expansion systems other 
than analytic tableaux. 
• To apply similar techniques to those applied in this thesis to multiple-valued logics. 
• To incorporate sequence unification into the proof systems presented in this thesis. 
• To extend the proof systems presented in this thesis to deal with equality. 
It is foolish to try to order either the importance or difficulty of problems that have yet to be solved. 
Instead I have ordered the points above by how much my work contributes to the statement of new 
research topics. In particular, expressing the first four points would have been difficult or impossible 
without the work in this thesis, as would appreciating that solutions to these problems can reasonably be 
hoped for by applying techniques applied in this thesis. 
The most obvious issue left open in this thesis but requiring further work is suggested by the structure of 
this thesis itself. That is, in Chapter 4 I present a first extension of propositional expansion systems, and 
in Chapters 5 to 8 show how other proof systems can be derived from that system. However, the system 
of Chapter 4 is complete only if a certain condition holds, and in Chapter 9 I show how propositional 
expansion systems can be extended in a different way if the condition fails. Since the system of Chapter 
4 is a special case of the system of Chapter 9, it is of great interest to know if the arguments of Chapters 5 
to 8 can be seen as special cases of more general arguments. If so, then we could reasonably hope to use 
these arguments to produce good computational systems for logics not covered by the rest of this thesis. 
This problem is particularly important given that temporal logics are logics for which the system of 
Chapter 4 is incomplete. 
A good implementation of the proof systems presented in this thesis, that took advantage of the generality 
of those proof systems, could significantly enhance future research. I certainly do not suggest that 
immediate efforts should be made to build world class theorem provers based on my work. Serious 
implementations of theorem provers tend to be the result of large teams and many years: for example the 
Markgraf Karl refutation procedure recently celebrated its fifteenth birthday (Ohlbach and Siekmann 
1989). Also, I stand by the moral of Wallen's maxim quoted in Chapter 1, that implementations do not 
give a firm basis for choosing between different proof systems. However, there are two reasons why I 
believe implementations can be helpful. First, implementations can be easily distributed to allow other 
research workers to literally play with your ideas. In extreme cases they can be published: surely it is the 
length of the code (18 lines) as much as the good results that makes SATCHMO (Manthey and Bry 1988) 
so interesting? Second, results based on closely analogous implementations of related proof systems can 
be highly suggestive, especially where they tend to confirm theoretical arguments: Gore and D'Agostino 
(1991) provide just such a confirmation of D'Agostino's (1990) arguments on the relation between 
analytic tableaux and KE. I think that a well-written implementation of some of the proof systems in this 
thesis, allowing varying restriction theories and expansion systems to be incorporated, could allow faster 
research into the relationship between different proof systems for restricted quantification. 
In Chapter 7 I defined an analogue of matrix characterisations of validity based on any expansion system. 
To date, the only such characterisation which has been shown to be computationally important is that 
based on analytic tableaux, which gives rise to the connection method (Wallen 1989, Bibel 1987). 
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Investigations of other matrix characterisations of validity have already been demanded by D'Agostino 
(1990), and for expansion systems such as KE could be of great importance, given D'Agostino's 
demonstration of the advantages of KE over analytic tableaux. However, it is not clear that important 
systems result based on other expansion systems, and therefore this topic requires further investigation. 
A good general implementation, as requested in the previous paragraph, would make investigating this 
much easier. 
In this thesis I have given general arguments which are expressed in terms of restriction theories and 
expansion systems. However, I have used a fixed definition of polarities; namely that polarities are two-
valued. Hahnle (1990, 1991) has shown that by allowing many-valued polarities one can derive tableaux 
proof systems for a large range of many-valued logics. As far as the proof theoretic arguments in this 
thesis go, there seems to be nothing crucial in my use of two-valued polarities. It should be quite 
straightforward to apply similar arguments in Hahnle's more general framework, thus deriving all the 
benefits obtained in this thesis for a much greater variety of logics. Many-valued logics are of great 
interest in computer science and artificial intelligence, as argued for instance by Belnap (1976, 1977). 
More recently Hovsepian (1992) has shown formally that some features of the world, such as the 
indistinguishability of close colours given imperfect sensors, can only be modelled accurately using 
many-valued logics. 
Frisch and Scherl (1990, 1991) have shown in general how sequences (representing sequences of worlds) 
can be used in proof systems for modal logics. Once this is done, unification can be applied to sequences: 
in some cases special purpose unification algorithms eliminate all other reasoning in the restriction 
theory. Applying these techniques to my work should be straightforward, since Frisch and Scherl's 
presentation is quite general. As I discussed in Chapter 1, I have not considered unification in this thesis 
because it is not central to the proof theoretical arguments I apply: however it is certainly central to any 
efficient automated reasoning system. 
In this thesis I have not considered logics containing equality: this is a significant drawback since very 
many applications of theorem proving require the use of equality, and equality provides some of the most 
difficult problems to the automation of reasoning. However, much of the theoretical work in this thesis, 
and certainly the approach I have taken, should be applicable to logics with equality: it should be natural 
to extend an approach involving theories to theories containing equality. This conjecture is supported by 
the fact that the connection method (Bibel 1987) can deal with equality, as can Petermann's (1991) work 
on incorporating theories into the connection method. 
Finally, I wish to point out a minor technical problem that was left open in Chapter 5. That is, whether or 
not name-acyclicity is necessary for the soundness of ES(145) if E satisfies non-vacuity. A solution to this 
problem would increase my peace of mind, although I do not see that it is of any great importance. 
Section 10.3: Conclusions 
The first contribution of this thesis rests in the definition of a very simple way of building in the 
semantics of a restriction theory into a proof system, and the identification of general conditions under 
which the resulting proof system is complete. The resulting proof system has the triple advantages of 
being proved correct in a general way; of being a very natural extension of propositional proof systems, 
and so being easy for humans to use and reason with; and of laying a firm foundation for theoretical 
results about more complex proof systems. This last point is amply demonstrated by the fact that four 
chapters of this thesis are devoted to such analyses. I also define a second way of building in the 
semantics of a restriction theory, which is valid under more general conditions. This has the same three 
advantages. However, the last advantage is not demonstrated in this thesis since I do not undertake 
further analysis of the resulting proof systems. 
The second contribution of this thesis is the identification of conditions under which order independence 
of rule applications can be reduced in proof systems for restricted quantification. In particular, I have 
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identified two conditions on restriction theories which enable a significant cause of order dependency in 
my first proof systems to be removed. I call these conditions "alphabetical monotonicity" and "non-
vacuity". Non-vacuity is not an essentially new condition. In this thesis I show its importance proof-
theoretically, showing that in its presence application of propositional proof rules can be completely 
separated from instantiation of restricted quantifiers. I also use non-vacuity to generalise existing 
techniques. My definition of alphabetical monotonicity is new, but in this thesis I show that even if 
alphabetical monotonicity holds, some order dependence remains in the resulting proof systems. This 
makes it much more desirable that non-vacuity should hold of a restriction theory than just alphabetical 
monotonicity. 
Building on the first two contributions, I prove correct matrix characterisations of validity for restriction 
theories satisfying either alphabetical monotonicity or non-vacuity. The central motivation underlying 
matrix characterisations is the total elimination of order dependence of rule application and its 
replacement by global tests on resulting proofs. The test for the case where alphabetical monotonicity 
holds is more complex than that for non-vacuity, illustrating the greater usefulness of non-vacuity. These 
results represent the most significant single result in this thesis, since they generalise Wallen's matrix 
characterisations of validity for modal logics, both by extending the range of logics covered and by 
defining matrices more generally. 
All the contributions in this thesis isolate and generalise insights which have earlier only been applied to 
particular systems or logics. I believe that this process of isolation and generalisation is vital to the 
development of automated reasoning as a science. As this process develops, more and more reasoning 
problems will become feasible using a combination of standard methods. Furthermore, new insights will 
be more immediately applicable. This is particularly important since building a good automated 
reasoning system is becoming a very complicated business: to facilitate building future systems it is 
essential that as much as possible of the experience of older systems should be able to be expressed both 
theoretically and in a way independent of the particular system. 
Because I have sought to isolate a particular problem in this thesis, I have not addressed several issues 
crucial to the efficient implementation of automated theorem provers. The central problem I have 
considered is that of extending propositional proof systems to variable-free proof systems for restricted 
quantification, and the conditions on both the propositional system and the restriction theory under which 
the extension is correct. An example of a concept essential to efficient proof search that I have not 
considered is unification. This is not at all to minimise the importance of unification in automated 
reasoning: instead I simply claim that unification is not important to the problem I have addressed. 
Explicitly considering unification simultaneously with their proof system represents a significant 
drawback to the work of Jackson and Reichgelt (1987, 1988, 1989), to the extent that completeness proofs 
for their systems are not forthcoming (Jackson and Reichgelt 1989, page 190). 
Suppose one wished to implement a theorem prover for a logic which could be expressed by restricted 
quantification. One might refer to work such as D' Agostino' s (1990) concerning a suitable basic 
propositional proof system. By using the work in this thesis one could determine if and how this system 
could be extended to the full logic, depending on the properties of the restriction theory. By reference to 
work such as Frisch and Scher' (1990, 1991) one could determine how ideas derived from constraint 
reasoning might be applied, such as the use of sequences to represent possible worlds in modal logics. 
Work such as that of Siekmann (1986) on special purpose unification might enable reasoning within a 
restriction theory to be replaced or partially replaced by a special purpose unification algorithm. One can 
imagine, as I proposed in Section 10.2, a general purpose implementation allowing all of this work to be 
incorporated very easily. Even without this, it should be possible to produce very acceptable special 
purpose theorem provers while not needing to redo much of the theoretical work underlying the 
implementation. 
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Index of Symbols and Notation 
Below I give page references for non-standard symbols and notation used in this thesis. Sometimes two 
definitions are listed for a symbol, for example if its syntax and semantics are defined separately. The 
symbols c and take different meanings in different context, and so I give two entries for those. 
I use the standard logical symbols t (truth), f (falsity), A (conjunction), v (disjunction), (implication), 
(negation), V (universal quantifier), and (existential quantifier). The syntax and semantics for these 
symbols are defined in Definitions 2.2.1 and 2.3.2. 
To mark the end of proofs I use the symbol q 
Below, a page number in roman type indicates that the notation is introduced in the main body of the text 
on that page. A page number in bold type indicates that the notation is used in a definition on that page. 
A page number in italic type indicates that the notation is explained in an italicised paragraph headed 
"Notation" on that page. 
Symbol 	 Notes 
ex :POO 	 universal restricted quantification 
X :p(x) 	 existential restricted quantification 
III 	 modal logic "box" 
O modal logic "diamond" 
N. 	 modal accessibility relation 
(in clauses) 
(in sort function declarations) 
E restriction theory 
EL 	 logic of restricted quantification 
L parts of EL distinct from E 
E 	 distinguished name 
c 	 distinguished world 
> 	 model 
( )i 	 term assignment ( )A 	 variable assignment ( )I,A 	 general semantic assignment 
h, 	 entailment within E 
I I- 	 forcing 
0 	 negative polarity 
1 	 positive polarity 
a 	 conjunctive formula or position 
at, a2 	 subformulas or subpositions of a 
i3 	 disjunctive formula or position 
131,132 	 subformulas or subpositions of f3 
7 	 universal formula or position 
7o, 7r 	 subformulas or subpositions of 7 
6 	 existential formula or position 
So, or 	 subformulas or subpositions of 0 
'cm 	 propositional modal translation 
next 	 skolem function for serial modal logics 
_c 	 constant domain modal translation 
'in 
Tv
m 	
varying domain modal translation 
subsort relation 
7 	 expansion tree 
O closed branch in expansion tree 
Page(s) Definition(s) 
1, 11, 12 2.2.1, 2.3.2 
1, 11, 12 2.2.1, 2.3.2 
1, 15 
1, 15 
1, 15 
10 2.1.1, 2.1.2 
17 
9, 	 10 2.1.3 
9, 	 10 
10 
10 
15 
12, 2.3.1, 2.3.2 
12 2.3.1 
12 2.3.1 
12 2.3.1, 2.3.2 
13 2.3.3 
63 
13 2.4.1, 2.4.2 
13 2.4.1, 2.4.2 
14 , 30 2.4.4 
14, 30 2.4.4 
14, 30 2.4.5 
14, 30 2.4.5 
14, 32 2.4.6 
14, 32 2.4.6 
15, 32 2.4.7 
15, 32 2.4.7 
15 
15 
16 
16 
17 
20 
22 
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( y 	 complement (other than Ti , above) 	 22 
Occ 	 set of occurrences 	 29 
—q-. 	 equivalence relation on Occ 	 30 	 3.5.1 
< 	 subposition 	 30 	 3.5.2 
P set of positions 	 30 	 3.5.2 
Pa, Pal , etc. 	 set of positions of given type 	 30, 32 
lab() 	 label of a position 	 30 
polo ) 
	
polarity of a position 	 30 
(1) side condition 	 32 	 4.1.1 
(2) side condition 	 32 	 4.1.1 
(3) side condition 	 32 	 4.1.1 
(4) side condition 	 32 	 4.1.1 
(5) side condition 	 43 	 5.1.2 
(6) side condition 	 83 	 9.1.1 
Mx 	 model for a branch X 	 39 	 4.4.2.1 
LHME 	 (Least Herbrand Model) 	 43 	 5.1.1 
new() 
	
new name in a s-atom 	 47 	 5.2.2 
P( • -- ; -- • ) 	 distinction of eligible argument 	 49 
( )G 	 assignment 	 50 
] assignment 	 50 
indication of marking 	 60 
E 	 binary relation on position 	 67 	 7.1.6 
< binary relation on positions 	 67, 68 	 7.1.7 
X [A] 	 formula with distinguished subformula 	 75 
Q generic quantifier 	 77 
Index of Expansion Systems and Expansion Rules 
To summarise some naming conventions for expansion systems: 
• If S is the name of a propositional expansion system, then ES, EinstS, and EbranchS refer to three 
different expansion systems for restricted quantification using S's propositional rules. 
• Names of expansion systems decorated with a list of numbers, for example ES(1345 ) refer to the 
expansion system for restricted quantification, in which the listed side conditions are demanded. 
Propositional Expansion Systems 
The following table lists propositional expansion systems used in this thesis, with the names of rules used 
in that system and the section of the thesis in which the system is introduced. 
Name 	 Rules 	 Section 
Tab 	 (a), ([3) 	 3.1.2 
Tab with equivalence 	 Tab + (1*, (0=) 	 3.1.4 
KE 	 (A), (B1), (B2), (PB) 	 3.1.3 
KE with equivalence 	 KE + (1E+L), (1E-L), (OE+L), (OE-L), etc. 	 3.1.5 
analytic KE 	 (A), (B1), (PB(32) or (A), (B2), (PB(1) 
	
3.3 (Theorem 3.3.8) 
Extensions of Propositional Systems for Restricted Quantification 
If S is a propositional expansion system, then it can be extended for restricted quantification in one of the 
following ways. 
Name Rules Relevant Side Conditions Section 
ES S + (7), (6) (4), (2), (3), (4), (s) 4.1 
EInstS S + (7-Inst), (6-Inst) (1), (3), (4), (5) 8.1 
EbranchS S + (7-branch), (6) (/), (3), (4), (6) 9.1 
The definitions of the side conditions (4) to (6) are indexed in the Index of Symbols and Notation. 
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Definition Number Definienda 
2.1.1 	 Atom, Clause Syntax 
2.1.2 	 Clause Semantics 
2.1.3 	 Restriction Theory E 
2.2.1 	 Syntax of a E-logic 
2.3.1 	 Model 
2.3.2 	 Semantics 
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5.2.3 	 alphabetical monotonicity 
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6.2.3.1 	 Reverse Range Restricted 
6.2.4.1 	 Markable argument position, obeys marking 
6.2.4.1 	 Marked Literal 
6.2.4.2 	 Obeys marking 
7.1.1 	 Tree for a set of positions 
7.1.2 	 P-complete branch, tree 
7.1.4 	 path 
7.1.5 	 matrix 
7.1.6 
7.1.7 
7.1.9 	 <-minimal, satisfies < 
7.2.2 	 satisfying (3) in a path, (3)-closed path 
7.3.1 	 Paths through a Matrix 
9.1.1 	 Side Condition (6) 
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Appendix 1 
The Use of Sequences as Prefixes for Modal Logics 
One feature of much work in modal logic theorem proving is the use of sequences as prefixes, as for 
example in the work of Fitting (1983), Wallen (1989), and Frisch and Scherl (1990, 1991). In this thesis, 
however, I used simple names for prefixes (prefixes to the forcing relation I I-, that is) as in the examples in 
Section 4.2. In this appendix I show that it is not difficult to derive proof systems using sequences as 
prefixes from the work presented in this thesis. 
This appendix provides a proof system very close to Fitting's prefixed tableaux (1983, Chapter 8). Also, 
it would be a very good starting point for the derivation of matrix-based characterisations of validity for 
modal logics which would be very similar to Wallen's (1989). (The matrix characterisations actually 
presented in Chapter 7 are further from Wallen's precisely because sequences are not used.) The 
arguments from Chapter 7 could be repeated for the proof system presented here very easily. The 
arguments presented here do not have the generality of Frisch and Scherl's (1990, 1991) or their 
completeness. Here I concentrate on modal logics, but the arguments seem amenable to generalisation 
without too much difficulty. 
Where the modal accessibility theory satisfies alphabetical monotonicity or non-vacuity, one can define a 
sequence based proof system as follows. As in the rest of this thesis, I consider only ground-based proof 
systems and I do not consider unification. 
Let us say that a sequence is any finite sequence of positive integers, including the empty sequence e. I 
will refer to a typical sequence asp and write p,2,1 to refer to the sequence p followed by 2 followed by 1. 
If p and q are sequences I will write pq for their concatenation. 
We build an accessibility relation R0 on the set of prefixes by demanding that for any sequence p, and for 
any integer i, that 
P R o 
Now, the conditions of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity translate into simple additional conditions 
on this relation as follows: 
Property 	 Additional Condition on R 0 
reflexive 
	
p R 0 p for any sequence p 
symmetry p, i R 0 p for any sequence p, integer i 
transitive 	 p R0 pq for any sequence p, non-empty sequence q 
The great advantage of sequence-based proof systems for modal logics is that reasoning within the modal 
theory is replaced with reasoning about the single, fixed, binary relation R0. This opens the way for the 
use of sequence unfication in automated theorem proving. (The condition of seriality is dealt with 
differently, as will be discussed below.) 
In Section 4.2, I briefly discussed the fact that one can easily derive modal logic expansion rules from the 
rules (y) and (6). They would be as follows (I introduce only the rules for positive q formulas and 
positive 0 formulas, the rules for negative formulas being obvious once these are given). 
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Appendix 1 
Modal Logic Expansion Rules using Names 
The side condition (i) now demands of an application of (10) that we can prove w w i and the side 
condition (2) now demands of an application of (10) that W1 is a new name on the branch. 
Although previously we have regarded names as being devoid of internal structure, we can equally well 
now look on the set of sequences as a set of names. Note that, as defined above, there are only countably 
many sequences. The next point is to observe that the rule 10 introduces "w w 1" . If names are 
sequences then we can always choose w1 to be w,i for some integer i. In that case we always have 
w R0 w 1. Doing this consistently would ensure that x, is always subsumed by R0. 
Having shown that is subsumed by R0 the next step is to show that we can replace the use 1K, in side 
condition (2) by R 0. Fortunately the work in this thesis makes this rather easy. 
The crucial point is to observe that, barring only the modal logic thoery containing only symmetry and 
transitivity, all modal logic theories satisfy alphabetical monotonicity or non-vacuity (as shown in 
Chapter 6). Where alphabetical monotonicity holds, we can replace the side condition (2) by (5), namely: 
"provided w w1 e LHM E(7)" 
where LHM E(T) is the least Herbrand model of all literals w x, w 1 introduced by the rule (10) 
anywhere in the tree . 
Except in the case of seriality, it is clear that R0 represents precisely the least Herbrand model in the 
appropriate theory of the complete set of atoms 
Rp,i 1p any sequence, i any integer I. 
For any given finite subset of this set of atoms, we can construct a tree which contains that subset, and 
moreover using a formula which is equivalent to any given formula! This is in fact easy. Say we have a 
formula 1X and we wish to include the atoms 
ER 3 , 2 R 2,1 , 1, 3 R1,3,4 I. 
Consider the following formula: 
c11-1Xv(Of)v(OfAl=10f)v(OfnEl0fADE0f) 
The recurrent use of Of means that it is equivalent to X in any of the modal logics under consideration 
here. 
We could start a tree for this formula with an initial four branches for the first four formulas. On the 
second branch (for 0 f) we could use the rule (10) to introduce r 3. On the third branch (for 0 f A El O f) 
we could introduce first e 2 and then 2 2,1. On the fourth branch (for Of A11104A1111110 f) we could 
introduce e gc 1 followed by 1 gc 1,3, and finally 1,3 Ic 1,3,4. This technique can be generalised to introduce 
an arbitrary finite set of atoms. 
Given the argument above, in an expansion tree for any formula X it is quite sound to assume the presence 
of any arbitary finite set of atoms. Because of this, and since all the modal theories under consideration 
are compact (as are all theories considered in this thesis) we can safely assume the presence of the entire 
set ( p x p,i I p any sequence, i any integer I. As mentioned above, Ro is the least Herbrand model of this 
set, so the condition (5) is equivalent to 
"provided that wRwiE RO."  
One point remains to be resolved. This is the distinction between serial logics such as D and non-serial 
logics such as K. Again, the work in this thesis provides a simple solution. Recall from Chapter 6 that 
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logics in which neither seriality or reflexivity hold satisfy alphabetical monotonicity but not non-vacuity. 
Then recall from Chapter 5 that in this case we must demand the condition (3), that only names 
(sequences, now) already appearing on the branch may be used in applications of (y) (or (1 0) here). For 
example suppose p 1 111 f appeared in a branch. Although of course for any i we have p Ro p, i, this fact 
cannot be used unless for some i the sequence p,i has been introduced on the branch by the rule (10). 
This is all that is needed to separate the non-serial case from the serial or reflexive case. 
In summary, the various arguments above show the soundness and completeness of the following proof 
system for all modal logics considered in this thesis, excepting the modal logic for which the accessibility 
relation is only symmetry and transitivity. In the statements below, the relation R 0 refers to the relation 
defined for the appropriate modal theory. 
Modal Logic Expansion Rules using Sequences 
(1q) 	 p11-11110  
q 11-10  
(10) 	 p 11-100  
 
where applications of (1q) must satisfy 
provided that p Roq; 
and applications of (10) must satisfy 
provided that i is an integer and p,i is a new sequence on the branch; 
and additionally, if the modal accessibility theory is neither serial nor reflexive, applications of (1q) must 
satisfy 
q is a sequence that has been introduced by some (10) expansion on the branch. 
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